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This dissertation argues that early modern playwrights used metadrama to 
construct the experience and concept of playgoing for their audiences.  By staging 
playgoing in front of playgoers, playwrights sought to teach their audiences how to attend 
a play and how to react to a performance. This type of instruction was possible, and 
perhaps necessary, because in early modern London attending a professionally produced 
play with thousands of other playgoers was a genuinely new cultural activity, so no 
established tradition of playgoing existed. Thus, playwrights throughout the era from 
John Lyly to Richard Brome attempted to invent playgoing through their performances. 
 The first chapter argues that this construction of playgoing was heavily 
influenced by the politics and economics of the London playhouses. Throughout the early 
modern era, London magistrates and puritan antitheatrical writers viewed performances 
as producing the immoral, unruly and often riotous actions of the audiences. And they 
used these reactions to performances as an excuse to close the playhouses and punish the 
playwrights. In order to keep the playhouses open and their livelihoods intact, 
playwrights had to keep their audiences from reacting to drama. Each subsequent chapter 
traces a method playwrights employed to limit audience reaction. The second chapter 
demonstrates that playwrights tried to limit the effect performances had on their 
audiences by dramatizing playgoers who were not affected by drama, thereby 
discouraging audiences from seeing themselves as the object of performance. The third 
chapter shows how playwrights often satirized playgoers who reacted to performances in 
order to stigmatize audience reaction. The final two chapters challenge the commonly 
held critical opinion that playwrights were working within a humanist interpretive 
tradition, which linked reading, imitation and praxis.  Instead, I suggest that playwrights 
attempted to keep audiences from actively interpreting their performances in order to 
limit audience reaction.  The study concludes by comparing Hamlet with The Duchess of 
Malfi and argues that Webster’s play (and not as commonly thought Hamlet) is a 
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Introduction: 
 New, Unruly Playgoers and Metadrama 
 
 
In 2008, I attended a production of Titus Andronicus that was billed as an 
authentic rendition of the play.  The idea was to put on a performance that recreated the 
experience of attending an early modern production of Shakespeare’s play. To 
accomplish this goal, the actors did not thoroughly rehearse their parts or memorize their 
lines, but rather read from scrolls that only contained their lines and the line directly 
before theirs. The audience was also asked to help contribute to the authenticity of the 
performance. Before the show began, we were asked by the director to actively 
participate in the performance by booing the villain, cheering the hero, verbally 
denouncing bad acting, and in general behaving like rowdy, unruly early modern 
playgoers.  
Surprisingly, our role as unruly playgoers was difficult to pull off and our attempt 
to play that part was perhaps the most uncomfortable aspect of the experience (which is 
saying a lot given we were watching Titus Andronicus).  It was a small production and 
most of the audience members knew each other, and the cast and director knew most of 
the audience. And yet, everybody seemed unwilling to interrupt the performance with 
catcalls, hisses, or cheers, and any attempt on the part of the audience to do what the 
director asked felt uncomfortable and forced. So for the most part, we sat silently and 
watched the production like polite, quiet twenty-first century playgoers.  
What this attempt at recreating the early modern playgoing experience brought 
home to me is that attending a play is not a natural activity; playgoing does not exist as a 
universal idea.  It has a history, and different cultures construct playgoing differently. The 
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twenty-first century audience of Titus Andronicus could not easily slip into the role of 
early modern playgoers because our notion of playgoing was vastly different from the 
early modern notion. We have been trained through some set of unacknowledged, and 
perhaps undiagnosed, processes to sit quietly in the dark and watch performers perform. 
Any activity that departs from that training felt rude, crass and unnatural. Early modern 
audiences, apparently, did not have this training, and so for them, sitting silently would 
have probably felt unnatural, perhaps even rude or maybe it simply wouldn’t have 
occurred to them. 
The present study grew out of that experience. It attempts to discover how early 
modern audiences were trained at playgoing. That is, how was the concept and activity of 
playgoing constructed in early modern London? Who constructed playgoing and why? 
What were the methods used in this construction?  Where did this construction take 
place? This is a more ambitious project than it might seem at first glance because 
playgoing as a concept is more complex than the binary opposition between silent and 
unruly playgoer that I discovered while trying to play the part of an early modern 
audience member.  I conceive playgoing rather broadly as encompassing not just the 
behavior of the audience, but the entire conceptual experience of attending a play. That 
is, playgoing includes not just the physical conditions of attending a play, but the idea of 
that activity – the theoretical and conceptual assumptions that enabled playgoing to 
function. Defined this way, playgoing includes the concept of performance as well as the 
role of audience within that performance. So in order to understand playgoing, a host of 
interconnected questions need to be addressed: How did performance affect the 
audience? How was the audience expected to respond to the performance? How were 
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they expected to interpret the performance? Were there interpretive processes audiences 
were expected to use? Were these interpretive strategies different from reading 
strategies? Did the presence of flesh and blood actors affect the representational and 
ontological category of performance? Were stage performances thought of as more “real” 
than other fictional representations?  
Some of these questions may seem to have obvious or natural answers from a 
twenty-first century perspective, in part because they have already been thoroughly 
explored and answered by generations of playwrights, actors, critics and drama theorists. 
However, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, there were no August Strindbergs or 
Bertolt Brechts or William Archers to answer these questions. It is not just that these 
thinkers came after early modern drama, but that early modern dramatic culture never 
really produced anybody like them. There is really no such thing as an early modern 
playwright/critic who left us critical or theoretical treatises on playgoing.  Shakespeare 
never wrote anything like Brecht’s “The Modern Theater is the Epic Theater” in order to 
explain to the public what he was trying to accomplish through his drama, what the role 
of the audience was in his project and how he imagined performance to work. Nor did 
Marlowe give interviews in which he explained his own theory of performance.  Ben 
Jonson’s “Discoveries” probably comes closest, but it is at best a partial and fairly un-
ambitious exploration of the kinds of questions I have in mind.1  This project can be 
thought of, in part, as an attempt to imagine what a theoretical treatment of playgoing 
would have looked like if Shakespeare, Marlowe, Middleton et al. had collaborated and 
produced one.  
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This is not to say that the culture did not try to come to grips with playgoing. 
Indeed, this study will argue that metadrama represents the dramatic space where 
playwrights struggled to understand playgoing and consequently metadrama will be the 
dominant object of this study. I will look to metadrama for evidence of how early modern 
playwrights thought about playgoing and will argue that it provided the means through 
which playwrights constructed playgoing. Metadrama, like playgoing, can be broadly 
conceived. It includes any play or scene that takes as its subject playgoing and which 
often attempts to dramatize the basic conditions of the playhouse.  Thus, metadrama 
includes inset plays (or plays within plays) and explicit discussions about playgoing (as 
in Hamlet’s advise to his players).  I will also be suggesting that overtly theatrical events 
(as in coronations and weddings) and quasi-dramatic performances (such as dumb shows, 
puppet shows and performed songs) also constitute metadrama. These latter two 
categories can be considered metadramatic because they recreate the basic conditions of 
the theater – they involve a performance and an audience. Thus, they provide the 
playwright with an opportunity to reflect on playgoing as well as construct the concept 
and activity of playgoing for his or her audience.   
This construction was possible, and perhaps necessary, because playgoing in early 
modern London was a genuinely new cultural activity, so no established tradition of 
playgoing existed. Attending a play performed by professional players in a permanent 
theater was simply not an activity that was available to the average London citizen before 
the 1570’s, and so no one, not the playwrights, theater owners, actors nor the audiences, 
seemed to quite know what to make of playgoing. There were of course plays produced 
before the 1570’s, but it has long been recognized that playgoing in that context was 
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radically different in kind from early modern playgoing. Before the first permanent, 
commercial and lasting theater was built in 1576, the only way to view a play in sixteenth 
century England was either to attend an “interlude” (short performances preformed at 
court, private residences and universities) or catch a mystery cycle performance during 
the Corpus Christi festival.2  Neither of these types of performances drew the kind of 
large heterogeneous crowds that attended the public performances throughout the era of 
early modern drama.  The private interludes could only be attended by an elite and 
homogeneous few. And while the mystery cycles could be viewed by anyone, they were 
only produced during special occasions, and because they were staged on moving wagons 
that moved in a procession throughout the city, these performances probably only drew 
around 100 people at a time.3  These types of audiences were a far cry from the large, 
heterogeneous playhouse audiences of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. 
By the late 1570’s, any London citizen with a penny to spend on entertainment could 
watch a play on almost any given day and be surrounded by as many as three thousand 
other playgoers.4 This crowd would have been highly diverse, made up of women, men, 
the aristocracy and merchants. These basic conditions of playgoing are, more or less, 
familiar to twenty-first century playgoers; however, for the early modern London citizen, 
this form of playgoing was a genuinely new activity. In fact, from a broad historical view, 
by 1642 when the playhouses closed, playgoing was still a relatively new activity.  
Beyond providing a reason for why playwrights constructed the experience of 
playgoing (because they were establishing a new cultural tradition), the newness of 
drama also helps explain why metadrama was such a popular early modern stage and 
literary device; playwrights continued to return to the topic of playgoing because they did 
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not fully understand it. They wrote about playgoing within their plays to come to grips 
with what playgoing meant – to construct it. To take an example from our own era, all of 
the books, articles, conferences, and documentaries produced in recent decades on the 
significance and impact of the internet do not suggest that we fully understand its 
significance or impact. Rather, the mass of discourse about the internet suggests our 
struggle (and perhaps inability) to understand this nascent cultural phenomenon. 
Likewise, metadrama and its ubiquity suggests early modern culture’s struggle to 
understand the nascent cultural phenomenon of playgoing.  
The newness of early modern drama also means that the art form was almost 
necessarily experimental. As readers of the drama have long noted, early modern 
playwrights experimented with new poetic forms (blank verse), genres (tragic-comedy) 
and narrative rules (the abandonment of classical unities). And I will be suggesting that 
playwrights were also experimenting with new ideas about audience and performance. I 
will argue that playwrights asserted new ideas about playgoing that were different, and 
sometimes radically different, from the traditional or classical notions of the efficacy, 
representational nature and interpretive possibilities of drama. In fact, some of these ideas 
are different from anything that came after early modern drama because the playwrights 
were responding to an almost unique social, political and economic situation. This study 
will attempt to highlight the nascent and experimental nature of early modern drama as it 
appears within metadrama. 
Apart from providing a space where playwrights could explore the concept of 
playgoing, metadrama also represents an attempt to construct playgoing for the playhouse 
audiences.  By staging playgoing in front of audiences, playwrights were attempting to 
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influence the audience’s understanding of playgoing. For instance, in chapter two, I will 
suggest that some metadramatic plays tried to convince the audience of their role in the 
playhouse. And in chapter three, I will argue that some metadramatic plays attempted to 
show the audience how to behave – what kinds of actions were acceptable and what kinds 
were not. Thus, metadrama was intended to have a real effect on the notion of playgoing. 
In fact, sometimes metadrama was intended to have a material effect on playgoing; by 
trying to influence audience behavior, metadrama was attempting to control their physical 
activity. Metadrama then can be understood as producing a theory of playgoing and 
praxis – a true attempt at constructing the experience of playgoing for playgoers.   
After examining and analyzing a number of plays, I’ve come to the general, and 
perhaps contentious, conclusion that within this attempt at constructing playgoing, 
playwrights sought to construct a non-reactive playgoer.  Because the concept of the non-
reactive playgoer is defined negatively (the non-reactive playgoer is defined by what the 
playwrights did not want) and because the concept is never fully articulated within the 
drama but culled and pieced together from dozens of plays and playwrights, it is 
necessarily vague.  But in general, the non-reactive playgoer can be thought of as the 
playwrights’ attempt to construct a playgoing experience that limited the range of 
audience reactions within the playhouse. It seems the playwrights’ ideal audience 
member was one who sat quietly, did not interrupt the performance and, most 
importantly, did not use the performance as the basis for action.  They seemed to want a 
more pensive or stoic audience than the unruly ones that seemed to have populated the 
early modern playhouses. Put another way, the non-reactive playgoer is the polar 
opposite of the ideal Brechtian playgoer; Brecht wanted to produce a visceral and 
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emotional reaction in his audience that would lead to political action. Conversely, early 
modern playwrights wanted to produce a playgoer that did not respond to performance 
with action – political or otherwise.  
By arguing that playwrights wanted to produce a non-reactive audience, I am 
contradicting probably hundreds of drama and performance critics who assume that 
performance always works in conjunction with audience response.5 This assumption, as it 
pertains to early modern drama, often seems rest on the belief that playwrights of the 
period were working within a classical and/or humanist rhetorical tradition.  Since most 
playwrights were taught within the humanist tradition – a tradition which valued rhetoric 
and Aristotelian dramatic and poetic theory – we tend to assume that they implemented 
humanist ideas about language, poetry and rhetoric within their drama.6  In other words, 
we tend to think of drama rhetorically, as affecting the audience and producing an action 
(praxis) within the audience.  Indeed, the humanist tradition (discussed most thoroughly 
in Chapters two and four) valued audiences who used literature as the basis for action. 
But I will argue that numerous playwrights throughout the period were experimenting 
with a different approach to drama and a different theory of performance, an approach 
and theory that tried to limit (and not encourage or produce) audience reaction.  
There are historical, political and economic reasons why playwrights would want 
to create a non-reactive audience. These reasons will be fully discussed in the first 
chapter, but in short, playwrights tried to create a non-reactive audience because a highly 
reactive, unruly early modern audience actually posed a threat to the playwright, and so 
playwrights seemed to have constructed the idea of a non-reactive playgoer in opposition 
to the actual unruly ones they confronted. For instance, periodically playgoers’ unruly 
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activity would translate into a riot, and the playwrights and the theaters were then 
punished for the activity of their audiences. A fairly famous example of a playhouse riot 
occurred during the 1597 production of The Isle of Dogs. As a result of the riot, warrants 
were issued for the authors of the play, Ben Jonson and Thomas Nashe, and the theaters 
were ordered to be destroyed. The playhouses avoided this fate, but the message was 
clear: if the audience misbehaved, the playwrights and the theaters would pay the price. 
The playwrights seemed to have responded to this threat by staging metadrama that 
constructed the idea of a non-reactive playgoer in an attempt to change the actual 
experience of playgoing. They attempted to turn the unruly playgoer into a non-reactive 
one.  
This is not to say that the playwrights’ attempts to create the non-reactive 
playgoer worked. By all accounts, audiences remained active, reactive and unruly 
throughout the early modern era.  The inability to produce a truly non-reactive playgoer 
makes the concept of this type of playgoer all the more significant. In fact, because the 
non-reactive playgoer never really existed, it should not be thought of as the result of 
playwrights’ construction of playgoing; it is better thought of as the cause of their 
construction. For complex reasons that will be discussed more thoroughly in the first 
chapter, the attempt at creating a non-reactive playgoer allowed and sometimes forced 
playwrights to confront most, if not all, of the issues related to playgoing discussed 
above. That is, once the non-reactive playgoer was conceived, a whole network of 
theoretical ideas concerning playgoing had to be created in order to account for that type 
of playgoer.  
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For instance, in order to avoid playgoers’ reactions, playwrights attempted to limit 
the effect their performances had on their audiences. So in order to construct the non-
reactive playgoer, playwrights had to conceptualize and dramatize the efficacy of their 
performances. In chapters two and three, I describe what I see as the complex network of 
theoretical ideas concerning performance, staging techniques and audience that needed to 
be created in order to ensure that the audience was not affected by the performance.  
Similarly, in order to keep the audience from reacting to their plays, playwrights had to 
keep the audience from actively interpreting performances. Because humanist reading 
strategies often encouraged the audience to actively read and then act on the basis of their 
interpretation, playwrights sought to interrupt this reading process in order to interrupt 
audience reaction. In chapters four and five, I trace several techniques that the 
playwrights implemented to limit the interpretive agency of the audience. This study then 
is not simply about the playwrights’ attempt to control the unruly audience; it is about the 















The Social Formation of Playgoing and Its Absent Cause 
“And none knows the hidden causes of those strange effects” – George Chapman, All Fools7 
 
 
The majority of this study is made up of an analysis of individual metadramatic 
scenes. The goal of this analysis is to show how playwrights contributed to the 
construction of playgoing. These plays – that is, the evidence for the construction of 
playgoing – are spread across the entire early modern era from the opening of the first 
theaters in the mid-1580’s to the closing of the theaters in 1642. Some of these 
playwrights knew each other personally or at least knew each other’s work, but some 
probably did not, so some playwrights were probably producing ideas about playgoing 
without the direct influence of other earlier playwrights. Thus, as I suggested in the 
introduction, the evidence for the construction of playgoing is scattered, fragmented and 
seemingly unconnected; it is found in dozens of plays over the course of sixty odd years 
with no discernable pattern or narrative of development. One could assume because of 
the fragmented nature of the construction of playgoing that the result of this construction 
would also be fragmented: it would be incoherent, uneven and sometimes contradictory. 
However, I will be arguing the opposite: all these different playwrights and plays 
produced a fairly coherent construction of playgoing. There are outliers, plays that seem 
to produce ideas about playgoing that are atypical or counter to the trend that this study 
traces. But by and large, the entire era constructed playgoing in a remarkably similar 
way.  
This chapter is dedicated to explaining how this could be the case. In order to do 
so, I will suggest that the construction of playgoing occurred within a set of historical and 
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economic conditions that made it imperative for playwrights to produce a concept of 
playgoing. The reaction to this imperative is why playwrights produced a metadramatic 
construction of playgoing and, incidentally, is why my analysis of metadrama differs 
from previous analyses and theories of it. Once this is established it is necessary to 
describe a historical model that can adequately explain how the historical conditions 
could produce a unified and relatively coherent construction of playgoing. The particular 
theory of history that I will be employing was developed by Louis Althusser and his 
student Alan Badiou and adapted to literary critical uses by Fredric Jameson. These 
theorists’ ideas about history can help grasp the fragmented yet coherent construction of 
playgoing because they are dedicated to respecting, in Althusser’s terms, the semi-
autonomous nature of the different aspects of society, while simultaneously paying 
attention to how they work as a whole or structure. Their ideas then can help describe 
what I will be calling, following Althusser, the social formation of playgoing – the 
structure of early modern playhouse culture that produced a coherent construction of 
playgoing.  
 
I: The Unruly Playgoer: Riots, Immorality and Punishment in the Playhouses  
 
 
 In the introduction, I suggested that early modern playwrights created the concept 
of the non-reactive playgoer in reaction to the unruly playgoer that constituted early 
modern audiences. And much of this study works under the theory that playwrights were 
concerned and maybe even obsessively concerned with the unruly actions of their 
audiences. However, it must first be established why early modern playwrights were so 
concerned with audiences. After all, there is nothing unique or historically specific about 
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performers being concerned with their audiences; performers in any medium or time 
period are always going to be interested in their audiences, and these audiences often 
behave in an unruly manner. However, the historical context of early modern drama 
seemed to have made early modern playwrights particularly anxious about their 
audiences, which, as we will see, ultimately led them to construct the concept of the non-
reactive playgoer.  
 Scholars of the theater have long noted the unruliness of London playgoers. Ann 
Jennalie Cook, Andrew Gurr and S.P. Cerasano have all pointed out the disruptive 
activities that audience members were accused of engaging in.8 For instance, playgoers 
would routinely talk (to one another and to the performers), loudly crack nuts, obtrusively 
open beer bottles, and gamble during a performance. Furthermore, it wasn’t unusual for 
pickpockets and prostitutes to frequent the playhouses; the combination of crowds and 
liquor no doubt provided a lucrative business opportunity for both professions. And 
Steven Mullaney has argued that the very location of most of playhouses suggests a kind 
of lawlessness. Most playhouses were located in the liberties, the suburbs of London; 
Mullaney describes these “outskirts of the premodern city” as places “of complex and 
contradictory sort of freedom, ambivalent zones of transition between one realm of 
authority and another” and as “a borderland whose legal parameters and privileges were 
open-ended and equivocally defined.”9 The location of the theaters then permitted, if not 
encouraged, the kind of unruly activity of the early modern playgoer.  
 It is difficult to know exactly what the playwrights thought about their audience’s 
activity. However, it seems reasonable to assume that playwrights would be 
understandably annoyed at playgoers who interrupted their plays and distracted their 
14 
players. In fact, some of the evidence we have for audience behavior comes from 
playwrights complaining about playgoers.10 And Cersano suggests “perhaps some of the 
well-known on-stage audiences represent the players’ impressions of their spectators; and 
perhaps when these representations are unlikable, this was the players’ (and dramatists’) 
way of getting back at the audience.”11 For instance, the citizen couple in Francis 
Beaumont’s The Knight of the Burning Pestle is an unflattering representation of 
playgoers who interrupt performances.  On a superficial level, the playwrights’ 
preoccupation with audience behavior can be understood as a concern that playgoers (like 
the citizen couple) would disrupt their performances.     
Disruptive behavior may have been annoying, but the audience’s unruliness 
produced a much more dangerous and significant behavior: playgoers would periodically 
riot in the theaters. These riotous playgoers posed a serious threat to playwrights because 
playwrights were often held legally and politically responsible for the riots that occurred 
within their playhouses.  For instance, in 1597 a warrant was issued for Ben Jonson and 
Thomas Nashe after their play The Isle of Dogs incited a small scale riot at the Swan.  
The Privy Council describes the disturbance as “very great disorders committed in the 
common playhouses both by lewd matters that are handled on the stage and by resort and 
confluence of bad people.”12 Here the council is making a distinction between the actions 
of the “bad people,” and the “lewd matters that are handled on the stage,” but the 
implication of the Privy Council’s ruling is that if these “bad people” create a 
disturbance, it is playwrights’ and playhouses’ fault because they staged “lewd matters.” 
This connection between the actions on stage and the actions in the audience created the 
premise that allowed the Privy Council to punish the theaters for the actions of their 
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audiences.  In fact, the state didn’t just attempt to punish the playwrights; in reaction to 
the riot, the Privy Council also ordered that all theatrical productions be halted and that 
all the playhouses be torn down. For reasons that are unclear, the latter order was, 
thankfully, never carried out, but the Privy Council’s reaction (or overreaction) to the 
playhouse riot illustrates the danger that riotous playgoers posed to the playwrights and 
playing companies: if their audience’s rioted, their profession, livelihood and, one might 
even say, their way of life could come to an end.  
This reaction seems to have been extreme in degree but was not unique in kind. 
Five years earlier, the Privy Council had closed the theaters after a riot near the Rose. 
This riot actually had very little to do with playgoing.  It began on the other side of the 
Thames after a feltmonger was arrested. The city’s feltmongers and other sympathetic 
merchants felt the arrest unwarranted and started a riot, which eventually migrated to the 
Rose.  Even though the riot really had nothing to do with playhouses, all the playhouses 
were closed from Midsummer Day to Michaelmas (June 21, 1592- September 29, 
1592).13  
Beyond providing more evidence of the unruly and riotous activity of playgoers, 
this anecdote suggests that the London citizens seem to have associated playgoing with 
riotous activity.  The rioters gravitated towards the theater presumably because they 
believed playhouses were a place where unruly activity occurred and/or they could use it 
as an excuse to assemble and protest.14  An incident in 1618 also suggests this 
connection: allegedly, a group of sailors were planning to riot outside the Globe, though 
the riot was stopped before it began.15 It seems early modern theaters, like today’s town 
squares or capital buildings, were a good place to gather if you wished to protest. This of 
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course made London magistrates nervous. They too made connection between riots (or 
even just assemblies) and the theaters, and so punished the theaters probably because they 
already suspected them of fostering unruliness and this just confirmed their suspicions 
and/or these incidents gave them an excuse to close the playhouses.   
 Influencing the perception that riots and the theaters were connected was the long 
shadow cast by the 1549 riot led by Robert Kett during the reign of Edward VI, which 
was supposedly started during a play. Fifty-four years later, the anti-theatrical writer 
Henry Crosse uses the Kett rebellion as evidence to argue that playgoing was a dangerous 
activity.  
For what more fitter occasion to summon all the discontented people together, 
then Playes? to attempt some execrable action, commotions, mutinies, rebellions, 
as it hapned at Wyndham in Norff. in the time of Ed. the 6. where at a Stage Play 
… the horrible rebellion of Ket and his complices, by a watch-word given, brake 
out, to the trouble of the whole kingdome.16 
 
In early modern England, there seems to have been a long tradition of associating 
playgoing with riotous activity. This association seems to have produced the opinion that 
playhouses always had the potential to produce a riot even if a riot wasn’t actually 
produced. According to Crosse, plays simply attract “discontented people,” so a 
playhouse is a natural place for a riot to begin. Cook notes that “The lord mayor and 
aldermen routinely shut down playhouses whenever disorder threatened, as in the 
uprising of 1595.”17 Indeed, as the feltmongers’ riot at The Rose demonstrates, 
playhouses and playing companies were punished even when the theaters had nothing to 
do with the riot.  
 Scholars have tended to downplay the significance of these riots or disturbances.  
Cook remarks that despite the association of playgoing and public disorder, “in actuality, 
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only two major disturbances took place inside the theaters;” she points to a Shove 
Tuesday riot in 1617 and another “brawl” at the Fortune in 1626; she also cites “lesser 
incidents … in 1611 and in 1614 and at the Red Bull in 1610, 1622 and 1638.”18 The 
careful reader will note that Cook does not mention the 1592 incident at the Rose or the 
1597 riot at the Swan discussed above. So there were at least four major disturbances in 
or around the theaters in addition to the lesser incidents she cites, and there may have 
been more that have not been documented or have not yet been uncovered by scholars.19  
Still, Cook maintains, “In view of the volatile nature of any crowd, it is amazing that so 
few incidents are recorded for sizable gatherings, often taking place virtually ever day, 
during a period that spans seven decades.”20  Similarly, Gurr remarks, “But considering 
the alarm so regularly voiced by the civil authorities, particularly in the 1580s and 1590s, 
the number of affrays that actually engaged audiences inside the playhouse was almost 
nil.”21 Downplaying these incidents seems warranted if we are viewing them within the 
context of the overblown rhetoric of the antitheatrical writers. That is, these scholars are 
attempting to correct the impression of an always dangerous, riotous early modern 
audience that was created by the anti-theatrical tracts. As Cook notes, “the evidence 
shows plenty of disruptive behavior, but audiences scarcely merited their detractors’ 
characterization.”22  
However, if we read this evidence of disruptive behavior in conjunction with the 
anti-theatrical writers’ portrayal of audiences, then, I believe, the importance of audience 
behavior almost can’t be overstated, because even if the audiences weren’t as bad as the 
playhouses’ enemies would have us believe, the perception that playgoers had the 
potential to riot and that their behavior was the fault of the playwright’s plays meant that 
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playwrights and playing companies were held responsible for the actions (imagined or 
otherwise) of their audiences. Thus, the playwrights had a clear incentive to control their 
unruly audiences.  
Furthermore, the state’s fear of riots in the early modern era was acute. Without a 
police force, the large London crowds (large than anything previous generations had 
encountered) posed a serious threat to the state.23 As Andy Wood, David Underdown, 
Tim Harris and more recently John Walter have shown, riots, uprising, and popular 
protests were quite common throughout the period and were taken very seriously by 
government officials. So seriously that even the representation of uprisings (or any other 
treasonous activity that could lead to insurrection) was more or less forbidden.24 For 
instance, the state censor seemed to have banned the staging of riots.  Edmund Tilney’s 
suppression of the riot scene in the play The Book of Sir Thomas More, discussed in more 
detail below, is a famous example of such censorship.25 Given the state’s (almost 
paranoid) worry about riots, even a few playhouse riots would have posed a threat to the 
playhouses. And perhaps more importantly, the perception that a riot could always break 
out in the theaters or, worse, that the playhouse produced riots, meant that the playing 
companies were constantly threatened with closer because of the actions or potential 
actions of their unruly audiences.  
And even when playwrights were not held legally responsible for the riotous 
actions of their audiences, they were almost always held politically responsible for the 
immoral actions of playgoers.  As Jean Howard and others have shown, the playhouse 
was a politically contested public space – there were powerful groups that wanted the 
playhouses closed (the Puritans and London magistrates) and others that wanted them 
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open (the playgoing public and aristocratic patrons).26  Writers who expressed the 
antitheatrical position, such as Anthony Munday, Steven Gosson and John Northbrooke, 
often linked the audience’s behavior to the content of playhouse performances just as the 
Privy Council did during The Isle of Dogs incident. For instance, Munday describes the 
players’ actions as “intermixed with knauerie, drunken  merie-ments, craftie coosenings, 
undecent juglings, clownish conceites, and such other cursed mirth, as is both odious in 
the sight of God, & offensive to honest eares.”27 He then follows up with an attack on the 
actions of the audience: “Whosoever shall visit the chappel of Satan, I mean the Theater, 
shal finde there no want of young ruffins, nor lacke of harlots.”28 Like the Privy Council 
ruling concerning the Isle of Dogs riot, Munday is doing more than saying that immoral, 
unruly individuals attend the theater; he is suggesting that the performance in some way 
causes the audience’s behavior. Robert Ormsby, drawing on the research of Laura Levine 
and Jonas Barish, describes this anti-theatrical argument as “pathological.” He argues that 
“Antitheatrical rhetoric of the era is ‘pathological’ not simply to the degree that it 
portrays the actor’s body infected by unclean performance, but also in its depictions of 
audiences diseased by the spectacles they witness.”29 For instance, John Northbrooke 
says of plays, “what other thing doe they teache than wanton pleasure, and stirring up of 
fleshly lustes, unlawfull appetites and desires? with their bawdie and filthie sayings and 
counterfert doings.”30 Here the “stirring up of fleshly lustes” explicitly refers to a belief 
that viewing a performance can affect and infect the actions of the audience. Likewise, 
Munday makes the claim, “at theaters none of these [the mind, ears and eyes] but sinneth, 
for both the mind there with lust; and the eyes with showes, and the ears with hearing be 
polluted.”31  Stephen Gosson is also clearly drawing on and contributing to this 
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pathological model when he argues, “that which entereth into us by the eyes and eares, 
muste bee digested by the spirite, which is chiefly reserved to honor God.”32 This model 
is so common that Cynthia Marshall, echoing Ormsby, claims, “Virtually all the 
antitheatircalists refer to the effects of the stage as ‘infectious.’”33   
It should be noted here that although the playhouses were sometimes closed 
because of riots and public disturbance, the major reason that government officials shut 
down the theaters was because of plague, but the threat that the plague posed to the 
playhouse was perhaps not unconnected to audience behavior. The antitheatrical writers’ 
use of a viral metaphor to describe the playhouse can be understood as linked to the threat 
plague posed to the playhouses. They understood that the public and the state thought that 
plague was spread in the playhouses and so used the metaphor of infection to link the 
moral and physical affects of playgoing. However, the opposite is perhaps also true. That 
is, antithetical writers’ use of the viral metaphor influenced the belief that plague was 
spread in the theaters. Given early moderns’ relatively weak understanding of how 
infections were spread, it is not unreasonable to assume that the antitheatrical writers 
were able to partially convince the public and government that stage performances 
spread, not just moral, but physical disease. Or put another way, the difference between 
the physical and the moral effect of performance was collapsed in the public’s mind as a 
result of antitheatrical arguments. After all, since the middle ages, plague was often 
understood as a scourge sent by God to punish the wicked, so plague was already 
understood to function according to moral laws. Thus, closing the playhouse because of 
plague was not just a neutral and rational sanitation act done on the behalf of public 
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health; it was also a political act motivated by the immoral activities of the playhouse 
audiences.  
But even without this tentative link between plague and playgoing, from the 
playwrights’ perspective, the audience’s unruly behavior was almost certainly a political 
liability. When the audience behaved poorly, it reflected poorly on the theater. This poor 
reflection did more than simply injure the theater’s reputation; it could result in the 
closing of the theaters. This threat to the theaters seemed to have continued throughout 
the early modern era as the playgoing publics’ behavior continued to be unruly. And 
although theater historians debate the major causes of the closing of the theaters, most 
scholars agree that antitheatrical sentiment and antitheatrical writers’ efforts to link the 
theater to audience behavior at least contributed to the closing of the theaters in 1642.34 In 
the final analysis, antitheatrical writers’ attacks on the theater contributed to the end of 
early modern playgoing. Thus, most if not all early modern playwrights would have had 
to confront the danger that unruly audiences posed to the theater.   
 




Playwrights seemed to have responded to this threat to their livelihood not only 
by writing their own pamphlets defending the theater, but by writing scenes of 
metadrama that commented upon the activities of their audience.  In fact, many 
metadramatic scenes can be read as a direct challenge to the “pathological” depiction of 
playgoing put forth by antitheatrical writers, which were themselves based on the unruly 
activities of the early modern audience. Thus, metadrama represented an important site in 
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the struggle to keep the theaters open. It was a place where the playwrights could counter 
the political challenges that the unruly playgoer posed to the theaters. 
I am not the first to make the argument that playwrights used metadrama to 
counter the claims of antitheatrical writers. Tanya Pollard for one makes a similar 
pronouncement in her introduction to a collection of antitheatrical documents. She 
argues, “Beyond playwrights’ involvement in penning defenses, complaints, or general 
portraits of the theater, however, is the larger more interesting question of how the drama 
of the time responds, either directly or indirectly, to these debates.”35  Pollard goes on to 
point out that inset plays (or plays within plays) and explicit statements within plays that 
reflect on the nature of performance tend to challenge anti-theatrical depictions of the 
role of audience and the morality or utility of drama. However, Pollard is merely 
suggesting the uses the documents in her collection can be put to, rather than actually 
engaging in that type of analysis.  The fullest treatment of playwrights’ response to anti-
theatrical discourse is still Laura Levine’s Men in Women’s Clothing: Anti-theatricality 
and Effeminization.  Levine argues that playwrights internalized the antitheatrical 
position within their plays in order to render it absurd through a process she calls “anti-
antitheatricality.”36  
However, my own position and argument are somewhat different and perhaps go 
further than either Pollard or Levine. I will argue that playwrights were not only using 
metadrama to enter into the discourse of antitheatricality in order to debate the 
antitheatrical writers and counter their arguments; they were attempting to construct the 
experience of playgoing in order to influence the actual behavior of their audiences. In 
other words, metadrama didn’t just discuss playgoing, it constructed it. And by 
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constructing a non-reactive playgoer, the playwrights could negate the antitheatrical 
position since it, in part, rested on the unruliness of the audience.  In other words, 
metadrama was not only debating with the antitheatrical writers in order to change the 
publics minds, metadrama was attempting to change the behavior of their audience to put 
the public’s minds at ease.  
The Knight of the Burning Pestle, again, provides us with a clear example of 
playwrights using metadrama to comment on and construct audience behavior.  It utilizes 
a play within a play structure and depicts the audience of the inset play as behaving 
poorly. The citizen and his wife routinely interrupt the performance by complaining 
about its content and often suggest changes to the play’s script.  As I will show more 
thoroughly in the third chapter, this activity is satirized within the play to discourage the 
practice within the playhouse.  The play is constructing playgoing through metadrama by 
discouraging the type of unruly behavior that the playwrights want to exclude from 
playgoing. Of course, not all examples are this straightforward, but this example should 
demonstrate the process through which audience is constructed within metadrama. 
My analysis of metadrama, while differing in degree from Pollard’s and Levine’s, 
is a fundamental departure from the way that critics have traditionally analyzed and 
interpreted metadrama.  Apart from Pollard’s and Levine’s useful insight regarding 
metadrama, critics have generally analyzed metadrama in three somewhat separate but 
also interconnected ways: they have viewed metadrama 1) as a self-reflective in-joke 
between audience and actor 2) as a metaphor for larger or more universal ideas or 3) as 
evidence of playwrights’ challenge to essentialist thought. The first two critical uses of 
metadrama identify a type of self-reflexivity that is obviously present in early modern 
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drama, but is only tangentially related to this project.  However, the third critical use, 
generally associated with new historicism, is directly relevant to this discussion, and 
while probably the most influential, does not seem to describe accurately metadrama or 
explain its purpose. Furthermore, I will argue that my own take on metadrama offers a 
corrective to the new historicist position. Before addressing the anti-essentialist 
argument, it is perhaps useful to briefly describe the first two treatments of metadrama 
because they trace effects of metadrama that will be tangentially related to this study. 
Gurr provides perhaps the best example of the first type of analysis of metadrama. 
He argues that metadrama provides an in-joke between audience and players which then 
undermines the illusion of the drama. Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra is a clear 
example of this type of joke; Shakespeare has Cleopatra, who of course is played by a 
young boy, declare that some day, “I shall see / Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my 
greatness / I’th’ posture of a whore.”37 On a basic level, Cleopatra’s speech is a 
metadramatic wink at the audience.  Gurr argues that this type of joke was common 
throughout early modern drama and particularly popular with Shakespeare and Jonson. 
Indeed, Gurr points out that these jokes were not just made explicitly through speech, but 
were inherent to the practice of early modern playing. For instance Gurr notes: 
Shakespeare clearly expected his audiences at the Globe in 1600 for Hamlet to 
know that the same player who played Polonius, probably John Heminges, 
playing Hamlet, had played Brutus. For Shakespeare, Brutus killing Caesar in 
Julius Caesar prophesied the killing by the same player of his fellow in the new 
play. It made a neat theatrical in-joke for the regular playgoers.38 
 
In short, metadrama, in so far as it is self-reflective, could destroy the illusion of the 
performance, which as Gurr points out was never that illusory to begin with, and at the 
same time get a laugh from the audience.39  Metadrama’s self-reflexivity and the non-
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illusionistic aspects of early modern drama will play a role in this study (especially in 
chapter three), but I will be less interested in the aesthetic or comic aspects of metadrama, 
which are present within these self-reflective moments, than I am in the extended 
metadramatic meditations on playing and playgoing, which Pollard describes, and what 
effects these meditations had on the construction of playgoing.40  
 The second major way that critics have analyzed and interpreted metadrama is by 
locating the ways in which playwrights use the stage as a metaphor for the larger world. 
Again, Shakespeare provides a representative example of this type of use of metadrama. 
Jaques’ famous “All the world’s a stage” speech in As You Like It clearly uses the stage 
as a metaphor for human development.  Robert Crossmen gives the fullest and latest 
exploration of this trope. He argues that “by mentioning, discussing, and above all 
staging drama upon his stage, Shakespeare invites his audience to think of their own lives 
in theatrical terms.”41 Of course, Shakespeare did not invent this trope, nor is it unique to 
early modern drama. Crossmen points out that “the world-stage comparison was old 
when Epictetus used it” in the second century.42 
 Other critics have read the world-stage metaphor as more than just a conventional 
trope. They see this type of metadrama as producing what Sidney Homan has called the 
“Aesthetic Metaphor.” In this analysis, critics interpret the metaphor of the stage to cut 
both ways: the stage is a metaphor for the world and the world is a metaphor for the 
stage. This approach to metadrama is closest to my own; however, where critics such as 
Homan, James L. Calderwood, Robert Egan, Judd D. Hubert and Lionel Abel have 
argued that metadrama was reflecting on the aesthetic and formal aspects of dramatic 
poetry, I will focus on how metadrama reflects on performance’s own theoretical 
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assumptions and rhetorical purposes.43 Furthermore, all of these critics focus almost 
exclusively on Shakespeare and explore how he used metadrama to depict his own ideas 
about aesthetics and the challenges of creating art. This study is interested in the broader 
construction of playgoing, not just Shakespeare’s, and it is focused not on how the 
playwright thought about his or her own struggles with the medium, but on how the 
playwrights sought to construct that medium for the audience. That is, this study moves 
away from the individual construction of aesthetic ideas, and towards the collective 
construction of the activity of playgoing. 
The third type of analysis of metadrama is perhaps the most influential and my 
own analysis of metadrama offers a partial replacement or corrective of it. Consequently, 
I will spend the most space on this critical approach to metadrama. I refer to this type of 
analysis as the new historicist anti-essentialist argument because it is generally argued by 
new historicists (and so is often overtly political) and because it argues that early modern 
drama (and often metadrama) puts forth a view of the individual that, in Jonathan 
Dollimore’s words, “challenges the idea that ‘man’ possesses some given, unalterable 
essence which is what makes ‘him’ human, which is the source and essential determinant 
of ‘his’ culture and its priority over conditions of existence.”44 According to this view of 
metadrama, self-reflective performances are able to challenge essentialism by revealing 
individuals to be nothing but performance; by performing the individual and showing that 
individual to be engaging in a performance, metadrama demonstrates to the audience that 
individuals are nothing but performance. Or to phrase it in its most radical iteration, 
individuals are performance all the way down.  More broadly this use of metadrama is 
said to be used by early moderns to demythologize power.  Political power is nothing but 
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a performance of power, and so is not an essential part of society. It is contingent rather 
than necessary.  
The issue gets decidedly more complicated when concepts such as gender and 
sexual orientation are included within a discussion of anti-essentialism because of the 
period’s complex relationships with both these issues. But because the new historicist 
anti-essentialist position is put forth most forcefully within a discussion of power and the 
individual, and because this present study is largely disengaged from a discussion of 
gender and sexuality, the following discussion will be restricted to anti-essentialism as it 
is related to power and the individual.  
Greenblatt’s argument in his influential essay “Invisible Bullets” is perhaps the 
most well known expression of this anti-essentialist position.45 Here, Greenblatt is not 
overly concerned with metadrama; however, he does argue that the nature of drama itself 
reveals the anti-essentialist nature of political authority and so in his famous formulation 
both subverts and contains that form of power by simultaneously demystifying it and 
producing it.  By calling attention to its own theatricality through metadrama, drama is 
able to bring this subversion and containment to the surface of the audience’s 
consciousness. Specifically, Greenblatt argues that Queen Elizabeth’s power was 
predicated on “theatrical celebrations of royal glory and theatrical violence visited upon 
the enemies of that glory” because she was a “ruler without a standing army, without a 
highly developed bureaucracy, without an extensive police force.”46 The self-reflectivity 
of Shakespeare’s stage helps to sublimate this historically specific brand of political 
authority; thus, “the form itself, as a primary expression of Renaissance power, helps to 
contain the radical doubts it continually provokes.”47 By arguing that the Queen’s power 
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was not essential, Greenblatt is positioning himself as an anti-essentialist, or more 
specifically, he is arguing that early modern drama is inherently anti-essentialist and that 
by self-consciously referring to this inherent quality, early modern dramatists were 
attempting to challenge the essentialist assumptions of their society.    
This argument gets picked up and reformulated by a number of critics. For 
instance, David Scott Kastan, in response to Greenblatt’s essay, argues that stage 
representations of political figures are unable to contain their own subversions because 
“The theater … works to expose the mystifications of power. Its counterfeit of royalty 
raises the possibility that royalty is a counterfeit.”48 In other words, the theater is 
necessarily subversive whenever it performs power. Thus, metadrama constitutes a self-
awareness of this subversive quality and a reflection on drama’s own subversive power. 
Jonathan Goldberg thoroughly explores this argument in James I and the Politics of 
Literature. After reflecting on James’s depiction of himself as an actor, Goldberg argues, 
“from the King’s imagined stage, one can move to real ones, and I consider Chapman’s 
Bussy d’Ambois as a mirror of Jacobean absolutism and Shakespeare’s Henry V as a 
realization of the royal trope that declares the inherent theatricality of power and the 
power of the stage.”49 He then goes on to link the metadrama-as-anti-essentialist 
argument to the metadrama-as-metaphor argument by stating that the metaphor of the 
stage is reversible so that “the stage of history” is also “the stage as history.”50 And 
Matthew H. Wikander makes a similar argument in Princes to Act: “So dressed in the 
metaphor of the stage is the idea of kingship that there is always the possibility of the 
metaphor literalizing itself, of the kingdom becoming a stage.”51 To this list of works that 
draw or expand on Greenblatt’s insight could be added, Dollimore’s influential 
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introduction to the equally influential Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural 
Materialism and his book Radical Tragedy, Roy Strong’s Art and Power: Renaissance 
Festivals, and Louis Montrose’s The Purpose of Playing.52 I’m not suggesting these 
works are wholly indebted to Greenblatt, nor do I want to suggest that these critics are 
only concerned with metadrama (their arguments are much more ambitious). However, I 
am claiming that embedded within these critics’ description and analysis of early modern 
metadrama is the anti-essentialist position.  
The sheer number and caliber of critics who make, in one form or another, the 
anti-essentialist argument as well as the evidence they use to support their position seem 
to suggest its validity. However, the breadth of their evidence actually seems to 
undermine their position at least as it bears on metadrama, that is, on metadrama’s ability 
to demystify essentialist assumptions about the individual and political power.  The anti-
essentialist position, which these critics argue is subversively revealed and challenged 
through drama, seems to have been largely accepted by early modern culture and is often 
publically articulated, hence the wealth of evidence available to new historicist critics.53  
However, this wealth of evidence suggests that early modern society seems to have been 
rather transparently anti-essentialist. And since anti-essentialism was publicly (and rather 
explicitly) expressed, there seems to have been little need to subtlety expose the myth of 
essentialism through metadrama.   
Take for instance Wikander’s analysis of the representation of rulers in Princes to 
Act: he argues for the impossibility of safely playing monarchs because such 
representations reveal the anti-essentialism of the monarchy; monarchs are merely 
playing a part and are not essentially kings. This would seem to be, on its surface, a 
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radically subversive idea because early modern drama, according to Wikander, called 
into question the legitimacy of monarchs and the essential (and necessary) nature of their 
power.  However, Wikander’s evidence seems to undermine his argument. For instance, 
Wikander quotes Elizabeth and James I, who each compare their own performance as 
monarchs to the performance of stage actors. Elizabeth in 1586 in front of parliament 
declares, “we Princes, I tell you, are set on stages, in the sight and view of the world duly 
observed. The eyes of many behold our actions.”54 And James, in an even more public 
forum, writes in Basilikon Doron, “For Kings being publike persons, by reason of their 
office and authority, are as it were set (as it was said of old) upon a publike stage, in the 
sight of all the people; where all the beholders eyes are attentively bent to looke and pry 
in the least circumstance of their secretest drifts.”55 Wikander highlights the apparent 
discomfort these monarchs felt under the public gaze; however, what strikes me about 
these passages is not their discomfort, but their candor. Both monarchs openly admit in a 
public venue that they behave like actors. Indeed, James even mentions that this is an old 
trope, almost a cliché (“as it was said of old”).  Thus, the conclusion Wikander draws 
from these comments seems odd. He argues, “as Elizabeth and James pointed out, theater 
embarrasses royalty through its process of demystification.”56 But the monarchs who 
would benefit from this myth are not attempting to propagate it. They openly admit that 
they are actors and so would seem to be contributing to the process of demystification 
that Wikander (and many of the new historicist critics cited above) attribute to early 
modern drama. It’s hard to imagine that Elizabeth or James would be shocked by the kind 
of anti-essentialist arguments that new historicist critics find in metadrama since they 
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seem to be expressing it themselves. One imagines the monarchs would respond to such 
challenges with an apathetic shrug rather than with embarrassment or fear.  
 Furthermore, as Dollimore points out, (even though he engages in the anti-
essential argument) essentialism, as we know it, did not become a dominant ideology 
until the eighteenth century; it was largely a product of enlightenment rather than early 
modern thought.57  If essentialism was not a dominant mode of thought in early modern 
culture, then it makes little sense to challenge it within metadrama.  Early modern drama, 
according to this strain of new historicism, seems to be challenging an idea that did not 
exist, or at least was not widely accepted. And as the quotations from James I and 
Elizabeth suggest, within pre-essentialist and pre-enlightenment England, what we now 
refer to as anti-essentialism was more or less accepted. That is, we can tentatively equate 
pre-essentialist and anti-essentialist thought in so far as they are both comfortable with 
the idea that power and the individual do not exist as essential phenomenon but are 
largely made up of performance.   
 This is not to say that early modern drama is never expressing an anti-essentialist 
(or perhaps more precisely a pre-essentialist) position. Rather I mean to suggest that early 
modern drama was probably not self-consciously challenging essentialist thought in the 
Brechtian tradition, which Dollimore suggests shares some affinities with early modern 
metadrama.58  What seems more likely is that playwrights were merely expressing and 
perhaps reifying a widely held view of the individual and political power within their 
plays instead of providing a radical challenge to these concepts. Thus, explaining 
metadrama’s existence and primary purpose as expressing this radical challenge seems 
unlikely.  
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 What seems more likely is that early modern drama’s preoccupation with 
metadrama was not a preoccupation with essentialism, but a preoccupation with drama 
itself. As I suggested in the introduction and will argue throughout this study, playwrights 
continued to return to the subject of playgoing within their plays in an attempt to come to 
grips with the concept.  The numerous playwrights who produced metadrama were 
engaging in this discussion and construction of playgoing.  Metadrama, then, is primarily 
interested in playgoing and only secondarily or incidentally (or even accidently) 
interested in anti-essentialist ideas about the individual and political power.  
 Of course, this is not to say that early modern drama was completely disengaged 
from politics. Criticism of the last thirty years has thoroughly shown that early modern 
drama intervened in numerous political debates throughout the early modern era. I am 
simply suggesting that metadrama, as a technique, was not used primarily to make the 
specific interventions cited above. In fact, I am not even suggesting that metadrama was 
completely disengaged from all politics. As I previously suggested and will continue to 
argue below, early modern playwrights’ construction of playgoing, which took place 
largely within metadrama, was influenced by the political and economic situation of the 
theater and was seeking to intervene in this situation. So the period’s metadrama, looked 








III: Outlining the Social Formation of Playgoing: Structural Causality and Progressive 
Epistemology  
 
This view of metadrama also helps explain why most metadramatic plays 
construct playgoing similarly. The politics of the playhouse that produced the economic 
need to control the unruly audiences influenced all playwrights who worked within that 
political situation, so producing a non-reactive playgoer was in the interests of most early 
playwrights; consequently, most early modern playwrights constructed playgoing 
similarly.  
 The economic imperative of metadrama may demonstrate why the playwrights 
produced similar ideas about playgoing, but it does not explain how this construction 
took place. That is, the historical situation of playgoing may provide a reason why 
playwrights constructed playgoing the way they did, but it does not provide the historical 
process through which this construction was formed. To explain the historical process, I 
will be employing a Marxist concept of history developed by Louis Althusser, adapted to 
literary critical uses by Fredric Jameson, and expanded (as well as critiqued) by Alain 
Badiou. Although I do not claim to follow strictly the analytical programs of any of these 
major theorists, their theoretical insights influence much of this study (including the 
above description of metadrama) and so a description of their ideas – specifically their 
concepts of structural causality (Althusser and Jameson) and progressive epistemology 
(Badiou) – should help establish the theoretical foundations of my analysis of early 
modern drama.  Furthermore, by using their techniques and theories, I will avoid some of 
the pitfalls and weaknesses of previous studies that touch on the same questions and 
concerns of the present one, namely those studies that fall under the general category of 
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performance criticism and new historicism. Although I am not, strictly speaking, 
producing either a new historicist or performance criticism of early modern drama, this 
study is involved in the basic questions that both critical schools seek to answer: how 
does performance work and what is its relationship to the larger culture (performance 
criticism), and how does literature affect the culture that it inhabits (new historicism)? In 
addition, these still seem to be the most influential schools of criticism within early 
modern studies. For instance, Hugh Grady has argued that, within Shakespeare criticism, 
new historicism has moved past its insurgence phase and has become the “new 
orthodoxy.”59 And Edward Pechter suggests that the term performance as it is used by 
performance critics represents “one of the most powerful words in the current critical 
lexicon.” 60 So, it seems, any study of early modern drama that is not consciously taking 
part in their critical programs and accepting their theoretical assumptions should attempt 
to demonstrate how it is different from, while still being influenced by them in order to 
help situate the study within current critical discourse.  
Structural causality is perhaps best understood as a theory of historical causality 
that Althusser believed Marx developed in reaction to Hegel’s theories. Althusser argues 
that when Marx was writing, he only had two models of historical causality to work 
within: the Cartesian concept of mechanical causality and the Leibnizian notion of 
expressive causality, which Hegel adopted and Marx more or less inherited. Althusser 
argues that Marx quickly dismissed mechanical causality as useless but suggests that 
Marx was more or less forced to employ expressive causality within his critique of 
capitalism. Althusser argues that expressive causality “presupposed that the whole had a 
certain nature, precisely the nature of a ‘spiritual’ whole in which each element was 
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expressive of the entire totality as a ‘pars totalis.’”61 In other words, society is made up of 
several different parts or layers. The list of these layers various from thinker to thinker, 
but generally includes, but is not limited to: ideology, culture, politics and economics.62  
Althusser calls the entirety of this structure, the social formation. In terms of this 
study, the social formation of playgoing is made up of all the elements or “levels” of 
playgoing. So obviously the social formation includes the audience, playwrights, 
playhouses, and the texts of the plays themselves. However, as we will see, the social 
formation also includes the economic conditions of the performance, the Master of 
Revels’ office, the Privy Council, and (after Badiou’s theories of progressive 
epistemology are employed) the concept or theory of performance.   
According to Hegel and Leibniz this social formation is really just a manifestation 
or expression of an underlying totality, and the analyst’s job is to find these 
manifestations in order to locate the expressed connection between the parts of the social 
formation and their underlying cause. The famous “base-superstructure” account of 
history can be thought of as the result of this theory of causality. The superstructure (all 
the parts of the social formation) is simply the expression of the economic base.  
As Jameson points out, Althusser’s problem with this historical model is that it 
relies on “homologies” or “unreflective unities” in order to function. Jameson offers the 
example of Lucien Goldmann’s Hidden God, which claims to find “homologies between 
class situations, world views, and artistic forms.”63 Jameson explains why he finds this 
type of analysis troubling: 
What is unsatisfactory about this work of Goldmann’s is not the establishment of 
a historical relationship among these three zones or sectors, but rather the 
simplistic and mechanical model which is constructed in order to articulate that 
relationship, and in which it is affirmed that at some level of abstraction the 
36 
“structure” of the three quite different realties of social situation, philosophical or 
ideological position, and verbal and theatrical practice are “the same.” 64 
 
Jameson is suggesting here that Althusser’s critique of homologies and expressive 
causality is still relevant because this practice of relying on homologies to link disparate 
parts of society through a generalized concept is widely used in literary and social 
criticism.  
Indeed, despite Jameson’s and Althusser’s critique, expressive causality and its 
reliance on homologies seem to be still widely used in early modern studies. Performance 
criticism and new historicism both seem to rely on these concepts. In fact, both are often 
criticized for their use of homologies (though this term is rarely used). For instance, 
Edward Pechter has recently argued that performance criticism relies on “totalization” in 
order to function.65 That is, performance criticism claims that almost any aspect of 
society can be shown to be a form of performance.  Pechter, drawing on the work of 
Thomas Postlewait and Tracy C. Davis, argues that  
our “ideas of national identity and imagined history” are now … regularly 
“constructed” in terms of “performed identity,” part of a process by which “the 
idea of performance” has been “expanded to embrace” a variety of concepts, 
institutions, and practices, including myth, play, role-playing, ceremony, carnival, 
everyday life, conventional behavior, religious and social rituals.66 
 
Pechter complains that the result of performance criticism is “unlimited interpretive 
power, but one hard to localize within any particular context” and asserts that “it fixes an 
impression of unity, but only for the moment before itself dissolving into the amorphous 
expanse it was meant to define.”67 If we place Pechter’s complaints in the context of 
Althusser and Jameson’s discussion of historical models, it seems clear that Pechter is 
accusing performance criticism of relying on homologies and expressive causality. 
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Performance critics take individual aspects of society and analyze them as an expression 
of a totalized “culture of performance.”  
Likewise, new historicism has also been indirectly, and sometimes directly, 
accused of relying on expressive causality (which is a bit puzzling given its theoretical 
debt to Althusser). For instance Alan Liu offers an early, enduring and (according to 
some) largely unaddressed criticism of new historicism; he accuses its practitioners of 
searching for “any subject able to tell us what it is (authority, author, identity, ideology, 
consciousness, humanity) that connects the plural to the dominant, historical context to 
literary text, and so creates a single movement of culture.”68 Leeds Barrol, Jean E. 
Howard and Jameson himself have made similar pronouncements.69 More recently, 
Zachary Lesser and Luke Wilson, both drawing on Liu, have observed that new 
historicism often resorts, or is said to resort, to what Wilson calls “voodoo of 
resemblance” when forced to make “difficult connections between historical 
phenomena.”70 Is this not the same complaint that Althusser has of Hegel and Jameson of 
Goldmann? That is, new historicists are attempting to find the underlying concept or 
force that is expressed in the various aspects of society. In other words, what Wilson calls 
“voodoo of resemblance,” Jameson calls “homologies.” Since performance criticism and 
new historicism seem to be falling into the same theoretical pitfalls of expressive 
causality, Althusser’s alternative, structural causality, should help this study avoid those 
traps. 
For Althusser, the key difference between expressive causality and structural 
causality is that within expressive causality the parts of society are merely expressions of 
the whole, or “expressive causality,” as Robert Paul Resch suggests, “reduces the 
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effectivity of the elements to reflections of an essence (X, Y, and Z are all really 
manifestations of A, the single, independent, and omnipresent variable).”71  Althusser 
insists that within structural causality, “the whole existence of the structure consists of its 
effects, in short that the structure, which is merely a specific combination of its peculiar 
elements, is nothing outside its effects.”72 What ultimately causes these effects is 
Althusser’s “absent cause.”  He coincidentally uses the metaphor of drama to explain the 
absence or non-existence of the cause of the structure:  
the mode of existence of the stage direction (mise en scene) of the theatre which is 
simultaneously its own stage, its own script, its own actors, the theater whose 
spectators can, on occasion, be spectators only because they are first of all forced 
to be its actors, caught by the constraints of a script and parts whose authors they 
cannot be, since it is in essence an authorless theatre.73  
 
This cause then should not be thought of as a real occurrence. Alex Callinicos helpfully 
explains Althusser’s purpose in calling the cause “absent”:   
What Althusser is trying to hammer home to us is the shift from treating a cause 
as a thing ... from something that can be immediately or ultimately pointed to, 
grasped hold of, to treating it as the displacements effected by the structure of a 
whole upon its elements …. Reality is not something underlying these 
appearances, it is the structured relation of these appearances.74  
 
Or to phrase it in more philosophical language, the absent cause is not a material agent of 
change, but rather is a condition of possibility; by locating or inserting the absent cause, 
the possibility of the entire structure emerges. I will be arguing that the absent cause in 
the social formation of playgoing is the empty concept of the playgoer and the 
playwrights’ attempt to construct a non-reactive playgoer to fill that empty concept.  
It needs to be mentioned that even though Althusser understands the ultimate 
cause of history as absent, he still insists that “in the last instance,” the structure of 
history is determined through economic forces, thereby asserting the classic Marxist 
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notion of economic determinism. This assertion of economic determinism has puzzled 
some social theorists who draw on Althusser.75 Indeed the economic determinism of the 
absent cause seems counterintuitive; how can an absent thing or idea be determined 
through material forces? Resch helps resolve this apparent conflict by reminding us, 
By the term mode of production Althusser and Balibar mean not only the forces 
and relations of production but also their social conditions of existence and the 
reproduction of these social conditions. Thus the concept of a mode of production 
refers not simply to the economic instance … but also to the level of the social 
formation itself, insofar as other, non-economic instances are essential to the 
reproduction of the forces and relations of production.76 
 
By focusing his historical analysis on “the reproduction of the modes of production,” 
Althusser can assert economic determinism, while still asserting the complexity of the 
overall structure, including non-economic aspects of the structure. 
Indeed, the concept of economic determinism in the last instance can help make 
sense of how the historical conditions of playgoing (outlined above) and the social 
formation of playgoing are connected. The concept of the playgoer (the absent cause) was 
constructed by the playwrights in such a way as to ensure that the theaters would not be 
shut down; they attempted to create a non-reactive playgoer to control the unruly 
audiences, whose activities could result in the closing of the theaters and the non-
reproduction of the modes of production.  The absent cause of the social formation of 
playgoing is in fact economically determined, “in the last instance.” 
Althusser’s student Badiou seems to pick up on this idea of absent cause but 
applies it not to the structures of society but to the evolution of knowledge in order to 
form what he calls a progressive epistemology. Badiou’s link between the ontology of 
history and epistemology is significant to this study because it links the absent cause to 
both the production of new knowledge and the structure of the social formation. This is a 
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link that I will be relying upon as I argue that by attempting to produce the concept of the 
playgoer through metadrama, early modern drama was also able to produce the entire 
structure of the social formation of playgoing (ontological history), which included a 
theory of performance (epistemology). 
Badiou imports Althusser’s concept of the absent cause (as well as Lacan’s 
concept of the transcendental signifier) into an epistemological discussion and theorizes 
that new knowledge and new disciplines are produced not by progressively asking and 
answering questions, but by finding unanswerable questions. In other words, new 
knowledge is produced not through the accumulation of knowledge, but through the 
absence of knowledge.77 Badiou uses an example from the history of mathematics, the 
creation of imaginary numbers, to explain this process. To vastly simply this history: 
imaginary numbers were created to solve the problem of the impossibility of the formula 
x² +1=0. Once imaginary numbers were created, a whole new domain of mathematics 
was made possible. This process was only possible through what Badiou calls “the void” 
– a lack or absence.  Something had to be put in its place, “the vanishing term,” which 
then enabled new discussions, ideas, solutions and even disciplines. As Badiou declares, 
“The void is casual.”78  Badiou broadens this example to suggest that this is always how 
all new knowledge is produced.79  
 If we combine Althusser’s structural causality and Badiou’s progressive 
epistemology through the concept of the absent cause and apply it to early modern 
dramatic culture, we can begin to see how the construction of playgoing took place, while 
also avoiding the homologies often relied upon by performance criticism and new 
historicism.80  Simply put, this process works as follows (see the diagram at the end of 
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the chapter for a representation of this process): early moderns experienced a 
phenomenon, playgoing, for which they did not have an adequate concept.   
To fill this absence or void, early modern playwrights created an imaginary concept of 
playgoers. The concept they produced was that of the non-reactive playgoer.  The non-
reactive playgoer as a material thing never really existed – by all accounts unruly 
audiences existed throughout the period – but once this concept was asserted, its effects 
can be noticed throughout the social formation of playgoing because the effects are what 
make up the social formation. At the same time, this concept of the non-reactive playgoer 
produced new ideas about performance; it allowed or even forced the playwrights to 
construct a coherent theory of performance. Furthermore, both these processes, “in the 
last instance,” are economically determined since the concept of the non-reactive 
playgoer was created in order to save the playhouses from being shut down and so was an 
effort to reproduce the modes of production – the playhouses themselves.  Of course none 
of this is that simple. The purpose of this study is to trace the complexity of the process 
more carefully by analyzing texts which demonstrate the effects of the social formation.   
 Beyond producing what I believe is an accurate representation of how the concept 
of playgoing was constructed in early modern drama, the process above also should help 
this study avoid the use of homologies, which, as shown above, are produced through a 
reliance on expressive causality.  I won’t be employing homologies or expressive 
causality because I will not be suggesting that each text and level of the social formation 
is an expression or reflection of the concept of the non-reactive playgoer and the 
economic imperative that produces that concept. Rather, I will be arguing that the 
concept of the non-reactive playgoer has certain effects on the social formation and the 
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theory of early modern drama (and in fact both are constitutive of those effects).  Each 
level of the social formation and each aspect of the theory remain independent, or in 
Althusserian language, each level or aspect remains “relatively autonomous.” The whole 
of the social formation is only recognizable once the entire structure is grasped, at which 
point the relative autonomy is overcome. So for instance, I will be arguing below that the 
effects of the non-reactive playgoer can be seen in early modern censorship practices, but 
early modern censorship practices are not, in and of themselves, expressions of the non-
reactive playgoer. The effects are only recognizable by inserting the concept of the non-
reactive playgoer and tracing its effect within censorship practices.  And as we will see 
throughout this study, these effects are often surprising and not intuitively connected to 
the construction of playgoing.  
 




At this point one may object that the above process is reflexive or circular: in 
order to determine the structure of the social formation and the theory of playgoing the 
absent cause must be located, but the absent cause can only be found through an analysis 
of the structure. This circularity is explored by Badiou when he attempts to account for 
structural change within Althusser’s theory of structural casualty. This theory of change 
is necessary (and considered unfinished in Althusser’s work) because, after all, a social 
formation is not created ex nihilo, but is formed out of a previous social formation.81 
Indeed, the social formation of early modern playgoing, as many theater historians have 
shown (but without using these terms) was formed out of the social formation of 
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medieval drama.82 To account for historical change or periodization, Badiou explores the 
concepts of the event and the situation. For Badiou the event is that which is produced 
through change; the event is relatively equivalent to a new social formation (e.g. early 
modern playgoing); the situation is the conditions in which that event takes place (e.g. 
unruly audiences and their political and economic consequences). Feltham describes 
Badiou’s theory of event and situation as follows: 
The first characteristic of the event is that it is local and does not take place across 
an entire situation, but occurs at a particular point in the situation: the eventual 
site. The second characteristic is its absolute contingency: nothing prescribes the 
occurrence of an event; the existence of an eventual site is a necessary but non-
sufficient condition. Here Badiou places the error of deterministic theories of 
change; they confuse the existence of an eventual site with the existence of 
change. The third characteristic of the event is that it is undecidable whether it 
belongs to the situation or not. … This [leads to] the fourth characteristic of the 
event, its reflexivity. In order to identify an event and decide its belonging – by 
investigating its elements – one must thus have already have identified it, because 
it is one of its elements.83  
 
Badiou develops a complex truth procedure to determine how accurate the connection is 
between a particular event and situation, but what is of particular interest here is how 
Badiou identifies the consequences of the historical models he and Althusser advocate.84  
These consequences represent an abandonment of some of the ambition of Althusser and 
Jameson and jettison some of the orthodox Marxism of both thinkers. By doing so, 
Badiou’s analysis will define some of this study’s shortcomings. That is, when early 
modern playgoing is treated as a relatively static event and not as a fluid diachronic 
process, certain aspects of playgoing cannot be accounted for. 
 For instance, the project is necessarily reflexive or circular (as Badiou’s third and 
fourth characteristics assert) and somewhat arbitrary (as his second characteristic asserts). 
Thus, there is no logical guarantee that my description of how early modern playgoing 
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was constructed is correct – that the situation had anything to do with the event. All I can 
do is demonstrate that the effects of the non-reactive playgoer are present in the texts and 
material condition of playgoing, which suggests that the non-reactive playgoer is actually 
an absent cause of the structure of playgoing. Badiou puts it this way, “verify, via the 
excedentary choice of a proper name [of the absent cause or void], the unpresentable 
alone as existent; on its basis the Ideas will subsequently cause all admissible forms of 
presentation to proceed.”85  Feltham phrases the circularity of the process in less 
idiosyncratic language: “In order to know what kind of multiple the event is, one already 
needs to know what it is, then the identity of the event is suspended from the acquisition 
of a knowledge that one evidently does not yet posses. However, when one does come to 
possess this knowledge, one will have already possessed it.”86 
Furthermore, according to Badiou’s second and third characteristics, there is 
nothing necessary about the connection between the event and situation. That is, an 
unruly audience does not guarantee the social formation of early modern drama. After all 
and as previously pointed out, unruly audiences exist throughout history, and these unruly 
audiences did not produce similar social formations. This means that no universal lessons 
can be gleaned from this study. Its conclusions only apply to the event of early modern 
drama.  
 This leads to another consequence, an abandonment of an orthodox Marxist (and 
Hegelian) theory of history. For the traditional Marxist, history can be viewed through 
the interpretive lens of the material dialectic as one long narrative of class struggle.  But 
according to Badiou’s analysis of the event and situation, there is no single narrative, or 
what Lyotard calls a “master narrative,” only a serious of localized events.87 This leads 
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Badiou to state “There is no History, only histories.”88  This is in direct conflict with 
Jameson’s, more traditionally Marxist, assertion at the beginning of The Political 
Unconscious: 
only a genuine philosophy of history is capable of respecting the specificity and 
radical difference of the social and cultural past while disclosing the solidarity of 
its polemics and passions, its forms, structures, experiences, and struggles, with 
those of the present day.89  
 
For Jameson, the “philosophy of history” is, in large part, Althusser’s structural causality, 
which he adapts in order to maintain an orthodox Marxist notion of history. Of course 
Althusser did not want to give up on a grand narrative theory of history either.  Indeed, 
The Political Unconscious can be read as Jameson’s attempt to save Althusser from 
producing exactly the type of conclusions that Badiou, probably unwillingly, comes to.90  
 But Badiou’s insights points out the shortcomings of analyzing a social 
construction in the Althusserian tradition.  This study, while perhaps avoiding 
homologies, cannot produce grand narratives of history, or plug the early modern 
narrative into this larger history. Early modern drama, drama from the mid 1570s to 
1642, will be treated as one synchronic event that may have nothing to do with other 
synchronic events. Indeed, treating this period as one event and not as a diachronic 
narrative is somewhat problematic. There are aspects of drama that changed throughout 
the era. For instance, there are probably some differences between John Lyly’s theories 
of performance and those of Shakespeare, or between Shakespeare’s theories and John 
Ford’s. And there are historical situations throughout the period that may have changed 
the social formation of drama: for instance, the construction of the second Blackfriars 
Theater in the late 1590s or the publication of Jonson’s folio in 1616. Indeed, by finding a 
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different absent cause within those other situations, a whole different social formation 
would emerge (Badiou’s second characteristic).  
Despite the possible circularity and arbitrariness of the above process, this study 
will attempt to argue that the absent cause of the concept of the non-reactive playgoer 
within the situation of the unruly playgoer produces a structure of the social formation of 
playgoing and that this particular process is recognizable within numerous early modern 
texts. The truth procedure for the accuracy of this description can only really be the 
readers’ acceptance of my readings of these texts. That is, this process of identifying the 
absent cause of the social formation in order to describe the social formation will only be 
circular if my readings of individual texts, which are the effects of this absent cause, are 
unconvincing.   
 




Beyond supplying the absent cause in order to locate the structure of the social 
formation of playgoing, it is also necessary to find a way to describe that social formation 
and demonstrate how the different levels of the structure are related. Jameson supplies the 
analytical tool that can be used to describe the relationship between the levels. He calls 
this technique transcoding. Transcoding is Jameson’s take on the classical Marxist 
analytical technique of mediation. According to Jameson, mediation is a technique for 
locating “connections among seemingly disparate phenomena of social life generally.”91 
Transcoding provides a linguistic basis for this process since transcoding involves,  
the invention of a set of terms, the strategic choice of a particular code or 
language, such that the same terminology can be used to analyze and articulate 
47 
two quite distinct types of objects or “texts,” or two very different structural levels 
of reality.  Mediations are thus a device of the analyst, whereby the fragmentation 
and autonomization, the compartmentalization and specialization of the various 
regions of social life … is at least locally overcome, on the occasion of a 
particular analysis.92  
 
Thus, by transcoding between the different levels of the social formation of playgoing, 
the relationship between the levels can be described as can the entire social formation. 
Furthermore, transcoding can be used to compare the relationship between the various 
specialized languages found within the early modern metadramatic plays.  For instance, if 
we think that Webster’s use of the language of marriage law in The Duchess of Malfi and 
Jonson’s use of the language of reputation in Epicene are the effects of the same absent 
cause (the non-reactive playgoer), then a set of terms needs to be found that can 
accurately describe what both plays are doing. The actual languages of the plays remain 
distinctly different, but this difference is overcome through the transcoding process. In 
short, where the absent cause is used to locate the structure and its effects, the 
transcoding process is used to describe that structure. However, these two processes 
(locating the absent cause and transcoding) should probably not be thought of has 
completely separate activities. In order to locate the absent cause, the structure has to be 
described though transcoding, but in order to describe the structure, the absent cause must 
be found. This produces the kind of recursive analytical process that Badiou describes 
and I reproduce above. 
For reasons that will (only) become clear through the transcoding process, speech 
act theory’s terms will provide this “particular code” which is able to unite “at least 
locally” these plays, subjects and languages (or more simply texts). Specifically, J.L. 
Austin’s distinction between constatives and performatives and Searle’s concept of 
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institutional (as opposed to brute) reality will be employed in the transcoding process, a 
process that will start with a partial analysis of early modern censorship practices.  
 Before starting this process, the terms of speech act theory need to be briefly 
defined since I will be using them in a fairly specific (and maybe simplistic) way. In the 
first lecture of Austin’s How to do Things with Words, Austin makes the rather obvious, 
but previously unarticulated, distinction between language that describes things and 
language which does things. The former he calls constatives; the latter he calls 
performatives. While constatives simply describe preexisting reality, performatives are 
able to create reality through their articulation. Performative utterances are able to say 
something at the same time that they are able to do something. Austin gives the example 
of betting and marrying. To say “I bet” is not to describe reality, but is what constitutes 
the act of betting, just as saying “I do” or “I now pronounce you man and wife” creates 
the reality of the marriage.93  For Austin, the significance of the performative is that 
performative utterances are neither true nor false and so cannot be subject to truth tests.  
 This rather simple distinction between performative and constative utterances has 
been significantly complicated both within Austin’s text and within the debate 
surrounding that text. Most notably, this distinction has been challenged on philosophical 
grounds in the now famous debate between Austin’s champion John Searle and Jacques 
Derrida.94 However, I am not interested in the philosophical validity of the distinction. I 
am interested in their utilitarian value as transcoding terms. Indeed, this initial insight by 
Austin minus the later complications will provide the key to my analysis of early modern 
playgoing because, as I will be arguing throughout the study, but particularly in chapters 
two and three, early modern playwrights seem to have tried to construct stage utterances 
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as performative utterances. Obviously, playwrights did not have speech act theory’s 
terminology; nevertheless, Austin’s terms seem to accurately describe how playwrights 
throughout the period thought and wrote about their own performances within 
metadramatic texts. Because these metadramatic texts seem to be hinting at this 
distinction between performative and constative utterances, the terms provide a useful 
tool to transcode between the various levels of the social formation of playgoing.  
 This is not the first study that uses speech act theory to analyze early modern 
drama; however, my use of the theory is distinctly different from most critics’ uses. 
When speech act theory is used to analyze early modern drama, it is usually used to 
describe how language works within a play.95 I will be using speech act terminology to 
describe how performance works within the playhouse. This is perhaps a subtle but, I 
believe, crucial distinction. I will be arguing that playwrights constructed stage utterances 
to work according to speech act theory’s distinction between constative and performative 
utterances. I will, in a sense, be historicizing speech acts. The early modern critics that 
use speech act theory tend to take a universal view of the theory and use it as a way of 
describing how language always works; however, as Stanley Fish has shown in his 
critique of the use of speech act theory in early modern drama, this technique really only 
works when the play is actually about speech acts.96 Otherwise, the application of speech 
act theory is relatively arbitrary. One can simply choose any text and run it through a 
speech act analysis, so there is nothing specifically useful about its application to early 
modern drama since it doesn’t demonstrate anything about early modern drama; it simply 
shows how language always works. Early modern drama becomes a kind of test case to 
see if speech act theory is correct.  In other words, Fish is suggesting that unless a 
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dramatic text is about speech acts, then using the theory to describe early modern drama 
produces a study that is actually about speech acts and not about early modern drama. 
However, I will be arguing, in effect, that plays, or at least metadramatic plays, are 
almost always about speech acts because they are constructing stage utterances to work 
as speech acts. This is why speech act terminology can be used to transcode between the 
different texts and levels of the social formation. Furthermore, this construction tells us 
something significant about early modern playgoing. Speech act theories terms are not 
merely a means towards describing how playgoing was constructed; they are not an end 
in and of themselves.  
  Indeed, beyond providing the transcoding terms, this insight – that playwrights 
constructed stage utterances to act like performative utterances – also has a profound 
effect on the construction of the non-reactive playgoer. As I will argue more thoroughly 
in the second chapter, this construction of performative stage utterances meant that the 
performance’s object was not the audience but reality itself. In other words, early modern 
performance (as imagined within the play and constructed within the culture) was not 
designed to impact or affect the audience. This construction makes perfect sense if we 
consider the audience’s political, legal and economic predicament outline above. That is, 
the theaters were always working under the threat of being shut down, in part, because 
the audiences behaved in an unruly way and because the theater’s political opponents 
linked the behavior of the audience with the content of the performance. Thus, by 
positioning the audience as the non-object of the performance, the playwrights were able 
to deny the anti-theatrical position. The connection between the actions of the audience 
and the content of the performances, a link the antitheatrical writers insisted upon, is 
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theoretically severed.  Furthermore, the audience itself was being constructed through 
this process. They were being encouraged to not see themselves as the object of the 
performance and so were being trained not to be affected by the performance. And if they 
were unaffected they would be less likely to react to the performance.  Of course at the 
same time this training process was underway, they were being affected by the 
performance in so far as their reactions were being shaped by that performance. In a 
strange reversal, they were being affected by the performance to become unaffected by 
performance.  
This construction, if it worked, would have helped solve the playwrights’ legal 
problems.  The less unruly the audience’s behavior, the less likely it would be for the 
playwrights to be punished for the actions of their audience. Indeed, even if the audience 
did react to the performance, the playwrights would have constructed a theory of 
performance which could give them deniability since, according to them, performances 
do not work by affecting the audience, so the audience must have been acting 
independently of the performance.  
Indeed, this construction of stage utterances offers a rather elegant solution to the 
legal and political problems posed by unruly audiences. By constructing stage utterances 
as performative, the playwrights could, in a sense, have their cake and eat it too. They 
could contain the unruly audiences that posed political and legal problems while still 
allowing themselves room to explore controversial or even subversive ideas. Under this 
construction of playgoing, the content of the performance was immaterial, giving the 
playwrights the freedom to write about anything they wished, and it is clear that their 
subject matter was often controversial. Although metadrama, in so far as it attempted to 
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control the unruly audience, was, as I suggest above, a conservative attempt at 
maintaining the status quo, this construction also allowed the playwrights to explore 
subversive and possibly radical ideas. The medium may have been conservative, but the 
message did not have to be.  
But even while this construction of stage utterances solves some of the practical 
problems the playwrights faced, it also raised philosophical or theoretical problems: if the 
object of stage performance was reality, what was the nature of this reality; that is, what 
is the ontology of stage performances; if the stage utterances did not affect the audience, 
what was drama’s efficacy or what was its purpose? Was it, just like the audiences, 
quarantined – locked in a self-referential world where its content did not matter? By 
saving stage performance from political and legal repercussions, did the playwrights 
drain their own performances of any efficacy? 
To answer these questions it is useful to import another speech act term coined by 
another speech act theorist – John Searle’s institutional reality, a concept that helps 
explain the ontology of performative speech acts and so of early modern stage utterances. 
In his early work, Speech Acts, and in his later text, The Social Creation of Reality, Searle 
maintains a strict distinction between forms of reality that are constituted by language 
and those that are not.97 To make this distinction he argues that some features of reality 
can only be described through brute facts and others through institutional facts. He 
describes this distinction as follows: 
We need to distinguish between brute facts such as the fact that the sun is ninety-
three million miles from the earth and institutional facts such as the fact that 
Clinton is president. Brute facts exist independently of any human institutions; 
institutional facts can exist only within human institutions. Brute facts require the 
institution of language in order that we can state the facts, but the brute facts 
themselves exist quite independently of language or of any other institution. … 
53 
Institutional facts, on the other hand, require special human institutions for their 
very existence. Language is one such institution; indeed, it is a whole set of such 
institutions.98 
 
Searle goes on to point out that institutional facts are largely governed by language, and 
most of this linguistic governing is done by performative utterances.  
One of the most fascinating features of institutional facts is that a very larger [sic] 
number, though by no means all of them, can be created by explicit performative 
utterances … Institutional facts can be created with the performative utterance of 
such sentences as “the meeting is adjourned,” “I give and bequeath my entire 
fortune to my nephew,” “I appoint you chairman,” “War is hereby declared,” etc. 
These utterances create the very state of affairs that they represent; and in each 
case, the state of affairs is an institutional fact. 99 
 
Even though institutional reality is not completely constitutive of performative 
utterances, performative utterances always create institutional reality because they always 
construct a reality that is dependent on language.100 
Searle’s bifurcation of reality can be usefully applied to early modern dramatic 
stage utterances in order to explain the efficacy of performance and the way in which 
performative stage utterances work to produce a non-reactive playgoer.  If stage 
utterances were constructed as performative, then those utterances’ primary object was 
institutional reality and not the audience, as it is within a humanist/rhetorical model of 
performance. In other words, by constructing stage utterances as performative and not as 
rhetorical, playwrights were able to shift the object of performance away from the 
audience and towards institutional reality. And if the audience was not the object of 
performance, then they would be less likely to react to a performance. Indeed, as 
previously suggested, within a rhetorical model of performance, the purpose of the 
performance is to produce action within the audience. Performative stage utterances 
counter this model of performance by making the audience the non-object of 
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performance. And since audiences already were reacting to performances (as previously 
argued), this model attempted to convince the audience that they should not react since 
they were not performance’s rhetorical object.  
 And far from draining the performances of efficacy, this construction may be 
understood as heightening performance’s impact by redirecting its efficacy. Early modern 
stage utterances did not have to be filtered through the audience to gain efficacy; their 
content directly affected institutional reality. For instance, as we will see in chapter two, 
when the concept of marriage is performed on stage, it does not have to be submitted to 
the judgment of the audience because, as Austin shows, performative utterances are not 
subject to truth tests – they are neither true nor false, correct nor incorrect, they simply 
are. The performance creates institutional reality, and the audience simply has to accept 
that reality. By constructing stage utterances as performative, playwrights were able, at 
least theoretically, to produce a non-reactive audience and grant their performances 
ontological efficacy.  
 By arguing that playwrights constructed stage utterances as performative, I do not 
mean to suggest that they created this construction out of thin air or in some way 
anticipated Searle and Austin.  Like most concepts, the performative utterance has a 
history. Tracing this history is well beyond the scope of this project, but it is useful (and 
relatively easy) to speculate on what it might be in order to demonstrate that assigning 
speech act terms to early modern drama needn’t be an anachronism. For instance, 
performative stage utterances can be easily traced to Catholic religious rites. Communion 
and confession both assume the power of utterances to perform real actions. There are of 
course important differences between performative stage utterances and these two rites: 
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communion was (and is) supposed to affect, quite literally, brute reality (i.e. bread), not 
institutional reality; and confession, by its nature, does not have an audience. However, 
these sacraments provide historical examples of performative utterances that had 
currency in early modern London. Catholic thought did not completely disappear after 
the Act of Supremacy and the Act of Unity in the late 1550’s, nor did performative 
utterances disappear from the protestant church – transubstantiation still existed as a 
concept within protestant discourse.  Magical speech provides another historical example 
of performative utterances. Again, magic tends to affect brute and not institutional reality, 
but it too shows that early modern dramatic culture did not have to invent performative 
utterances out of thin air. Indeed, Stuart Clark has shown that magic was very much a 
part of the culture well into the Enlightenment period; prominent and influential 
intellectuals, and not just the “superstitious masses” seemed to have taken magic very 
seriously throughout the early modern era.101 Perhaps most significantly, we can look to 
theatrical shows of state for historical precedents of performative utterances.  New 
historicist critics, without using speech act terms, have long pointed out the importance of 
coronations, processions, and other shows of state in the creation of the institutional 
reality of the monarchy.102 As argued above, these critics usually use this insight to 
illustrate the anti-essentialism of drama.  However, my take on how performative 
utterances were constructed suggests that drama did not attempt to undermine the 
performative nature of these shows of state, but drew on their assumptions to construct 
stage utterances as performative – as accomplishing the same feat as shows of state.  
This shows, again, how my take on metadrama differs from the anti-essentialist 
position described above. New historicists sometimes argue that metadrama challenges 
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an essentialist position, but I am arguing that early modern dramatists drew on the anit- or 
pre-essentialism of their culture to claim that their performances were able to create 
institutional reality. That is, since the culture tended to see institutions, like the 
monarchy, as constitutive of performance, playwrights claimed that their performances 
were constructing those institutions or in other words, their stage utterances were 
performative.  
 One more, though by no means a final, example: marriage ceremonies and other 
legal performances also work because of a reliance on performative utterances. Marriage 
ceremonies were understood, just as they are today, as verbal acts that produced an 
institution. Indeed, in the next chapter I will demonstrate that Webster drew explicit 
parallels between the way that marriages work and the way that stage performances work 
in order to construct stage utterances as performance.  
 Apart from the final example, I can offer very little proof that any of these ideas 
made their way into theatrical culture. Indeed, it would probably take a full length study 
of the social history of the concept of speech acts to illustrate the above claims – a study 
that to my knowledge has not yet been written. However, scholars of early modern drama 
have argued that some of these cultural phenomena did influence the theater. For 
instance, David Hawkes has argued that magical thinking was very much a part of 
dramatic culture and argues that performative language is something that links these two 
discourses.103  And numerous critics have argued that playwrights used the Catholic mass 
as a model for their own performances either to replace Catholicism with a secular art 
form or to show sympathy with Catholics.104 The goal of this project, however, is not to 
trace the genealogy of performative utterances, but to locate it within social formation of 
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playgoing and to describe its impact on that formation, while keeping in mind that early 
modern dramatic culture probably did not invent the concept even if it did used it for its 
own purposes.  
 




Before looking at the individual texts that, in large part, make up this social 
formation of playgoing, I would first like to ground the construction of stage utterances 
as performative in an extra-textual layer of the social formation – censorship as practiced 
by the Master of Revels. Richard Burt has effectively argued, without using these terms, 
that the Master of Revels was very much a part of the social formation of playgoing in 
that he was intimately involved in the operation of early modern drama and not merely its 
antagonist or blocking figure.105 Indeed, since the Master of Revels was paid by the 
playwrights to censor their plays, he was not immune to the economic imperative of the 
playhouse I describe above; if the playhouses were closed, his income would be severally 
reduced.106 Thus, the censor’s office fits nicely into the social formation.  If the Master of 
Revels was a part of the social formation of playgoing, then the effects of the absent 
cause of the non-reactive playgoer will be present in this level of the social formation. By 
describing that effect, I hope to offer proof that the social formation of playgoing really 
did construct stage utterances as performative and further describe how these concepts fit 
within early modern drama – a description that will carry into the next chapter but will be 
relied upon throughout the project.  
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The manuscript of Sir Thomas More provides the best evidence of early modern 
censorship in existence. Indeed, it represents one of only a handful of manuscripts with 
the Master of Revels’ signature and the only one with extensive notes detailing how the 
play was censored. Because of the dearth of evidence, we can’t know if Tilney’s 
censorship method is representative of all censorship throughout the period, so I will not 
be suggesting that all of early modern censorship operated according to the 
performative/constative distinction.107 But what I will suggest is that the censorship of Sir 
Thomas More demonstrates that Tilney understood stage utterances to be performative 
and that the basic techniques of censorship found in Sir Thomas More can plausibly be 
indentified in other texts, which suggest that this view of stage utterances was more 
widely accepted than this one isolated incident.  
 At the start of the play, Tilney warns the author(s) that the insurrection scene 
needs to be amended.108 Tilney has written in the margins, “Leave out the insurrection 
wholy and the Cause ther off and begin with Sir Thomas Moore att the mayors session 
with a reportt afterwards off his good service don … only by A short reportt and nott 
otherwise att your own perilles.”109 As previously observed, and as scholars of censorship 
have noted, there was good reason for Tilney to be anxious about riots; riots were 
common in sixteenth century England and not unknown to occur within the playhouse 
itself.110  So it is not surprising that the riot scene drew the attention of the censor. What 
does seem surprising is that he allowed it to make it into the play at all. That is, although 
he doesn’t let the scene be performed, he does allow it to be discussed on stage. This 
technique of cutting scenes and having them replaced by a “reportt” does not seem to be 
isolated to Sir Thomas More although the manuscript of the play does provide the best 
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direct evidence of such a technique. As Dorthy Auchter notes, Tilney “was known to 
object to the enactment of controversial scenes on stage. He was generally willing to 
permit controversial actions to occur off stage, with the events being recounted on stage 
by secondary characters.”111 Clare reaches a conclusion similar to Auchter: “Tilney was 
anxious to have the portrayal of seditious events abridged, or reported rather than 
enacted.”112 Why would Tilney believe that recounting dangerous content was acceptable 
and enacting that same content was unacceptable? 
 This question can be answered by applying Austin’s distinction between 
constatives and performatives and by transcoding between Tilney’s censorship practices 
and early modern playwrights’ attempt within metadrama to control the unruly audiences 
through the construction of performative stage utterances. As Clare notes, Tilney’s 
strategy was to allow recounting of certain incidents, but to not allow them to be enacted.  
To enact a scene means to present or perform a series of actions (in the above example a 
riot) in front of an audience. To recount means to refer through narration to a prior series 
of actions. Tilney’s distinction between recounting and enacting is very similar to the 
constative/performative distinction.  Constatives are utterances that describe prior 
actions, and performatives are utterances that create the action as they are describing it. In 
other words, whereas performatives enact real actions, constatives recount actions. Thus, 
when Tilney is demanding a recounting, he is demanding a constative speech act, an 
utterance that is describing and referring to a prior action.  His anxiety then over a 
performance of a riot seems to be an anxiety over performative language since the 
enactment of a scene would be a performative, in that it would describe the riot at the 
same time that it is producing a riot.   
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It is now perhaps clear why Tilney was so keen on having the production of a riot 
moved off stage. If he had allowed the performance to be staged, the performed riot 
would have produced the real actions of a riot. This is not to say that the audience would 
have confused the fictional riot on stage for a real flesh and blood riot (more on this 
distinction in the third chapter). As Searle reminds us, performative utterances don’t 
create brute reality, but construct institutional reality. Thus, if the riot would had been 
performed, the riot would have been institutionally real. By institutionally real, I mean 
that it would have all of the institutional effects of a real riot with none of the material or, 
in Searle’s terms, brute effects. Riots, of course, have numerous effects beyond their 
brute destruction of material; they express displeasure, voice dissent or solidify 
opposition. But perhaps a riot’s most obvious and central object is the institution of the 
state. Riots destabilize state institutions. Moving, and thereby quarantining, the riot off 
stage was enough to make the play acceptable because it no longer contained an 
institutionally real riot, which had the power to destabilize the state. Tilney’s scene, a 
constative recounting of a riot, would not have had the ability to produce these 
institutionally real effects. 
Tilney’s manuscript is the only direct evidence of a censor moving a riot off stage 
in order to make the play acceptable; however, there is circumstantial evidence that this 
practice was more wide spread that just this single occurrence, for as Clare reminds us, 
“behind some of the … dramatic texts of the period, there may lie a censored 
document.”113  Indeed, the extant forms of The Life and Depth of Jack Straw and 
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus suggest they too were censored or self-censored in accordance 
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with Tilney’s anxiety over staged riots, which further suggests that these two plays also 
understood stage utterances as performative.  
Several critics have dealt with the seemingly harsh treatment that Sir Thomas 
More receives as opposed to the supposedly lenient treatment that Jack Straw and 
Coriolanus received.  The plays were written within ten years of one another and each 
contains a “riot scene,” yet only Sir Thomas More seems to have been censored. Clare 
uses this discrepancy to propose that “in the early Jacobean period there was some 
relaxation of censorship.”114 Taking a different approach, Dutton observes that the riots in 
Sir Thomas More may reference or echo the anti-alien riots that occurred in London 
throughout the 1590’s. The riots in Coriolanus, on the other hand, mirror the corn riots 
that occurred in Midland in 1607. Dutton believes that Tilney was more concerned with 
London proper than he was with any rural uprising; thus, he was only concerned with Sir 
Thomas More.115 However, I am not convinced that Coriolanus was not censored. 
Indeed, internal evidence seems to suggest that Shakespeare’s play was censored (either 
by Tilney, his successor Buc or Shakespeare himself) and was censored in the same way 
that Tilney censored Sir Thomas More: the performance of a riot was moved off stage.116 
The narrative of Coriolanus does, in a broad sense, depict a riot; however this riot is 
actually made up of the representation of a recounting of a riot, not a representation of an 
enactment. The riot occurs in the first scene and critics often refer to it as “the initial riot 
scene.” Indeed, the opening stage directions clearly set the stage for a riot: “Enter a 
company of mutinous Citizens with staves, clubs, and other weapons.” However, what 
follows is not the enactment of riot, but the makings of a riot, discourse concerning riots 
and a description of a separate riot. The “mutinous Citizens” described in the stage 
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direction never actually mutiny – the adjective never becomes a verb. Menenius and 
Coriolanus stop the mob before they actually start to riot. Beyond the “mutinous 
Citizens” potential riot, there is another riot occurring, but it is occurring off stage. The 
Citizens describe this riot as they plan their own: “What shouts are these? The other side 
o’th’ city is risen. Why / stay we prating here? To th’ Capitol!” (1.1.39-40) What is found 
in the text of Coriolanus is not an enactment of a riot, but the recounting of a riot. 117 
As with most early modern dramatic texts, we do not have the original manuscript 
of Coriolanus barring the signature and comments of the Master of Revels, so we can’t 
know if he told Shakespeare to, “Leave out the insurrection wholly” and replace it with a 
“reportt afterwards,” as Tilney instructed Munday. And we can’t know if there ever was 
an enactment of a riot; it is entirely possible that Shakespeare only wrote the recounting 
of the riot that we get in the folio version of the play – the only early modern edition. But 
either way, the fact that the folio edition contains a recounting and not an enactment 
suggests that Tilney’s injunction against staging riots was observed by Shakespeare.  
That is, either Shakespeare was censored or he anticipated the censorship and wrote his 
play in such a way that avoided the Master of Revels’ censor. In fact, Shakespeare was 
well positioned to understand how riots were censored. Shakespeare more than likely 
worked on the Sir Thomas More manuscript about a decade before he wrote Coriolanus 
and so would have known better than to stage a riot.118 
In any case, it is not necessary to explain the Master of Revels’ actions in regards 
to Coriolanus through a narrative of increasing leniency (Clare) or by pointing out the 
differing content of the plays (Dutton). Each play contains the same technique of 
censorship which relies on a distinction between enactment and recounting, which points 
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towards an understanding of stage utterances as performative. Riots are contained by 
turning performative enactments into constative recounting. 
The Life and Death of Jack Straw holds to a similar pattern. There are no riots on 
stage, merely discourse describing riots. For instance at the beginning of the third act, the 
Lord Mayor describes to the King the insurrection: “Burning up Bookes and matters of 
records, / Defacing houses of hostilltie, / Saint Iones in Smithfield, the Savoy and such 
like” (3.10.524-527).119  However, these actions are never represented on stage. It is 
usually assumed that the printed edition of Jack Straw has been cut by the censor; the 
play’s unusually short length and structural inconsistency both point to the censor’s 
intervention.120 It is impossible to know for sure what was cut by the Revel’s office, but I 
would assume, as does Clare, that much of the rebellion has been cut. Indeed, Clare 
suggests that the “original version would have included the acts of violence and 
victimization described by Holinshed.121 In Jack Straw, like Sir Thomas More and 
Coriolanus, the riot is described but not performed. There is a recounting but not an 
enacting.  
This is not to say that all riots were recounted and not enacted. Some staged riots 
clearly did make their way past the censor for reasons that can only be speculated upon. 
For instance, The Jake Cade scene in 2 Henry VI is also often compared with Sir Thomas 
More as an example of a representation of an early modern insurrection that was left 
uncensored. For instance, Clare suggests that 2 Henry VI was not censored because “the 
Cade scenes represent more of a parody than a real rebellion.”122 A similar argument 
might be made to account for the riots in Julius Caesar. The play itself is anti-mob, and 
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so the scenes of rioting are placed within an acceptable context and so drained of their 
institutional effects. 
Nevertheless, what the censorship practices of Sir Thomas More, Coriolanus and 
Jack Straw suggest is that the construction of stage utterances as performative made its 
way into the censor’s office, that is, into the legal level of the social formation of 
playgoing. Thus, we can trace the effect of the non-reactive playgoer through the 
construction of performative utterances onto this level of the social formation. Of course, 
this in and of itself is not enough to prove that stage utterances were constructed as 
performative; however, by transcoding between censorship practices and the other levels 
of the social formation of playgoing, this construction will become clearer as will the 
entire structure of the social formation and its reliance on the absent cause of the non-
reactive playgoer. 
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Tilney and the playwrights conspired 
together to create this construction anymore than I would argue that the playwrights as a 
group conspired to produce this construction. They all produced the same construction 
because they all existed within the social formation of playgoing. And it is the economic 
imperative of the social formation that produced this construction. As Althusser’s 
metaphor of the agentless theater suggests, the construction of playgoing itself is 
agentless. No one consciously produced it; it arose from the social formation of 
playgoing. Again, this helps explain why playgoing is constructed similarly throughout 
the period. The individual playwrights did not need to know what they were constructing 
or how their construction built on another playwright’s construction since, ultimately, 
they were not the ones doing the constructing.  
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But of course, locating or denying agency is not that simple: just because the 
playwrights were not the ultimate agent of this construction because the construction was 
economically determined “in the last instance,” does not mean that the playwrights were 
not in some ways conscious of the construction or even that they were not the willing 
agent of that construction. It simply means that the individual playwrights were not 
ultimately responsible for the entire social formation of playgoing, nor did they need to 
grasp the entirety of it to produce their individual plays. This is because they did not 
grasp the ultimate absent cause of the social formation even while they were participating 
in its effects. As Badiou suggests, “What makes the thing that I [playwright] have to 
come to know [the effects of the absent cause] enter into the field of knowledge [the 
social formation] remains itself unknown [the absent cause] to the knowing” 123 Or as the 
prologue to George Chapman’s All Fools (used as an epigraph for this chapter) observes, 
“And none knows the hidden causes of those strange effects” (Pro. 2-3). 
In the end, because the questions surrounding agency and intentionality are 
fraught with difficulties that cannot be addressed by a single study, I will largely avoid 
discussions of agency and intention.124 However, in the interest of brevity and syntactic 
simplicity, I will usually refer to the playwrights or the plays themselves as the 
grammatical if not philosophical agent of this construction instead of constantly stating 
that the social formation of playgoing produced this particular concept in order to control 
the unruly audience and therefore insure its own survival. It is simpler to say that the 
playwrights and plays constructed playgoing. And in the end, the pages that follow are 
dedicated to analyzing the object of the previous sentence not the subject. That is, this 
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study attempts to describe the construction of playgoing, not determine who did the 








































Note: the material conditions of the 
playhouse will not be covered until the 
fourth chapter.  






Performance’s Response to Audience: The Relationship between Audience, Performance 
and Reality 





My analysis of early modern censorship practices has suggested that the Master of 
Revels understood and constructed stage utterances as performative. Because the primary 
object of performative stage utterances is institutional reality and not the audience, this 
construction of stage utterances positions the audience as the non-object of the 
performance thereby constructing the audience as non-reactive. Of course, an analysis of 
a handful of censored texts is not enough proof to demonstrate this claim. If stage 
utterances really were constructed as performative, then the effects of that construction 
should be noticeable in other levels of the social formation of playgoing. Perhaps most 
noticeably this construction should be visible in the play texts themselves, the cultural 
level of the social formation.  
The plays that clearly demonstrate the construction of stage utterances as 
performative are those that go out of their way to create inset audiences. These inset 
audiences often have no narrative function. They seem to be created for purely 
metadramatic reasons – at least in part, to construct playgoing.  Furthermore, these plays 
are easily compared to Tilney’s censorship practices because they seem to be utilizing 
Tilney’s technique only in reverse: where Tilney’s suppression of riot scenes works by 
moving the performance of a riot off stage and turning the performative riot into a 
constative recounting of a riot, metadrama often works by changing a constative 
recounting into a performative enactment by supplying or constructing an audience.  
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These plays go out of their way to place a character in a position to watch other 
characters’ actions thereby turning those actions into a de facto performance – so 
constructing an inset audience also constructs an inset performance. The reason for this 
construction is often the exact inverse of Tilney’s reason for forcing the riot off stage; 
where Tilney did not want the riot to be institutionally real, this type of metadrama wants 
the performance to be institutionally real, at least within the fictive reality of the play. By 
dramatizing how the performance becomes institutionally real, these plays are 
demonstrating how performance responds to the presence of an audience.   
Speech act terms, then, can be used to transcode between the censorship practices 
(the legal level of the social formation) and the texts (the cultural level of the social 
formation) since both can be shown to be depicting stage utterances as performative. 
Furthermore, speech act theory’s terms can be used to transcode between the various 
texts that make up the cultural level of the social formation thereby demonstrating how 
the culture of playgoing attempted to construct stage performances as performative.  
But this creation of inset audiences is doing more than just constructing stage 
utterances as performative.  Performance is existentially dependent on audience, so a 
construction of performance is necessarily bound up with a construction of audience. By 
reflecting on the nature of stage utterances within a performance, these plays are also 
reflecting on the efficacy of performance and its relationship to audience. By depicting 
stage utterances as performative, these plays make institutional reality, and not the 
audience, the object of the performance. Thus constructed audiences form what I will 
refer to as the triadic relationship of playgoing: the relationship among audience, reality 
and performance. This relationship can be described as follows: the presence of the 
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audience creates a performance, and that performance then constructs institutional reality. 
However, the chain of effects ends there; the performance is not meant to directly affect 
the audience because performative utterances are not designed to produce an effect in the 
audience. The audience is necessary, but only in so far as they are a necessary condition 
for a performance. Audience, in a sense, affects the performance; the performance does 
not affect the audience. Consequently, 
the audience is the non-object of the 
performance; they are placed in a 
position where they are asked not to 
react. 
This construction of playgoing 
may come as a shock to some readers; 
the idea that performance was not meant 
to affect the audience may seem 
particularly counterintuitive. After all, 
drama, and more broadly art, has been understood, at least since Aristotle, as designed to 
produce an effect within the audience. Aristotle’s concept of catharsis clearly locates the 
object of performance within the audience and the playgoer’s consciousness. And more 
broadly, the rhetorical tradition, which of course was influenced by Aristotle, also locates 
the object of language in the audience. Indeed, one of the major purposes and goals of 
rhetoric is to convince the audience to act. For instance, Thomas Wilson’s popular 
rhetorical manual, The Art of Rhetoric, describes the goal of deliberative (as opposed to 
judicial or ceremonial) rhetoric:  
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Triadic Relationship of Playgoing  
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An oration deliberative is a mean whereby we do persuade or dissuade, entreat or 
rebuke, exhort or deport, commend or comfort any man … the whole compass of 
this cause is either to advise our neighbor to that thing which we think most 
needful for him, or else to call him back from that folly which hindereth much his 
estimation.126 
 
And Wayne A. Rebhorn argues that the primary goal of most early modern rhetoric was 
to get the audience to do what the rhetor wanted: “The treatises and handbooks 
themselves see the student engaged in what is essentially a one-sided argument in which 
he does the speaking and his audience, overwhelmed by his eloquence, agrees to do what 
he wants them to do.127  But by constructing stage utterances as performative, 
playwrights were moving away from this rhetorical and classical tradition by asserting 
that the purpose of their drama was not to get the audience to act, but was to construct the 
institutions that the audience lived within. In short, performative language offers an 
alternative to rhetorical language, an alternative that early modern playwrights seemed to 
have embraced. 
Furthermore, the triadic relationship is a different model of performance from the 
one described by the early modern trope of performance-as-mirror. Throughout the early 
modern period, writers used the metaphor of a mirror to describe the effect art has on the 
audience. Art, according to writers such as Philip Sidney, Thomas Nashe and George 
Puttenham, is able to affect the audience by holding a mirror up to the audience, so they 
can see a representation of their vices, which would then lead them to reform.128 The 
incredibly popular Mirror of Magistrates uses this principle to show rulers how not to 
rule. Indeed, one of the most famous metadramatic scenes in early modern drama 
describes performance as functioning like a mirror. When Hamlet gives advice to his 
players, he tells them “the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was 
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and is to hold as ‘twere the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature” (3.2.18-
21). And when Hamlet puts this theory to the test by staging The Murder of Gonzaga, the 
theory is shown to be correct – the play succeeds in affecting the audience by catching 
“the conscience of the king” (2.2.582). 
Because of Hamlet’s popularity and because of the popularity of the performance-
as-mirror trope in early modern literature, critics tend to see Hamlet as normative. 
William B. Worthen goes as far to say that Hamlet “nearly becomes the kind of 
theoretical investigation of performance that the Renaissance theater otherwise failed to 
produce.”129 Worthen seems to be suggesting Hamlet’s representation of performance is 
the period’s understanding of performance. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, 
the metadrama of Hamlet is actually atypical. Metadrama, in so far as it constructs 
playgoing, more often then not works against this model by staging the triadic 
relationship.   
Philip Massinger’s The Roman Actor, for one, seems to be disagreeing with 
precisely the view of performance expressed in Hamlet.  Like Shakespeare’s play, The 
Roman Actor stages a test of the mirror theory of performance, but unlike Hamlet, 
Massinger dramatizes the failure of this theory and consequently the failure of 
performance to affect the audience.  The actor Paris stages a performance specifically 
designed to redeem a playgoer by holding a mirror up to his sins. Paris expresses his 
belief in the redemptive power of performance when he defends the theater against 
Caesar’s claims that the theater is immoral: 
Do we teach, 
By the success of wicked undertakings, 
Others to tread in their forbidden steps? 
We show no arts of Lydian pandarism 
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Corinthian poisons, Persian flatteries, 
But mulcted so in the conclusion that 
Even those spectators that were so inclined 
Go home changed men (1.3.99-106).130 
 
What follows is a list of various vices (adultery, greed, corruption) that Paris believes can 
be cured through performance. As Charles Pastoor points out, Paris’s description of the 
effect performance has on the audience relies on the theory that art should function like a 
mirror and is similar to the view of performance expressed by Hamlet.131   
 This view of performance, however, is ultimately shown to be faulty, for when 
Paris attempts to implement this theory, his performance fails to produce the desired 
result; it fails to redeem the audience. Paris tells Parthenius that he can cure his father, 
Philargus, of avarice by staging a performance that will hold a mirror up to his sin. He 
explains this process to Parthenius in terms reminiscent of his argument to Caesar and 
Hamlet’s advice to his players: 
 Your father, looking on a covetous man 
 Presented on the stage as in a mirror, 
 May see his own deformity and loathe it. 
 Now, could you but persuade the emperor 
 To see a comedy we have that’s styled  
 The Cure of Avarice, and to command  
 Your father to be a spectator of it, 
 He shall be so anatomised in the scene, 
 And see himself so personated, the baseness  
 Of a self-torturing miserable wretch 
 Truly described, that I much hope the object 
 Will work compunction in him (2.1.97-108).  
 
Despite Paris’s claim, the play that he produces, as many critics have noticed, does not 
work; after seeing the play Philargus remains unrepentant.132 Although Philargus does 
identify with his dramatic doppelganger, Philargus disowns him when he repents: “An 
old fool to be gull’d thus! Had he died / As I resolve to do, not to be alter’d, / It had gone 
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off twanging” (2.1.407-409). Philargus remains unaffected (not “alter’d”) by the 
performance; instead, in a reversal that frustrates everybody involved, he wishes to 
influence the content of the play.  
The failure of Paris’s performance seems to be largely dismissed by critics. 
Joanne Rochester suggests that while the performance fails, “Paris’s faith in the power of 
his theatre is established, regardless of the failure of the play” because Philargus at least 
recognized himself in the mirror of the performance.133 And Edward L. Rocklin dismisses 
Massinger’s whole play as an anomaly: “There is a sense in which The Roman Actor is 
more pessimistic about the power of art to correct and inform its audience than any other 
play written between 1580 and 1642.”134  Rocklin doesn’t provide examples to support 
his claim, but even within Massinger’s canon this “pessimistic” view of performance is 
not unique. Massinger repeats this view of performance six years later in The City 
Madam. Again, performances (a musical performance and a dumb show) are staged to 
reform a miser (Luke) and again the play fails to affect its intended object. Luke remains 
unrepentant and claims:  
This move me to compassion, or raise  
One sign of seeming pity in my face? 
You are deciev’d. It rather renders me 
More flinty, and obdurate (5.3.61-64).135 
 
This inset performance is more complicated than the performance within The Roman 
Actor because Luke, unlike Philargus, does eventually reform; however, the play makes 
clear it is not the fictional performances that affect Luke, but real-life examples. After the 
performances fail to affect him, Luke asks John (the individual directing the 
performances) to show him “Some other object, if / your art can show it” (5.3.75-76).  
Instead of staging another fictional performance, John tells him that he will show him 
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“one thing real” (3.3.77). John then has Luke watch, not a fictional performance, but two 
real characters (Anne and Mary) ask for forgiveness from their husbands. This display of 
repentance convinces Luke to reform. The play’s conclusion about the efficacy of 
performance seems clear – fictional stage performances cannot affect the audience, even 
though real life examples can.  
Rochester, in her analysis of this play, again seems to dismiss the importance of 
the failure of the inset performance.  She believes that Luke is simply an “incompetent 
spectator.”136  But perhaps Massinger is not depicting the spectator as incompetent, but 
constructing performance as incompetent, or more precisely, as impotent. That is, 
Massinger is depicting performance as unable to affect the audience because he does not 
want performance to be affective. He doesn’t want the audience to see themselves as the 
object of performance because he doesn’t want the audience to actively respond to his 
play.   He, like many early modern playwrights, did not want the audience to see 
themselves as active participants in the performance, but wanted them to be non-reactive 
observers of drama. As will be shown, by dramatizing the triadic relationship between 
audience, performance and reality, playwrights throughout the period (Marlowe, Jonson, 
Brome, and sometimes even Shakespeare) seem to concur with the view of performance 
expressed in The Roman Actor and The City Madam.  In the final analysis, Massinger’s 
view of drama’s efficacy is normative and Hamlet’s is the anomaly. 
The wedding scene in John Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi provides perhaps the 
best example of this triadic relationship because the scene depicts a wedding ceremony as 
a figure for a stage performance, and a wedding ceremony, as suggested in the previous 
chapter, is a perfect example of performative actions. Webster seems to go out of his way 
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to describe the Duchess’s marriage as a stage performance by creating an audience for 
her marriage. The scene then becomes metadramatic in that it attempts to recreate the 
basic conditions of the stage: an audience and a performance. By depicting the scene as 
metadramatic, Webster equates wedding vows, a clear example of performative 
utterances, with stage utterances. Once stage utterances are depicted as performative 
utterances, the full construction of the triadic relationship can be dramatized and 
explored. Indeed, The Duchess of Malfi provides one of the fullest treatments of not only 
the triadic relationship, but as we will see throughout this study, the whole of the social 
formation of playgoing.  
The marriage scene is clearly exploring performative utterance because marriages 
in general are one of the clearest examples of how speech acts function. Indeed, one of 
Austin’s favorite examples of the performative speech act is the marriage ceremony (the 
other is wagers) because all marriages utilize performative utterances; the words uttered 
during a legitimate marriage always do the work of marrying the couple, thereby creating 
an institutional reality – a marriage. However, what counts as a legitimate marriage is not 
universal. It varies from culture to culture. When Austin gives the example of a marriage 
vow as a speech act, he is describing a marriage as it is defined by twentieth century 
western society; he is not giving a universal or transhistorical exploration of speech acts. 
The specificity of the example is apparent in his description:  “It is always necessary that 
the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, 
appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other 
persons should also perform certain other actions.”137 In other words, the social, legal and 
cultural context of the utterance has to be just right for the utterance to work and perform 
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an action. To demonstrate this point, Austin gives a short list of such requirements: “it is 
essential that I should not be already married with a wife living, sane and undivorced, and 
so on.”138 To this list could be added: the marriage is performed in front of witnesses and 
overseen by someone legally able to perform marriages (clergy, justice of the peace, ship 
captain).  
In early modern England, however, the context that was necessary for a marriage 
to work was quite different than it was in Austin’s time and place. For instance, B.J. and 
Mary Sokol observe that “today it is almost unbelievable that a valid marriage could have 
been created as informally as it was seen to be in John Webster’s play The Duchess of 
Malfi.”139 We find the Duchess’s marriage unbelievable because she is clearly employing 
a particular type of marriage – a spousal, which is no longer considered legitimate by 
most western societies. A spousal is a marriage that is performed by the two parties 
entering into a marriage contract without a clergy or other authority figure (clergy or state 
official) present.140  Within the marriage scene, the Duchess overtly announces her intent 
to perform this type of marriage:  “I have heard lawyers say, a contract in a chamber per 
verba de presenti is absolute marriage” (1.1.478-479).141 Not only does the Duchess’s 
legal language signal the deployment of a spousal, it also demonstrates an understanding 
of marriage as ultimately performed by and constitutive of language – per verba, by 
means of words.  Austin’s understanding of marriage as constructed through performative 
utterances is mirrored in the language of early modern marriage law (which the Duchess 
employs), but the necessary circumstances for a per verba marriage to work do not reflect 
Austin’s understanding of marriage. Significantly in early modern England, the social 
position of the speaker had nothing to do with the performance of a per verba 
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marriage.142 The marrying couple could perform the marriage themselves without 
witnesses or state officials.143  
Given the rather broad range of social contexts that would support the 
performative utterances of an early modern marriage, the Duchess’s inclusion of a 
witness, even though she doesn’t need one, seems conspicuous. That is, Cariola’s 
presence at the wedding cannot be explained through legal requirements. That being said, 
many couples used a witness even though they didn’t need one. Witnesses were used for 
a fairly obvious reason: they could confirm that a wedding actually took place in the 
event that the legitimacy of the marriage was challenged by interested parties.144  For 
instance, family members who opposed the marriage, a husband who regretted his 
decision to marry after consummation or a jilted fiancé from a previously arranged 
marriage might have wanted to deny that the wedding ever took place. However, the 
Duchess makes it explicitly clear that this is not the reason she wishes Cariola to witness 
the marriage. Before Antonio comes on stage, the Duchess tells Cariola that she needs her 
to keep the marriage a secret: “Cariola, / To thy known secrecy I have given up / More 
than my life, my fame:” (1.1.349-351). Cariola then promises that she will indeed keep 
the secret: “For I’ll conceal this secret from the world” (1.1.352). Still, the Duchess is not 
content merely to inform Cariola of the secret; she must also be present when the secret 
marriage is performed. She instructs Cariola to hide and listen to her discussion with 
Antonio, “place thyself behind the arras, / Where thou mayst overhear us” (1.1.358-359). 
When the actual marriage ceremony is taking place, the Duchess does not want Cariola to 
only overhear the ceremony, she also must see it, and so she asks her to come forward to 
watch the proceedings (1.1.475). In short, the Duchess demands that Cariola witness the 
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marriage but at the same time demands that it remain a secret. Brian Corrigan accurately 
describes Cariola’s role as a “secret witness to the secret vows.”145  However, Corrigan 
never reflects on what it means to be a secret witness. Indeed, a “secret witness” is 
oxymoronic. Witnesses do not keep secrets; they report on the event they witnessed to 
inform other individuals, who are not present at the event.  Huston Diehl’s reading of 
Cariola’s presence at the marriage also reflects an understanding of Cariola as a witness: 
“[Cariola] witnesses the private marriage of the couple and can therefore testify to its 
existence.”146 But the Duchess does not want Cariola to testify to its existence – she has 
been sworn to secrecy. Cariola’s presence at the wedding is conspicuous in that she is 
clearly present for a reason, but the reason is not explicitly supplied by the narrative. 
There is no practical or legal reason for her to witness the marriage.   
There could, however, be an emotional reason for her presence. Cariola is the 
Duchess’s friend and confidant, and so the she may be including Cariola in the wedding 
simply because she wants a friend present. Indeed, before her marriage to Antonio, one 
gets the sense that she is an isolated figure, who cannot honestly communicate with her 
brothers or her court. Thus, she relies on Cariola for support and friendship. And, of 
course, the Duchess would have a hard time keeping a secret from her own waiting 
woman and bed fellow, so Webster had to let Cariola in on the secret to avoid awkward 
scenes latter in the play.  One the other hand, Webster could have easily written the play 
without giving the Duchess a waiting woman. 
However, if we view Cariola’s presence at the wedding within the broader social 
formation of playgoing and through a metadramatic interpretive lens, a clear reason for 
her presences (as opposed to an emotional, practical or legal reason) emerges.  
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Specifically, if Cariola’s conspicuous presence at the Duchess’s marriage is compared to 
Tilney’s censorship of Sir Thomas More by transcoding between the two via speech act 
terminology, Cariola’s purpose at the wedding can be better understood; she is not a 
witness to the wedding, but an audience member of the performance of a marriage.  In 
fact, the Duchess (and Webster) seems to be drawing on the same understanding of 
performance that Tilney is only the Duchess is utilizing performance to create the 
opposite effect of Tilney’s censorship technique. Where Tilney hides the audience from 
the performance to negate the performance’s ability to become institutional reality, the 
Duchess includes an audience in order to lend her marriage the power of performance. 
Without an audience, the Duchess’s marriage would not be a performance and so would 
not be able to produce an institutionally real marriage.  So the Duchess constructs an 
audience to turn her marriage into a performance. 
That being said, the Duchess could have had a legal and therefore institutionally 
real marriage without Cariola’s presence since spousals were considered legitimate even 
without an audience, and so the Duchess could have created a real marriage without a 
performance.  Nevertheless, the legality of the marriage reinforces the ability of the 
performance to become institutionally real. By dramatizing a marriage that is based on 
performance and on legal principles, Webster is able to demonstrate how both processes 
are able to construct an institution (a marriage) out of language. He seems to be equating 
marriage ceremony to performance and showing them both to work through performative 
language.   
By creating a conspicuous audience, the Duchess is also creating a conspicuous 
performance. Again, there is no narrative reason why the Duchess’s marriage should be 
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depicted as a performance. This depiction of her marriage as performance makes sense, 
however, if it is analyzed metadramatically. The Duchess’s marriage is depicted as a 
performance to reflect on playgoing, and so the scene dramatizes not only a fictional 
marriage but an inset performance with an inset audience that metadramatically reflects 
on the nature of performance and on the audience’s role within the performance. Indeed, 
critics often note Webster’s penchant for metadrama, though this marriage scene has not 
to my knowledge been considered a piece of metadrama.147 But when her marriage is 
understood as metadramatic (because of the conspicuousness of the audience), then the 
triadic relationship of playgoing is clearly visible within this scene: the Duchess places 
Cariola at the wedding in order to construct a marriage; the audience then gives her 
marriage the ability to create institutional reality (the marriage). The marriage, however, 
has no discernable effect on Cariola (it is not rhetorical); she is simply present to lend the 
actions she watches the ability to produce institutional reality.  
The ability of the audience to lend the actions they watch the quality of a 
performance is also evident in Ferdinand’s response to the Duchess’s marriage, but 
instead of giving the marriage the quality of a performance, he refuses to be an audience 
to the marriage. When she attempts to introduce her brother to Antonio, she significantly 
highlights Ferdinand’s position as observer.  She does not ask, will you meet my 
husband, but rather asks, “Will you see my husband?” (3.2.86 emphasis mine).148 She 
wants Ferdinand to be an observer of the couple rather than an interlocutor or active 
participant in the scene; in other words, she wants to construct another (non-reactive) 
audience. Now that her secret marriage is made public, the Duchess wants to recreate or 
re-perform the marriage thereby creating the “echo” that she demanded from the church 
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during her first performance of marriage: “We are now man and wife, and ‘tis the church 
/ That must but echo this” (1.1.492-493). Given Ferdinand’s disapproval of the marriage, 
it is not surprising that he does exactly the opposite of what the Duchess asks by denying 
her this second performance.  
Indeed, where the Duchess simply wants Ferdinand to see her husband, and not 
necessarily interact with him, Ferdinand talks with (or rather at) Antonio but refuses to 
see him (3.2.87-109). At one point in this one way conversation, he explicitly states his 
desire not to see his new brother-in-law: “I would not for ten millions / I had beheld thee” 
(3.2.95-96). Ferdinand states that he does not wish to see Antonio because he is afraid 
that if he does, he will do something which “would damn us both” (3.2.95).  However, 
embedded in Ferdinand’s refusal to see the couple is an understanding that viewing a 
performance will in some way legitimize it by granting it the quality of a performance 
and therefore providing an echo of the first performance and marriage.149 Thus, 
Ferdinand is self-consciously denying his role as an audience member by refusing to be a 
witness to the couple, and true to his word, exits before Antonio comes back on stage. 
This desire to deny the Duchess an audience is also evident in Ferdinand’s response to 
the Duchess’s question, “Will you see my husband?” He replies, “Yes, if I could change / 
eyes with a basilisk” (3.2.86-87).  He agrees to witness the two only if his eyes were able 
to kill the couple rather than merely observe them. The image of the basilisk becomes a 
kind of anti-audience, one that does not produce reality out of the actions it witnesses, but 
destroys what it sees.  Since this role as an anti-audience member is not possible 
(audiences always grant the actions they watch the quality of a performance), Ferdinand 
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denies the two an audience. Indeed, throughout the rest of the play, Ferdinand will not be 
present when the two are together on stage.  
Another (simpler) example of a constructed or inset audience exists within The 
Duchess of Malfi that corroborates or reinforces the triadic relationship between 
audience, performance and institutional reality found in the Duchess’s metadramatic 
wedding. When the Duchess, Antonio and her children are banished, their banishment is 
accomplished through a performance – a dumb show or an inset performance. And this 
performance is viewed by an audience – two pilgrims. Like Cariola’s conspicuous 
presence at the Duchess’s marriage, the pilgrims’ presence at the dumb show is not fully 
explained through the narrative. Indeed, they seem to stumble upon the dumb show, and 
after they witness it, are never heard from again. Unlike Cariola, they comment upon the 
performance they watch and their comments confirm the ability of the performance to 
become institutional reality.150 For instance, the Second Pilgrim verifies that what they 
just watched produced a change in institutional reality by simply stating, “they are 
banished” (3.4.27). Although they do question where the authority to accomplish this 
banishment comes from – “what power hath this state / of Ancona to determine of a free 
prince?” and “But by what justice” (3.4.28-39; 34) – they do not question the 
effectiveness of the dumb show, which accomplishes the banishment. Like the Duchess’s 
marriage, this banishment is produced through a performance, and the performative 
nature of the banishment is highlighted through a constructed audience, whose presence 
is conspicuous. Furthermore, the pilgrims are not the object of the performance they 
watch. The proceedings do not rhetorically affect them. Even though they express 
sympathy for Antonio and the Duchess, they move on with a dismissive air: “Come, lets 
83 
hence. / Fortune makes this conclusion general: / All things do help th’unhappy man to 
fall” (3.4.42-44 emphasis his). And of course, they are not being banished; they are 
simply commenting upon Antonio’s unlucky narrative and then moving along largely 
unaffected by the performance.  
Indeed, their knowledge of Antonio’s narrative further sets them up as a figure for 
the playhouse audience who is watching the performance. It is not clear how they know 
so much about the couple’s affairs. Although there are a lot of rumors about Antonio and 
the Duchess, this is the first time they (or at least the First Pilgrim) have been to this 
chapel: “I have not seen a goodlier shrine than this, / Yet I have visited many” (3.4.1-2). 
They seem to be wandering pilgrims, but can accurately summarize and comment on the 
couple’s narrative. Their knowledge makes sense if we view their position within the 
narrative metadramatically: they know about the couple because the playhouse audience 
they represent knows about the couple. Or to put it another way, their knowledge, like 
their presence, is conspicuous but can be understood if we view them as a figure for the 
playhouse audience. 
By depicting inset performances as impacting institutional reality, the play 
positions the inset audience (the Pilgrims and Cariola) as non-reactive playgoers. They 
are not rhetorically affected by the performance but become unaffected observers to 
performative actions. Simultaneously, the stage audience that the inset audience 
represents is also positioned as the non-object of the playhouse performance and 
constructed as non-reactive playgoers. In fact, as I will argue in the next chapter, The 
Duchess of Malfi goes out of its way to link the inset audience with the playhouse 
audience in an attempt to influence the playhouse audience’s thoughts about their own 
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role in the playhouse. That is, by watching representations of themselves, the audience’s 
position within the playhouse is being constructed for them. To appropriate Hamlet’s 
description of performance as a mirror, the inset audiences of The Duchess of Malfi show 
the audience images of themselves to influence their thoughts about their role within the 
playhouse. But while Hamlet describes the mirror as reflecting nature and the audience’s 
morality, the metadramatic mirror within The Duchess of Malfi reflects the playgoer qua 
playgoer. That is, Webster does not dramatize moral behavior to show playgoers how to 
act within a moral universe and to affect their conscience, but depicts playgoing behavior 
to show playgoers how to behave within the playhouse and to affect their playhouse 
behavior. This construction process, of course, creates a paradox: playwrights use 
metadrama to position the audience as the non-object of the performance and so 
paradoxically convince the audience through performance not to be convinced by 
performance. In other words, The Duchess of Malfi affects the audience to not affect the 
audience.  
This same basic technique of constructing audiences to create institutional reality 
that is deployed by the Duchess is also present in Marlowe’s Tamburlaine and Edward II. 
Both title characters use this process to affect the transfer of authority and so to produce 
the institutional reality of the monarchy. However, Tamburlaine and Edward II use the 
triadic relationship for different ends: Tamburlaine uses it to insure his victory over 
Cosroe, and Edward II uses it to destabilize his enemies’ victory over himself. Despite 
their differences, in both plays the triadic relationship is asserted/constructed and then 
used in order to manipulate the transfer of authority. And in both plays, Marlowe uses the 
subject and language of the transfer of authority not just to reflect on the nature of power 
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and how power is transferred, but to reflect on the relationship among performance, 
audience and institutional reality.151  Similarly, The Duchess of Malfi uses the subject and 
language of marriage to reflect on the triadic relationship. By using speech act terms to 
transcode between Marlowe’s plays and the Duchess of Malfi, and between both plays 
and Tilney’s censorship practices, we can see how all of these texts are contributing to 
the same social formation of playgoing which seeks to construct stage utterances as 
performative. 
In Tamburlaine, the triadic relationship is deployed by Tamburlaine to effectively 
depose Mycetes. When Tamburlaine encounters Mycetes alone on the battlefield, he has 
the opportunity to steal his crown; Mycetes gives the crown to Tamburlaine (without 
knowing who he is) and is unable to get it back. However, Tamburlaine chooses not to 
steal the crown.  Instead, Tamburlaine seems to forgo theft in favor of performance.  He 
tells Mycetes as much when he gives him back his crown: “Here, take it for a while, I 
lend it thee, / Till I may see thee hemmed with armed men. / Then shalt thou see me pull 
it from thy head” (2.4.38-40).152  In her commentary of this scene, Kateryna Schray 
argues that Tamburlaine is simply being dismissive here: “Ultimately, Mycetes is so 
ineffectual that he is not even worth defeating on stage.”153 However, Schray seems to be 
missing the reason why Tamburlaine does not take the crown. Tamburlaine does not 
defeat Mycetes because they are on a (playhouse) stage but because Tamburlaine does 
not have a (inset) stage. That is, he does not have an audience and therefore does not have 
a performance, and without a performance, his actions will not have institutional effects. 
The taking of the crown will not produce an institutionally real deposition.  For a 
deposition to occur, Tamburlaine needs an audience a group of “armed men” who will 
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“see [Tamburlaine] pull it from [Mycetes’] head.” Tamburlaine, who as Marjorie Garber 
has shown, clearly understands the power of performative speech acts, has manipulated 
the situation so that the taking of the crown will have institutional force.154 
 In fact, the next scene deploys the triadic relationship to effect the institution of 
the monarchy. The triadic relationship is used in order to transfer authority to Cosroe: 
there is an audience, a performance (the crowning of Cosroe) and the creation of 
institutional reality (Cosroe is the new monarch), which is confirmed by the narrative; no 
one questions that Cosroe is king.  What does not occur is the actual deposition of 
Mycetes. Although the playhouse audience gets to see the coronation of Cosroe take 
place, the actual deposition of Mycetes never takes place on stage. The playhouse 
audience is left to assume that Tamburlaine has made good on his word and performed 
the deposition in front of an inset audience. Of course, throughout the play, Tamburlaine 
always does what he says he is going to do, so this assumption is well grounded. 
Nevertheless, the absence of the deposition from the stage performance seems 
significant and even conspicuous given Tilney’s censorship technique of moving 
controversial scenes off stage to limit the institutional effect of performances, and 
Marlowe’s grasp of the triadic relationship (he dramatized this relationship on either side 
of the absent deposition).  It is possible that Marlowe or Tinley moved the scene off stage 
in order to keep the deposition from becoming institutionally real. To stage the deposition 
of Mycetes in front of the stage audience would have had the institutional effects of a real 
deposition, just as staging the riot in Sir Thomas More would have had the institutional 
effects of a real riot. What those supposed institutionally real effects would have been is 
difficult to discern.  Obviously, the real and long dead Mycetes was in no position to be 
87 
deposed through a fictional performance, nor was Queen Elizabeth going to be dethroned 
because of a fictional deposition. The effects that either Marlowe or Tilney feared would 
probably have been more subtle and vague than that. Enacting a deposition affects the 
institution of the monarchy by destabilizing it. That the specific monarch is still the 
monarch is beside the point; the actual institution of the monarchy would have been 
destabilized through the performance of a deposition.  
That staged depositions destabilized the institution of the monarch can only be 
conjectured; however, there is some evidence that suggests that deposition scenes were 
censored, even if we don’t exactly know why. The possible censorship or self-censorship 
of the deposition scene in Tamburlaine recalls the more famous deposition scene in 
Richard II.  Critics and editors generally assume that at some point the scene depicting 
the deposition of Richard II was omitted; however, scholars have not come to a 
consensus on whether or not this omission constitutes censorship.155 Dutton describes the 
impossibility of knowing for sure when and why the scene was cut: “The plethora of 
possibilities – no censorship at all but revision, censorship for the press but not for the 
stage (though later rescinded), censorship for both stage and press, though both were later 
rescinded – make rational discussion of the subject almost impossible.”156 Despite 
Dutton’s assertion, it seems likely, as Clare suggests, that the play was censored before 
the original performance by Tilney in accordance with his policy of not allowing 
controversial scenes to be staged only recounted.157 Thus, Richard II suggests that 
depositions were in fact censored.  Indeed, if we read Richard II’s omission of the 
deposition scene in light of the non-staging of the deposition of Mycetes in Tamburlaine, 
the censorship of Richard II seems all the more likely.  This is not to say that all 
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depositions were pushed off stage, just as not all riots were pushed off stage.  The 
deposition of Richard II eventually made its way (back?) into the performance, and other 
plays from the period staged depositions (like Edward II discussed below). But the 
censorship of depositions further suggests that the Master of Revels’ office understood 
stage utterances as affecting institutional reality and provides a reason why Marlowe does 
not stage the deposition of Mycetes. Marlowe understood stage utterances as 
performative and was anxious about the institutional force of a staged deposition. 
 The scene after the absent deposition scene also seems to suggest that depositions 
would destabilize the monarchy because what follows the absent scene is a coronation, 
which would seem to stabilize the monarchy rather than destabilizing it.  Coronations 
assure the nation’s subjects that someone is on the throne and that power is consolidated.   
In fact, as new historicist critics like Greenblatt have suggested, the stabilization effect of 
coronations is exactly why real coronations were staged in such a public and theatrical 
way.158  If staged coronations are understood as stabilizing the monarchy, then staged 
depositions can reasonably be supposed to destabilize it. In fact, the staging of Cosroe’s 
coronation can be considered doubly stabilizing because Cosroe was already king before 
the coronation. This coronation is simply affirming and enlarging that preexisting 
condition. Hence, when Tamburlaine gives him the crown, his first words are “Hold thee, 
Cosroe, wear two imperial crowns” (2.5.1). By giving Cosroe another crown, 
Tamburlaine is reaffirming the institution of the monarchy and Cosroe’s position within 
that institution. Indeed, by not staging the deposition, the Marlowe creates a moment in 
the play were Myectes’/Cosroe’s kingdom does not have a king. The play moves 
(somewhat conspicuously) directly from Mycetes being king to Cosroe being king. The 
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liminal and destabilizing space between those two kingships is glossed over by not 
staging the deposition. 
A fear of destabilizing the crown may have been the reason why the deposition 
scene occurs off stage, but it’s somewhat unclear who placed the scene off stage. In other 
words, there is no proof that Tamburlaine actually was censored. The manuscript (like 
most early modern manuscripts) is lost and none of the extant versions of the play 
contains a performed deposition. Indeed, no major scholar of early modern censorship 
includes a discussion of Tamburlaine.159 Thus, we are left to assume that Marlowe wrote 
the play with the deposition scene occurring off stage either because he feared censorship 
and so self-censored (as I argue Shakespeare did in Coriolanus) or he did not want to 
destabilize the monarchy. Neither of these possible reasons conforms to our 
understanding of Marlowe as a troublemaker and agent of subversion. Of course, he 
could have left out the deposition scene for purely aesthetic or practical reasons: perhaps 
staging the deposition would ruin the pacing, or perhaps the actor who played Mycetes 
had to play another part in the next scene.160 However, if one accepts the triadic 
relationship I am arguing for and accepts my argument for why Tamburlaine does not 
dethrone Mycetes when they are alone, than it seems unlikely that Marlowe would have 
shifted the deposition scene off stage for reasons unrelated to the triadic relationship 
since he had just staged a scene that dramatizes that relationship. In other words, the non-
staging of the deposition seems purposeful and seems to suggest Marlowe’s grasp and 
construction of the triadic relationship.161 
In fact, Marlowe utilizes the triadic relationship again in his dramatizing of the 
transfer of power in Edward II. However, in this scene it is the deposed (Edward II) and 
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not the deposer (Tamburlaine) who manipulates the relationship, and consequently the 
motive of the manipulating agent is inverted. Where Tamburlaine waits for an audience 
in order to give his (off-stage) performance the ability to affect the institutional reality of 
the monarchy, Edward denies his actions an audience in order to limit the institutional 
effect his actions have, thereby destabilizing the transfer of authority. Furthermore, while 
Tamburlaine is only manipulating the role of the audience within the triadic relationship, 
Edward is also manipulating the role of the performer and of the nature of the 
performance.  
Edward’s acknowledgement of the triadic relationship is actually quite clear in the 
deposition scene because he, unlike Mycetes (but more like Shakespeare’s Richard II), 
clearly understands that he has to give up his crown and expresses this understanding by 
complaining to Leicester.  During his dialogue with Leicester, Edward seems to realize 
that while he must give up the crown, he does have control over how he gives up the 
crown. Through this description of how he will give up his the crown, Edward displays a 
grasp of the triadic relationship and a cunning and complex manipulation of it.  
Indeed, Edward seems to revel in his ability to control the performance of his own 
deposition: he takes off the crown, puts it back on, starts to give it back, keeps it, and then 
finally gives it to Leicester.162 As he is moving through these series of feints, he seems to 
be contemplating aloud the best way to give up the crown. He sometimes thinks it best to 
give up the crown willingly, “Here, take my crown – the life of Edward too” (5.1.57). 
Other times he seems to think that defiance will be a better strategy and that he should 
force his enemies to take it from him, “I’ll not resign, but whilst I live, be king!” (5.1.86). 
Ultimately, he seems to understand that he has no choice but to give up the crown; he 
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admits, “what the heavens appoint I must obey” (5.1.56), but he can’t decide if he wants 
to force them to take it from him, or if he should of his own agency give it up.  
Edward is eventually moved past his indecision by an argument from Leicester, 
who reminds him that if he doesn’t willingly give up the crown, his son will lose the 
monarchy and his dynasty will end. Although Edward seems to accept Leicester’s 
argument, he feints one more time, and it is this last move that is of particular interest as 
it demonstrates an awareness on the part of Edward of the triadic relationship of 
playgoing and the institutional force of performance.  
 Here, receive my crown. 
 Receive it? No, these innocent hands of mine 
 Shall not be guilty of so foul a crime.  
 He of you all that most desires my blood 
 And will be called the murderer of a king, 
 Take it. What, are you moved? Pity you me? 
 Then send for unrelenting Mortimer 
 And Isabel, whose eyes, being turned to steel, 
 Will sooner sparkle fire than shed a tear. 
 Yet stay, for rather than I will look on them, 
 Here, here! [He resigns the crown] (5.1.97-107). 
 
The beginning of this speech follows the same pattern of thought that has been going on 
throughout the scene. He moves from willfully giving up the crown to demanding that 
they take it from him. This pattern starts to alter when he notes that his audience is moved 
to pity by his own inner turmoil and sarcastically tells them to go fetch Mortimer and 
Isabel.  At this point, the pattern shifts. Edward’s language is no longer focused on his 
own action, but on who will watch and take part in this action – who will take part in the 
performance. At first he wants Mortimer and Isabel to watch him give up the crown, but 
after contemplating that scenario, he quickly changes his mind. The reason he states for 
not wanting them present is that he does not want to see them, “for rather than I will look 
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on them” (5.1.106). By denying them the position of observer, he is controlling who is a 
part of the performance and so is denying the force of his own performance. In other 
words, he is reversing Tamburlaine’s strategy. Whereas Tamburlaine delayed the taking 
of the crown so that he could wait for an audience and a performance, Edward’s decision 
to give up the crown is sped up because he realizes that he does not want an audience. 
And of course, Edward is reversing Tamburlaine’s strategy because Edward has the 
opposite goal of Tamburlaine; whereas Tamburlaine wants a smooth transition of power, 
Edward does not.  
However, Edward’s strategy is more complex than a mere inversion of 
Tamburlaine’s strategy because Edward is not alone when he gives up his crown; 
Leicester, Winchester, Trussell and others are present at the deposition, and so he cannot 
or does not simply deny his actions an audience. What Edward seems to do is not only 
control who is in the audience but who is in the performance and so controls what the 
performance does – how it affects institutional reality. The individuals present when he 
gives up the crown are not the individuals who will ultimately receive the crown. 
Winchester has to report to Isabel, Mortimer and the prince that Edward has abdicated. 
Although the prince will hold the crown, it is made clear throughout that Mortimer and 
the Queen will receive the power of the crown through his role as Protector and her 
position as Queen, or they will simply kill the prince and (somehow) inherit the crown. 
Edward understands that his son is only a means through which Mortimer will secure the 
crown.  For instance, when Winchester tries to assure Edward that the only reason he 
wants the crown is so they can give it to Prince Edward, King Edward responds, “No, ‘tis 
for Mortimer, not Edward’s head, / For he’s a lamb, encompassed by wolves, / Which in 
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a moment will abridge his life” (5.1.40-42). Thus, Mortimer and the Queen are not only 
audience members, they are also participants in the performance because they (as far as 
Edward is concerned) will ultimately receive the crown. By denying Mortimer and the 
Queen the position of observers of the performance, Edward not only limits the audience 
but also denies them the position where they could receive the crown – inside the 
performance.  
Because those who will receive the crown are not part of the performance, the 
transfer of authority does not work through performance and performative utterances but 
is reliant on constative utterances. The crown and the power the crown symbolizes must 
go through a mediating messenger, in this case Winchester. But constative utterances do 
not become institutional reality. Furthermore, constative utterances are unreliable.  The 
recounting witness has to be trusted by those that hear the utterance. The dual instability 
of the constative transfer of authority is reflected in Edward III’s reaction to the news that 
he will be king. He at first tells Isabel that he does not want to be king because he is too 
young (5.2.92). When Isabel insists, telling Edward that it is “His Highness’ pleasure” 
(5.2.93), Edward responds by asking to see to his father: “Let me but see him first, and 
then I will” (5.2.94 my emphasis). On one level, this line shows that he simply does not 
seem to trust his mother. He, like Othello, demands “ocular proof” because he does not 
believe what others are telling him – he does not trust the recounting witness. On another 
(more embedded) level, Edward is demanding a performance of abdication. Indeed at this 
point, he would have the crown, the kind of “ocular proof” that would have satisfied 
Othello. Thus, he does not merely demand material proof of the abdication, he wants to 
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see his father. If he gets to see his father, then his father can effectively transfer authority 
to him via a performance.  
Because Edward II’s deposition does not clearly transfer authority, Edward III 
needs to participate in another performance, the coronation, in order to become king.  
And like the coronation in Tamburlaine, this coronation deploys the triadic relationship. 
It clearly has an audience and the performance of the coronation is dramatized, like most 
coronations, in a highly theatrical way; it involves a Champion’s challenge, trumpets and 
a toast (5.4.70-79). However, Edward II is not present at the performance and does not 
take part in the transfer of authority. Thus, the coronation does not involve a transfer of 
power between two generations through a performance, but simply anoints one king, 
while the previous king is absent. And although the previous King has already given up 
the crown, that deposition can only be accessed by Edward III through constative 
utterance. In other words, there is no political performance that transfers control of the 
crown to Edward III. Instead, the play narrates two separate performances, one which 
performs the deposition and the other the coronation.  
What these two separate performances produce is an unstable crown. Kent notes 
the instability of the crown immediately after the coronation, “Either my brother or his 
son is king” (5.5.103). This instability does not last long; shortly after the coronation, 
Edward III finds out that his father is murdered, which automatically (via primogeniture, 
not performance) makes him king. Indeed, between the deposition/coronation and the 
discovery of murder, no real king emerges. The lack of a true king is partially symbolized 
by the absence of the crown.  After the deposition, the crown seems to completely 
disappear from the proceedings. Presumably, Edward II gives the crown to Winchester, 
95 
and although Winchester delivers the message that Edward has abdicated, he never 
mentions the crown again, and the crown does not seem to be involved in the coronation 
scene (though of course the lack of original stage directions makes this difficult to prove). 
It is as if once Edward II gives it up, the crown never finds another person to possess it.  
This instability does not occur in Tamburlaine; there is a clear performance of the 
transfer of authority and the crown’s position is never in doubt. In fact, in Tamburlaine, 
Marlowe manipulates the triadic relationship to make sure there is always a king, but in 
Edward II, Marlowe uses the triadic relationship to dwell on the lack of a king. What this 
difference signifies is difficult to say, and not of much significant to this study.163 What is 
significant to this study is Marlowe’s grasp of the triadic relationship and his efforts to 
dramatize and so construct it within Tamburlaine and Edward II. 
In The Duchess of Malfi, Tamburlaine, and Edward II, performance was used to 
create societal, public institutions – marriage and the monarchy. However, Ben Jonson’s 
Epicene shows that performance can also be used to produce a more private institution, 
individual reputations. In Epicene, Jonson has his character Truewit construct audiences 
and manipulate the triadic relationship in order to affect the reputations of the gulls, Daw 
and La Foole.  
Their reputations are produced through a complex trick that Truewit plays on the 
two towards the end of the play. Truewit has convinced Daw and La Foole that they are 
angry with one other (when in fact neither is angry but both are scared of the other’s 
wrath) and persuaded them that the only way to dissipate the anger is for one to subjugate 
and humiliate the other. So Truewit sets up a scene where La Foole will kick Daw and 
Daw will tweak La Foole’s nose. In other words, each must perform penance in front of 
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the other. The performance-like nature of this penance is highlighted in the highly 
theatrical, metaphorical and probably anachronistic surrendering of the sword; in addition 
to being beaten, each character will give up his sword in a chivalric display of 
emasculation and submission.  What neither character knows is that Dauphine will be 
assaulting both characters. In order to convince the two that they shouldn’t witness the 
event (so that Dauphine can do the kicking and tweaking), Truewit has to convince them 
to be blindfolded. To get them to assent to the blindfold, he makes a rather odd argument: 
“That’s for your good, sir: because if he should grow / insolent upon this and publish it 
hereafter to your dis-/grace (which I hope he will not do) you might swear / safely and 
protest he never beat you, to your knowledge” (4.5.316-319).164  
Truewit is essentially giving La Foole deniability but is doing so in a way that 
explicitly links performance’s ability to produce institutionally real events to the 
existence of an observing audience. La Foole seems to believe that by not seeing himself 
get beaten, he can deny that the action took place. But of course, he will know that the 
action took place because he will be able to feel the beating. However, by not seeing the 
beating, he will be denying the action the status of performance and so produce an 
institutionally real event. The beating will be real (it will physically happen), but it will 
not be institutionally real (it will not affect his reputation). Thus, Truewit can truthfully 
say that if La Foole does not see the action, Daw cannot “publish it hereafter to your 
disgrace.” The action will not affect La Foole’s reputation because it is not a performance 
since it will not have an audience. Thus, he can satisfy Daw without his reputation being 
affected.  
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In the end, La Foole is being mocked for believing Truewit, but La Foole is 
essentially relying on the same notion of audience and performance that Ferdinand does 
when he refuses to view the Duchess and Antonio, or when Tilney forces the production 
of a riot off stage to deny it an audience. That is, La Foole, at Truewit’s behest, is 
denying his actions an audience in order to negate its ability to become institutionally 
real; he is attempting to manipulate the triadic relationship.  
Part of what makes this scene comic is that La Foole is unaware that he is not the 
audience of the performance; he is actually the actor or performer within a performance 
he doesn’t know exists. La Foole is taking place in a performance that Truewit has 
engineered without La Foole’s knowledge. Thus, he cannot deny the event an audience 
(as Ferdinand and Tilney are able to do) because he never was in a position to be an 
audience member and doesn’t know who is in the audience. And of course, La Foole 
should know that Truewit will be watching the whole event, thereby providing an 
additional audience, making his attempt to deny the actions an audience futile. In short, 
La Foole’s understanding of the deniability that Truewit is offering him is absurd because 
he only partially grasps his own role in the performance. 
The total performance that La Foole (and Daw) do not grasp also deploys the 
triadic relationship. In this performance, Dauphine is the actor since he plays the part of 
both La Foole and Daw. This performance also has a constructed audience. Truewit has 
positioned Clerimont, Epicene and others to watch Dauphine humiliate La Foole and 
Daw. And like the constructed audiences in The Duchess of Malfi, it is not immediately 
clear why these individuals are present to watch the action. Dauphine ventures a guess as 
to why Truewit would want an audience to watch his actions – he accuses Truewit of 
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vanity: “This is thy extreme vanity now; thou think’st thou / wert undone if every jest 
thou mak’st were not published” (4.5.237-238). 165 The first part of Dauphine’s claim 
seems wrong; Truewit is not indulging in a vanity by desiring an audience to watch his 
performance. Truewit makes sure that Dauphine understands that his desire for an 
audience is not related to his pride by giving the credit for the performance to Dauphine 
by insisting, “Thou shalt see how unjust thou art presently. / Clerimont, say it was 
Dauphine’s plot (4.5.239-240). The second half of Dauphine’s claim, however, seems 
right; Truewit and Truewit’s project of humiliation would not be finished (“undone”) 
until an audience was constructed to watch what he had created because he needs an 
audience to give the actions the status of a performance and so become institutional 
reality. In this case, the institutional reality that is being created is Daw and La Foole’s 
reputation. He is turning them into cowards and fools through a performance, even 
though they believe that they are performing for one another and impacting their 
relationship with one another. 
 However, this inset audience is slightly different from the inset audience in the 
Duchess of Malfi, Tamburlaine, Edward II and Massinger’s plays because the inset 
audience seems to have been affected by the performance they wanted. That is, this 
performance seems rhetorical instead of, or perhaps in addition to, its being performative. 
The audience (excluding Clerimont and Epicene) were under the impression that Daw 
and La Foole were fashionable wits, and not the gulls that they become as a result of the 
performance. Haughty, a member of the inset audience, remarks on the value of the inset 
performance: “how our judgments were imposed on by / these adulterate knights!” (4.6.1-
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2). In this performance and within this triadic relationship, the audience does seem to be, 
at least partially, the object of the performance.  
Nevertheless, the knowledge they receive is based on the institutional reality 
(Daw and La Foole’s reputation) that is created by the performance. Thus, they are not 
the individuals who are directly being affected by the performance. In fact, we can locate 
anti-essentialist thought, as described in the first chapter, in this scene and its connection 
to the triadic relationship. If we view, with the anti-essentialists, Daw and La Foole’s 
character as constitutive of performance, then this performance is constructing them as 
gulls, and overwriting their previous performances as fashionable wits. They are then the 
object of the performance. The audience simply has to confront this new reality that is 
being constructed for them through the performance. They are interacting with 
institutional reality, not the performance. Furthermore, Daw and La Foole’s reputation 
are only part of what gets produced through the performance; in a way, the main 
beneficiary or object of the performance is Dauphine (another actor in the performance), 
who gets credit for the performance and whose reputation is made through it. After the 
performance, Haughty and the other audience members praise his looks and cleverness, 
and Truewit asserts, “See how they eye thee, man! They are / taken, I warrant thee” 
(4.6.42-43). In other words, his reputation with these women has been made through the 
performance that he took part in. 
Still, the fact remains that the audience of this performance (Haughty and 
company) do act on the basis of the performance. They cast aside Daw and La Foole 
from their “college” and take in Dauphine. So this version of the triadic relationship is 
not as strict as the version expressed in The Duchess of Malfi or Marlowe’s plays. 
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Nevertheless, the basic structure of this relationship is expressed and constructed within 
this inset performance.  
Moreover, this inset performance is able to show the breadth of possible results 
produced by the triadic relationship. Indeed, each of the characters in the four plays 
discussed in this chapter utilizes performance and the triadic relationship to achieve 
different results: the Duchess produces a marriage, Tamburlaine transfers power, Edward 
destabilizes power, and Truewit creates reputation. What remains relatively constant in 
all of these plays is the basic relationship between audience, performance and 
institutional reality. The audience is not the direct object of the performance, but is 
necessary to give the performance the ability to directly affect institutional reality. 
Although these four plays hopefully provide enough evidence to demonstrate how 
widespread the construction of the triadic relationship was, this basic relationship is 
produced in many of the plays throughout the period. For instance, one can read the 
deposition scene of Shakespeare’s Richard II as an example of the deposed manipulating 
the triadic relationship. There are also scenes similar to Truewit’s trick in other plays 
such as the anonymous The Second Maids Tragedy (see 5.1) and in Middleton’s A Mad 
World My Master (see 5.2). In the interest of space, I will not analyze all of these plays. 
However, I will be relying on the triadic relationship throughout the rest of the study, so 
most of the plays I discuss will also participate in the construction of this relationship at 







Mirrors in the Playhouse: The Praxis of Constructing Playgoing 
 “Sit, and sit civilly, till the play be done” Richard Brome, The Antipodes166 
   
 In the previous chapter, I suggested that by dramatizing and then reflecting on the 
relationship among audience, performance and reality, the plays are also constructing that 
relationship in the playhouse. Indeed, throughout this study I will be arguing that 
metadrama almost always constructs playgoing at the same time that it reflects on 
playgoing. That is, by discussing playgoing in front of playgoers, the plays are attempting 
to influence the audience’s understanding of playgoing. This construction/reflection 
process, of course, creates a paradox: playwrights use metadrama to position the audience 
as the non-object of the performance and so paradoxically convince the audience through 
performance not to be convinced by performance. In other words, metadrama affects the 
audience not to affect the audience. In the scenes discussed thus far, this paradoxical 
process has remained implicit; however, early modern plays often make this process 
explicit by showing the audience their position within the performance – the non-object 
of the performance – and by showing them how to act, that is not act, within that 
construction.   
 Hamlet uses the metaphor of a mirror to describe how performances impact the 
audience: “The pur/pose of playing … was and is to hold as ‘twere the mirror up to 
nature, to show virtue her / own feature” (3.2.18-21). This metaphor can be fruitfully 
used to help describe the practical process of audience construction. However, and as 
briefly mentioned in the last chapter, Hamlet describes the mirror as reflecting nature and 
the audience’s morality; the metadrama discussed in this chapter reflects performance 
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itself and the role of audience within that performance. The mirror then is held up not to 
the playgoer to show the playgoer his or her own reflection as a moral individual, but to 
reflect the playgoer qua playgoer. That is, these plays do not dramatize moral behavior to 
show playgoers how to act within a moral universe, but depict playgoing behavior to 
show playgoers how to behave within the playhouse.   
 
I: The Mirror of Performance: Doubling the Triadic Relationship 
 
Early modern drama often shows the audience what their position is within the 
performance by doubling the performance the audience is watching; plays depict the inset 
performance as a mirror image of the playhouse performance, which the inset 
performance is occurring within. The doubling of performance in these plays further 
illustrates the triadic relationship detailed in the previous chapter and also highlights the 
purpose of this relationship – to construct playgoing as a non-reactive experience for the 
playhouse audience. By doubling the performance, the playwrights are able to tell the 
audience what the play is doing, so their experience of playgoing is being shaped by the 
performance they are watching. Thus, the doubling of a performance is not just the 
representation of the concept of playgoing, but the praxis of that concept.    
 The doubling of the performance occurs in The Duchess of Malfi when characters 
within the play reflect on the impact the Duchess’s marriage has on the fictive reality of 
the dramatic narrative. Because the Duchess’s marriage is depicted as an inset 
performance, which then metadramatically reflects on playhouse performance, her 
marriage becomes a figure for playhouse performances, including the performance of The 
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Duchess of Malfi.  As her performance of a marriage is constructed as performative, the 
performance of The Duchess of Malfi is also constructed as performative (as are all other 
stage performances), so when characters reflect on the Duchess’s marriage, they are also 
reflecting on The Duchess of Malfi. In short, the inset performance is a double of the 
stage performance of The Duchess of Malfi. Webster’s play demonstrates this doubling 
process particularly well because so much of the narrative is concerned with the fallout of 
the Duchess’s marriage. The marriage takes place within the first act and much of the rest 
of the play traces the effects of that marriage. In a general sense, the play The Duchess of 
Malfi is “about” the Duchess’s marriage, so when the characters within the play discuss 
the institutional impact of the Duchess’s marriage on the fictive reality of the play, they 
are also discussing the impact the play they inhabit is supposed to have on the 
institutional reality outside the playhouse. 
 For instance, when the Duchess tells Bosola that she married Antonio, he 
immediately starts to describe to her the impact he thinks her marriage will have on the 
larger culture.  
Fortunate lady! 
For you have made your private nuptial bed 
The humble and fair seminary of peace: 
No question but many an unbenefic’d scholar  
Shall pray for you for this deed, and rejoice 
That some preferment in the world can yet 
Arise from merit. The virgins of your land 
That have no dowries, shall hope your example 
Will raise them to rich husbands: should you want 
Soldiers, ‘twould make the very Turks and Moors 
Turn Christians, and serve you for this act. 
Last, the negated poets of your time,  
 In honor of this trophy of a man,  
Rais’d by that curious engine, your white hand, 
Shall thank you, in your grave for’t; and make that 
More reverend than all the cabinets 
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Of living princes. For Antonio,  
His fame shall likewise flow from many a pen, 
When heralds shall want coats to sell to men (3.2.279-297). 
 
The rhetorical situation that Bosola is speaking within complicates this speech and makes 
it difficult to read as a straightforward description and analysis of the Duchess’s 
marriage. After all, Bosola is spying on the Duchess, and so his role as “intelligencer” 
means that he must praise her decision to marry (or any of her decisions), so that he can 
gain her confidence and extract information.167 So when read rhetorically and within the 
narrative of the play, this speech is Bosola’s way of flattering his mark. However, this 
speech can also be read metadramatically, as a comment on the efficacy of the Duchess’s 
marriage both within and outside the playhouse. Read this way, Bosola is telling not only 
the Duchess but also the playhouse audience how the marriage will affect the broader 
culture. That is, he is interpreting her marriage as doing more than simply creating a 
single marriage; he sees it as fundamentally changing the institution of marriage.  
Specifically, he asserts that the taboo of marrying outside of one’s class will 
dissolve because of her mixed class marriage.168 He tells the Duchess, “Virgins of your 
land / that have no dowries shall hope your example / will raise them to rich husbands.” 
That is, her marriage will become an example for other marriages, and because of that 
example, the institution of marriage itself will change. In fact, he seems to go even 
further than asserting that the nature of marriage and claims that the institution of class 
distinctions (status through birth) will be transformed in favor of a system of merit 
because of her marriage. He suggests, “many an unbeneficed scholar shall … rejoice / 
that some preferment in the world can yet / arise from merit.”169  He is expanding the 
scope of the institutional reality that the Duchess’s marriage impacts.  By doing so, 
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Bosola is reflecting on the ability of The Duchess of Malfi to produce a wider institutional 
reality (an early modern reality) than exists within her narrative (the fictive reality of the 
play). Although the wider institutional reality that Bosola cites still takes place within the 
fictive reality of the play, this broader view of how the performance of her marriage will 
affect the fictive institution of marriage mirrors the way that the stage performance (The 
Duchess of Malfi) will affect the real institution of marriage. The Duchess’s marriage is 
doubled: her stage performance and her inset performance mirror one another. The 
audience looks into this mirror and witnesses a representation of their own experience of 
watching the play, thus shaping their understanding of their role within that experience. 
And the role that is being constructed within this doubled performance is that of the non-
reactive playgoer, where institutional reality, and not themselves, are the object. 
 Indeed, critics have argued that Webster’s play probably impacted early modern 
institutional reality in the same way that Bosola asserts the Duchess’s marriage is 
impacting the fictive institutional reality of the play. For instance, Mary Beth Rose 
argues, “the heroics of [the Duchess’s] marriage is associated with the bourgeois 
recognition of merit in determining status, rather than the aristocratic reliance on 
birth.”170  This is not to say that this is the only way of reading the Duchess’s marriage; it 
can also be seen as an unwelcome and dangerous challenge to the institution of marriage 
and status. In fact, Rose explores the tension between these two interpretations of the 
play. Likewise, Bosola’s speech can also be read somewhat ironically: he is not 
straightforwardly praising the Duchess’s decision to marry, but is asserting the dangerous 
challenge the Duchess’s marriage poses to “the aristocratic reliance on birth” and is 
subtly reminding the Duchess of the danger this challenge poses to her and her family. 
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Indeed, Sara Jayne Steen has convincingly argued that this would have been the early 
modern response to the Duchess’s marriage: a split between support for and fear of its 
revolutionary implications.171  Regardless of whether early modern culture would have 
supported or feared the implications of the play they watched, these conflicting 
interpretations do not negate the institutional impact of the performance. The 
performance of the play becomes institutional reality and so directly affects the institution 
of marriage and class.  Whether one supports or fears that impact is beside the point. The 
important point for this study is that Webster highlights these institutional effects by 
describing the effects of the inset performance of the Duchess’s marriage.   
 This may seem like an impossibly ambitious model of performance: one fictional 
performance of a subversive or dangerous marriage changes or has the potential to 
change the entire real institution of marriage. However, it is not entirely unreasonable, 
especially within a speech act model of institutions and language.  As Fish, drawing on 
Austin and Searle, points out, this is simply how speech acts work and perhaps how 
institutions function. In his essay on Coriolanus, Fish argues that Coriolanus uses speech 
acts, specifically declaratives, to create his own state, where the laws of Rome do not 
apply to him. Fish concludes by suggesting the play dramatizes the radical potential of 
speech acts. I quote at length because Fish aptly describes what happens when the logic 
of speech acts is carried to its logical conclusion and because Fish’s analysis influences 
and shares affinities with my own analysis of The Duchess of Malfi:  
The moral of this [Coriolanus’ attempt to create his own state through language] 
is chastening, even disturbing: institutions are no more than the (temporary) 
effects of speech act agreements … This becomes obvious if one reflects a bit on 
the ontological status of declaratives …: if declarative utterances, when they have 
their intended force, alter states of affairs, what brings about the state of affairs in 
which a declarative utterance is endowed with its intended force? The answer is, 
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another declarative utterance, and it is an answer one would have to give no 
matter how far back the inquiry was pushed. The conclusion is inescapable: 
declarative (and other) utterances do not merely mirror or reflect the state; they 
are the state … 
 It might be objected that to reason in this way is to imply that one can 
constitute a state simply by declaring it to exist. That of course is exactly what 
happens: a single man plants a flag on a barren shore and claims everything his 
eye can see in the name of a distant monarch or for himself; another man, hunted 
by the police and soldiers, seeks refuge in a cave, where, alone or in the company 
of one or two fellows, he proclaims the birth of a revolutionary government.172 
 
In other words, as I suggested in the first chapter, if institutions are constitutive of speech 
acts, then speech acts have the ability to alter institutions. This is as true of states as it is 
of marriages, at least according to the logic of speech act theory and, as I argue, the logic 
of the early modern construction of playgoing. The Duchess is claiming for herself the 
ability to create a marriage that transgresses class and gender boundaries, which then 
effects the institution of marriage, and Bosola is reminding her, perhaps as a veiled threat, 
of these effects.  And by framing the Duchess’s marriage as a double of the play, Webster 
is also claiming for himself and his play (and perhaps all plays) this ability: his 
representation of a transgressive marriage is changing the institution of marriage.173  One 
can argue the extent of these effects: how influential can one semi-secret marriage be or 
how powerful of an effect can one play make? Just as one can question how 
revolutionary an effect a government can have if it is made up of one individual. In fact, 
as I will argue in the Coda, The Duchess of Malfi explores these very questions. But if 
stage utterances did behave like performative utterances, then, to use Fish’s language, 
“the conclusion is inescapable.” Performances affect the institutions that they describe.  
But of course, as I have already suggested but want to make clear, this does not 
mean that these effects actually took place within the reality of early modern society. Just 
because the playwrights constructed their stage utterances as performative does not mean 
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that they actually behaved as performatives – affecting institutions.  In fact, the present 
study argues against this speech act model of institutions. As I argued in the first chapter, 
the institution of the playhouse is constitutive of its economic and political situation. Or 
in other words, the playhouse was created, not through speech acts, but through the 
material forces of early modern society. But obviously this does not mean that early 
modern playwrights recognized or accepted my (or Althusser’s) version of institutions. 
They seem to have put forth a model similar to Fish’s. And by constructing this model, 
that is claiming that their stage utterances were performatives, playwrights could, 
simultaneously, claim for themselves an ambitious and powerful model of performance, 
and place the audience within a position where they were not directly affected by 
performances.  Bosola’s speech, if we read it metadramatically, seems to be making these 
claims.  
That being said, Bosola does seem to understand the Duchess’s 
wedding/performance as influencing flesh and blood individuals and not just the abstract 
institution of marriage. But the individuals who are influenced by her performance (the 
Virgins, Scholars and Soldiers) are not those present at her performance; they are not her 
audience. Indeed, her original audience, Cariola, is poised to benefit from the Duchess’s 
marriage in much the same way Bosola describes the benefits of the marriage; she is a 
unmarried woman.  But Bosola does not cite her as the beneficiary of the Duchess’s 
marriage, nor does the narrative of the play since Cariola maintains that she will not get 
married (3.2.23).  Instead, those who are affected by her marriage are those who merely 
hear of her marriage. They are influenced not by her performance, but by the institutional 
reality that the performance creates. Performance is being constructed within this play in 
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a way that does not affect the audience, and because this performance is being doubled, 
the stage audience, like Cariola, finds themselves within a position where they will not be 
affected by the performance of The Duchess of Malfi.  
Bosola’s metaphor of a “seminary” or seed bed further explores the institutional 
effect of the Duchess’s marriage: “For you have made your private nuptial bed / The 
humble and fair seminary of peace” (3.3.281-282).  The term “seminary” in the 
seventeenth century referred to a piece of land that was used to grow plants that were 
later transplanted, or in a more general sense, “a place of origin and early development; a 
place or thing in which something (e.g. an art or science, a virtue or vice) is developed or 
cultivated, or from which it is propagated abundantly.”174 The seeds in a seminary do not 
stay where they are, but are moved to other locations to finish growing. Likewise, the 
Duchess’s marriage does not stay confined to the “private nuptial bed,” but can be 
transplanted to other locations, where the Virgins, Scholars and Soldiers will benefit from 
her performance. This iteration is possible because the marriage/performance first 
impacts the institution of marriage, and once that institution is changed, the full 
consequences of the performance can be accessed by anyone interacting with the 
institution. In short, the Duchess’s performance of marriage does not affect Cariola (the 
audience of the performance), but the institution of marriage (the institutional reality that 
the performance addresses). And this is the process of The Duchess of Malfi’s efficacy; it 
impacts the institution of marriage.  
 When the Duchess reflects on the impact of her marriage, she expresses an 
ambivalence about its implication – an ambivalence that perhaps mirrors Webster’s (and 
perhaps many playwrights’) ambivalence about the influence of stage performance. The 
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Duchess expresses this ambivalence when she responds to Bosola’s speech which, as 
argued above, describes the institutional impact of her marriage. She tells Bosola, “As I 
taste comfort in this friendly speech, / So would I find concealment” (3.3.299-300). She 
seems to like that the performance of her marriage (both inside the play and inside the 
playhouse) will become institutional reality and therefore impact the institutions of 
marriage and status, but she also fears it and so opts for secrecy – for “concealment.”  In 
other words, she finds comfort in the idea that her marriage will impact institutional 
reality therefore become public, but she also wants to deny others knowledge of her 
marriage.  Of course, it is clear why she would want to keep her marriage a secret. Her 
brothers have forbidden her to marry and threatened to harm her if she did, but at this 
point in the narrative, her brothers already know that she is married (Ferdinand discovers 
the marriage earlier in the scene). What she seems to fear is the revolutionary potential of 
her marriage because of its ability to become institutionally real.  
 This tension between wanting to keep her marriage a secret and allowing it to 
affect institutional reality is also expressed through the Duchess’s conflicting descriptions 
of her own marriage. When the Duchess is alone with Antonio and Cariola (the only 
characters present at her marriage), she tells Antonio, in response to his request for sex, “I 
hope in time ‘twill grow into a custom / that noblemen shall come with cap and knee, / 
To purchase a night’s lodging of their wives” (3.2.4-6). Here she seems to be suggesting, 
even if it is in jest, that she does want her marriage to impact the institution of marriage. 
She wants the gender relations in her marriage to become the “custom.” However, when 
she is speaking to her brother, she denies this desire: “I have not gone about, in this [her 
marriage to Antonio], to create / Any new world, or custom” (3.2.110-111).   
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  As I will argue in the coda, this tension between an acknowledgment of the 
public nature of performance and a desire to keep the performance a secret mirrors a 
tension within the playhouse over the potential impact of its own performances.175 
However, for now, it is enough to notice the way that The Duchess of Malfi calls attention 
to the institutional impact of the Duchess’s marriage and how that impact mirrors the 
impact of the performance of The Duchess of Malfi. 
In Webster’s play, the object of performance (the institution of marriage) is 
doubled; the play holds up a mirror to the institution of marriage to show how the play is 
actually impacting that institution. In Epicene, the audience’s role within the triadic 
relationship is actually the aspect of playgoing that is doubled; the play holds a mirror up 
to the audience to show the audience what their role is within the performance. Jonson 
accomplishes this doubling by essentially telling the audience that their role in the 
performance of Epicene is the same as that of the inset audiences within Epicene. In the 
final scene of the play, the stage audience is actually used within the performance as an 
inset audience, thereby forcing the stage audience to equate the inset audience with 
themselves because, at the end of the play, they are, quite literally, the same thing. When 
the stage audience and the inset audience are collapsed into one audience, this audience 
takes part in the triadic relationship the play is dramatizing. The performance is then 
doubled when the stage audience finds itself within the triadic relationship. The 
relationship is now within the play and within the playhouse.  
This doubling process begins with the formation of the triadic relationship in the 
last scene of the play. Morose signs the contract that completes the main plot of the story 
– Dauphine’s attempts to get Morose’s wealth. However, signing the contract is not 
112 
enough; he also needs an audience to witness the signing. The signing of the contract 
recreates the basic conditions of the stage; it is metadramatic. Morose’s comments about 
his signing seem to both suggest metadrama and an effort to double the performance. He 
tells those who are watching (his audience), “Here, I deliver it thee as my deed. / If there 
be a word in it lacking or writ with false ortho/ graphy, I protest before – I will not take 
the advantage” (5.4.195-197). Editors often assume that the dash here is a substitute for 
the word “God,” a word that could not be spoken on stage.176 However, another 
possibility exists: at other moments in the play a dash indicates a gesture, as when 
Morose demands that his interlocutor make a gesture instead of verbally replying to his 
question. The gesture that he would make after “I protest before” would seem to be a 
gesture towards those who are watching him sign the contract. He is asking those present 
to watch or witness his signing of the contract, thereby constructing an audience. This 
then forms the triadic relationship: the constructed audience watches his actions (signing 
the document); the audience’s presence turns the action into a performance; the 
performance then has the ability to impact institutional reality, in this case legal reality.177  
The doubling process occurs within this scene because at the same time that the 
dash in the text signifies a gesture to the onstage characters, the dash can also signify a 
gesture to the playhouse audience, which then transforms the entire playhouse audience 
into a witness to his performance. He is not just asking the characters on stage to be his 
audience, he is also asking the playhouse audience to be his witness. Thus, the audience 
is put into the exact position of the inset audience, and the triadic relationship is formed 
onstage between the inset audience, inset performance and fictive reality and between the 
stage audience (who is the inset audience), the stage performance and reality. Since the 
113 
inset audience and the stage audience take on the same role within Morose’s 
performance, the inset audience becomes a mirror of the stage audience, thus informing 
the stage audience of their role within the performance.  
This interpretation of the dash is supported by Truewit’s last speech which 
explicitly addresses the playhouse audience in the same way that Morose seems to be 
addressing the onstage audience through his gesture.  In these last lines of the play, 
Truewit directly addresses the audience by declaring, “Spectators, if you like this 
comedy, rise cheerfully, and / now Morose is gone in, clap your hands. It may be that / 
noise will cure him, at least please him” (5.4.248-250). Truewit here is making an appeal 
to the audience for applause as well as integrating that applause into the plot of the play 
by urging the audience to annoy Morose, who can not tolerate loud noises like 
applause.178 What is interesting about this scene is that Truewit is not really breaking 
character; he is not addressing the audience as an actor – Truewit is still Truewit and 
Morose is still Morose. Instead, Truewit seems to be constructing an audience for his 
fictional performance out of the real audience watching Epicene. He is turning the stage 
audience into an inset audience.  
The epilogue to Richard Brome’s The Antipodes also uses this metatheatrical 
technique to call attention to the role of audience within a performance, thereby forming 
the triadic relationship out of the playhouse performance and the playhouse audience.  
The epilogue is spoken by the Doctor and Peregrine, who both, like Truewit, do not break 
character, and also like Truewit, address the playhouse audience. The Doctor’s address to 
the audience is particularly significant because it explicitly pulls the audience into the 
plot of the play and into the triadic relationship.  
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Whether my cure be perfect yet or no, 
 It lies not in my doctorship to know. 
 Your approbation may more raise the man, 
 Than all the College of Physicians can; 
 And more health from your fair hands may be won, 
 Than by the strokings of the seventh son (5.7.34-39). 
 
Again, like Truewit, the Doctor is giving the audience’s applause curative powers. 
However, Truewit is clearly being ironic when he tells the audience that they can cure 
Morose since the audience’s applause will not alleviate Morose’s suffering but will 
aggravate it. The Doctor, on the other hand, is being more forthright in that he is 
attempting to cure his patient Peregrine. In other words, in Epicene it is clear how the 
audience’s applause will affect the performance (it will annoy Morose); however, the 
curative power of the audience’s applause in The Antipodes is a bit of a mystery. Indeed, 
the Doctor’s speech seems to only make sense once the triadic relationship is located 
within the plot of The Antipodes and once the Doctor’s speech to the audience is 
interpreted as an attempt to double this relationship.  
Most of the plot of The Antipodes involves the Doctor’s attempt to cure 
Peregrine’s addiction to travel narratives, an addiction that has made him impotent. He is 
so obsessed with travel that he neglects to sleep with his wife. To cure Peregrine, the 
Doctor has his friend Letoy stage a play that dramatizes Peregrine’s trip to the Antipodes. 
Originally, this dramatized trip was supposed to cure Peregrine of his wanderlust and his 
addiction to travel narratives by satisfying his desire for travel.  However, when 
Peregrine takes control of the plot by claiming the throne of Antipodal London, the 
players of the inset performance improvise and cast Peregrine’s wife, Diana, as the queen 
of Antipodal London and convince Peregrine that he must marry and sleep with Diana to 
fully take control of the realm. He does and is cured. The play that the Doctor and Letoy 
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stage becomes, in essence, one extended bed trick. The play tricks Peregrine into sleeping 
with his own wife.  
 The bed trick is depicted within the play as an inset performance, a performance 
that forms a triadic relationship. Throughout the inset play (the Doctor’s bed trick) an 
audience is in attendance. Indeed, like Cariola in the Duchess of Malfi, this audience is 
not only superfluous but seemingly counterproductive. Having an audience watching 
should reveal to Peregrine that he is being tricked; a physically present audience should 
reveal that he is in a performance and not actually in the Antipodes. One would think that 
the ploy would work much better if all the characters of Brome’s play played characters 
in Letoy’s inset play, thereby creating a kind of virtual reality, where Peregrine could 
both indulge his travel fantasy and sleep with his wife (the virtual queen of the 
Antipodes). Indeed, it is difficult to understand why Peregrine does not notice the 
audience since the audience talks among themselves and comments on what they are 
seeing throughout the performance. At one point in the inset performance, Peregrine does 
seem to be made aware of the inset audience (how could he not?) when he asks the 
Doctor, “And what are those?” To which the Doctor replies, “All Antipodeans.” (2.8.69-
70). The play then moves on with Peregrine supposedly satisfied that the audience 
watching him is in fact an Antipodean audience, but he never questions why others are 
observing his every move. In other words, having an audience present to watch 
Peregrine’s performance creates a large plot problem that never seems to be fully 
resolved; it is a conspicuously constructed audience. However, to structure the plot 
without an audience would negate the ontological value of the fictive play – its ability to 
become institutionally real. The audience allows the performance to create the institution 
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of Antipodal London with all of its antipodal institutions: for example, marriage, 
professions, monarchy. The institution of the monarchy is particularly important since it 
is within this institution that Peregrine sleeps with his wife. Because the institution 
demands that he sleep with the previous queen, he does and is cured of impotence. The 
cure works because somebody is watching the performance, just as the Duchess’s 
marriage works because Cariola is watching it, and Truewit’s tricks work because his 
friends are watching them. 
 The Doctor’s call for applause within the epilogue can now be understood as an 
attempt to place the playhouse audience in the same position as the inset audience 
watching Letoy’s inset play, thereby pulling the playhouse audience into the triadic 
relationship and doubling the performance. The audience’s presence within this triadic 
relationship is able to cure Peregrine for the same reason that the inset audience is 
necessary to cure Peregrine, because their presence allows the performance to create an 
institutional reality that enables the bed trick. Indeed, the Doctor’s language within the 
epilogue suggests the audience’s role in this process. The Doctor states, “Your 
approbation may more raise the man, / Than all the College of Physicians can” (5.7.36-
37, my emphasis). On one hand, approbation refers to the audience’s ability to give 
approval, so the Doctor is simply making a blatant appeal for applause. On the other 
hand, approbation can also refer to the action of proving or declaring something true.179 
The “something” in this case is the performance that they just witnessed. Thus, the 
Doctor is asking the audience to applaud the play thereby making it true. By announcing 
their presence through applause and by being integrated into the plot, the audience is put 
into a position where they take on the role of a constructed audience of the fictional 
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performance, which gives that performance the ability to be performative, which in turn 
makes the performance institutionally real. The applause approbates the performance. 
Since the performance is approbated, Peregrine must work within the real institution of 
the monarchy which demands that he sleep with his wife, thus curing him of his 
impotence. The performance is then doubled since the stage audience and the inset 
audience are performing the same function. The audience is watching a mirror image of 
itself, and the function that is being created within this mirror is essentially a non-reactive 
one. Each audience (the inset audience and its double, the stage audience) is constructed 
as unaffected observers of performative actions.  
Not only is the audience’s role within the triadic relationship doubled within The 
Antipodes, but the role of performance within this relationship is also doubled. The 
Antipodes doubles the role of performance by dramatizing a fictional performance 
becoming institutionally real. The inset performance (Letoy’s play) is used as a bed trick 
to get Peregrine to sleep with his wife, but according to early modern marriage law, under 
certain circumstances marriages were not legally (institutionally) real until they were 
consummated.180 In fact, the specifics of Peregrine’s marriage suggest that his marriage 
was not fully legitimate until after he slept with Martha because Peregrine seems to have 
been forced into his marriage (1.2.47-49). And enforced marriages were often not 
considered fully legitimate until after consummation.181 Indeed, while the marriage is 
being consummated, Letoy refers to Peregrine and Martha as a “new married pair” even 
though they were married three years before the consummation (4.8.42). Letoy may be 
referring to their fictional marriage as “new,” but within the context of the play and early 
modern marriage law, there is no distinction between the fictional marriage of the king 
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and queen of the Antipodes that was produced through Letoy’s play and the marriage of 
Peregrine and Martha. That is, their marriage is only institutionally real after 
consummation and the fictional marriage is what consummates the marriage. Thus, the 
fictional marriage is, in a sense, the institutionally real marriage. Whichever marriage 
Letoy is calling new, the fictional one or the real one, he is right.  
Thus, the inset performance within The Antipodes is able to demonstrate how the 
triadic relationship works within the playhouse. The fictional performance of a play 
produces institutional reality. Of course within the playhouse, sex is not required for this 
process to work, but the basic conditions of the stage are repeated within the inset 
performance: the fictional performance is able to produce an institutional reality.  By 
recreating this process, the performance is doubled and the triadic relationship is 
constructed and the audience’s position within this relationship is made clear to the 
audience. The audience sees that it is not the object of the performance and consequently 
they should not be affected by the performance or react to it. 
 
II: The Mirror of Playgoers: Satirizing Unruly Playgoers 
 
A more aggressive way that playwrights worked to control the audience was by 
satirizing fictional and unruly playgoers.  Occasionally, playwrights would dramatize and 
then mock fictional inset playgoers in an attempt to convince the actual playhouse 
playgoers to stop actively responding to the performance. In other words, playwrights 
held up a mirror to the audience to show them their own unruly activity.  And while 
mirroring the role of performance seems to have been the playwright’s attempt to 
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influence audience’s thoughts about their role within the playhouse, mirroring playgoers 
seems to have been the playwright’s attempt to influence audience’s actions within the 
playhouse. That is, satirizing active playgoers is an explicit attempt by playwrights to 
influence the material actions of the audience – the way they actually behaved. 
This attempt at audience to control the unruly audience takes a number of forms. 
Thomas Dekker’s “How a Gallant Should Behave Himself in a Play” is a straightforward, 
albeit non-dramatic, example of how playwrights satirized their audiences to affect their 
behavior within the playhouse. In this work, Decker describes the distracting and 
interruptive behavior of playgoers in order to satirize and stigmatize those activities.  
Jonson’s character Fitzdottrell in The Devil is an Ass likewise parodies gallants’ behavior 
within the playhouse. Similar accounts of playwrights mocking their audiences have been 
chronicled by theater historians such as Cook and Gurr.182 Critics generally use these 
accounts of unruly playgoers as evidence for how early modern audiences actually 
behaved without fully taking into account that satire also attempts to stop that behavior 
and replace it with ideal (in this case non-reactive) behavior, but this effect seems to be, 
at least in part, what the satire was meant to accomplish.   
In the interest of brevity and to avoid repetition, I will not investigate each case of 
audience satire; instead, I will focus on one particular type of satire which produces 
complex (and surprising) effects within the social formation of playgoing other than 
constructing non-responsive playgoers. That is, just as playwrights’ desire to place the 
audience as the non-object of performance worked in conjunction with their desire to 
construct stage utterances as performative, their desire to stop unruly behavior in the 
playhouse occasionally led them to construct or perhaps reify other aspects of the 
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playgoing experience, namely the naturalism of the stage and the differences between 
male and female playgoers.  When playwrights satirized their audience to construct the 
non-reactive playgoer, they also contributed to the non-naturalism of the early modern 
stage – a stage that made little effort to create a believable depiction of reality through 
illusionistic stage devices (for instance, realistic costumes, authentic looking props or 
sound effects).  This construction also contributed to the assumption that female 
playgoers were more likely to respond to performances as if they were real and 
consequently were less adept at playgoing.  
The first effect of the construction of playgoing (the non-naturalism of the stage) 
occurred because early modern audience reaction was in part predicated on how realistic 
the performance appeared.  Performances that were deemed realistic were often thought 
to be more likely to produce an audience reaction. Thus, satirizing audience behavior is 
connected to playwrights’ discussion within metadrama, about questions relating to the 
naturalism of the playhouse.  By discussing audience behavior, playwrights also 
discussed how realistic they wanted their stage to look.  In fact, playwrights’ tendency to 
limit the naturalism of the stage is often also an attempt to limit audience reaction. The 
second effect of the construction of playgoing (the gendering of audience response) is 
connected to the first effect because in the early modern era, women were often portrayed 
as more likely to be affected by performances because they were more likely to confuse 
reality with fiction. Likewise, the satire of fictional audience behavior was also often 
gendered. The active playgoer who was satirized within metadrama was often a woman. 
Thus, when playwrights mocked audiences who reacted to performances in order to 
construct a non-reactive playgoer, they were also forced to construct a theory of 
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performance that dealt with the naturalism of the stage and gender differences among 
playgoers.  
 
III: Cultural Assumptions about the Link between Naturalism, Gender and Audience 
Response  
 
 It seems that playwrights did not invent the link between naturalism and audience 
reaction nor the belief that female playgoers were more likely to be affected by 
illusionistic drama; rather they were probably responding to a prior cultural assumption, 
an assumption that can be found in recorded responses to early modern drama and 
antitheatrical documents. Before tracing their responses, it is first useful to locate and 
describe this assumption.  
 For instance, the link between naturalism and audience reaction can be found in 
several first hand descriptions of audience behavior.  Of the handful of eye-witness 
accounts of early modern performances, a few of them record playgoers’ confusion of 
fictional performances for real actions and suggest that this confusion led to (unruly) 
action. An anonymous elegy for Richard Burbage narrates playgoers’ reaction to 
Burbage’s performances.  
Oft have I seen him leap into a grave 
 Suiting the person, (which he us’d to have) 
 Of a mad lover, with so true an eye 
 That there I would have sworn he meant to die 
 Oft have I seen him play his part in jest, 
 So lively, that spectators, and the rest 
 Of his crews, whilst he did but seem to bleed 
 Amazed, thought he had been dead indeed.183 
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The elegist seems to be proposing that Burbage’s verisimilitudinous acting was so 
convincing that it led the audience to engage the performance as real. This effect of 
performance could be seen as elegiac hyperbole and as a conventional way of praising 
acting, but other early modern accounts of audience behavior suggest that audiences did 
in fact interrupt performances because they thought they were real. Edmund Gayton tells 
the story of a butcher who was so overcome by a battle scene that he “got upon the stage, 
and with his good baton took the true Trojan’s part so stoutly, that he routed the Greeks, 
and railed upon them loudly for a company of cowardly slaves to assault on em with so 
much odds.”184 Thomas Palmer in a dedicatory verse to Beaumont and Fletcher recalls a 
similar playhouse experience.  
How didst thou sway the theatre ! make us feele 
 The players wounds were true, and their swords, steele! 
 Nay, stranger yet, how often did I know 
 When the spectators ran to save the blow?185 
 
These anecdotes suggest that naturalism occasionally led playgoers to confuse 
performance with reality, and this confusion led them to react to the action on stage. And 
even if these events never actually occurred (that is, they were simply conventional forms 
of flattery), they still suggest a conceptual link between naturalism and audience reaction. 
Early moderns seemed to have believed that the more realistic a performance, the more 
likely it was to produce a reaction from the audience.  
And there is certain commonsense to this connection: the more realistic a 
representation is, the more likely the brain is to temporarily forget it is watching a 
representation and so is more likely to respond and react. Think of audiences’ responses 
to 3-D as opposed to conventional movies.  Moreover, the newness of professional drama 
may have contributed to the audience’s tendency to react to naturalistic performances. 
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Early modern audiences, not used to watching flesh and blood actors, were not fully 
comfortable with the phenomenon. They were not yet condition to always be able to tell 
the difference between stage representation and reality and so were likely to temporarily 
forget the difference. One can imagine that early moderns responded to performances 
similarly to the way that the first audiences of film were said to respond. A widely 
circulated story (which like the anecdotes discussed above, may in fact be untrue) holds 
that one of the very first audiences of one of the first films, the Lumière brothers’ 
L'Arrivée d'un train à La Ciotat, leaped out of the way of the approaching train. They 
allegedly forgot they were watching a representation of a train and so responded as if a 
real train was about to run them over.186  
This type of reaction is exactly what, as I have argued, playwrights were trying to 
avoid because it represented a potential threat to the theaters. Creating naturalistic stage 
performances that could unleash these types of audience responses would not only 
interrupt the performance (making it difficult to produce a play), but could also lead to 
more politically dangerous audience behavior – insurrection and riot.  If playgoers were 
unable to help themselves from taking the side of the Trojans against the Greeks, would 
they be unable to help themselves from aiding Jack Cade against Henry VI, Bolingbrook 
against Richard II or Jack Straw against the aristocracy?  In short, naturalism led to a type 
of audience reaction that playwrights would have been uncomfortable with.  
Not surprisingly, antitheatrical writers were also uncomfortable with naturalism 
on the stage because of its potential effect on playgoers. Critics have long noted that 
antitheatrical writers were anxious about drama’s reliance on pretense; by pretending to 
be something they were not, actors offended Puritan religious principles and destabilized 
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gender and class hierarchies.187 However, these critics have not noticed the way in which 
antitheatrical writers linked pretense and naturalism with performance’s efficacy and 
audience reaction. The antitheatrical writers, like the authors of the anecdotes described 
above, seemed to believe that the more real a performance appears, the more likely it is to 
affect the audience.   
For instance, Stephen Gosson points out that it is necessary “in stage playes for a 
boy to put one [sic] the attyre, the gesture, the passions of a woman; for a meane person 
to take upon him the title of a Prince, with counterfeit port, and traine, is by outwarde 
signes to shewe them selves otherwise then they are, and so within the compasse of a 
lye.”188 Although Gosson is making a general argument about all acting, he is also 
specifically attacking naturalistic drama – verisimilitudinous acting and illusionistic stage 
devises. Gosson is particularly worried about actors trying to look like the individuals 
they are representing by mimicking the “port, and traine” of others.189 Later in the 
argument Gosson seems to connect the naturalism of the stage with its ability to affect the 
actions of the audience: “these outward spectacles effeminate, and soften the hearts of 
men, vice is learned with beholding, sense is tickled, desire pricked, and those 
impressions of mind are secretly conveyed over to the gazers, which the players do 
counterfeit on the stage.”190 Gosson is not explicitly connecting realism on the stage with 
actions of the audience, but there is the suggestion that when the audience is transported 
by the illusion of the stage, the “outward spectacle,” they are more likely to be affected 
by the performance, to have their “desire pricked.” 
William Gager, who tries to defend drama, makes the connection between the 
illusion of naturalism and drama’s efficacy more explicit. He argues that academic drama 
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is moral while professionally produced drama is immoral precisely because academic 
drama does not make an attempt at naturalism. In Gager’s reply to John Rainolds, who 
argues that drama is immoral because men act like women, Gager points out that his 
student-actors do such a bad job that no one would confuse the men for women and that 
this bad acting negates the immorality of academic performances. I quote at length 
because Gager’s argument clearly connects realistic acting with performance’s effect on 
the audience: 
As for the danger to the spectators in heeringe and seeinge thinges lyvely 
expressed, and to the actors in the earnest meditation and studye to represent 
them; I grant that bad effectes doe fall owte in thos Playes, agaynst the which 
suche arguments are iustly to be amplyfyde; but there is no such myscheefe to be 
feared to enswe of owres. wherin for owre penninge, we are base and meane as 
you see; and specialy for womanly behavior, we weare so careless, that when one 
of owre actors should have made a Conge like a woman, he made a legg like a 
man. in summ; owre spectators could not gretely charge owre actors with any 
such diligence in medytation and care to imprynt any passions; and so neyther of 
them coulde receyve any hurt therby.191 
 
Gager, a successful and prolific academic dramatist, admits that “lyvely” or lifelike 
dramatic productions are a danger to the audience but points out that his actors are so 
unconvincing that there is no danger to the audience. His unrealistic actors do not try to 
“imprynt any passions” in the audience, and so they are not “hurt” by the unrealistic 
performances. Compare this portrayal of acting to the elegits’ portrayal cited above: for 
the elegist, Burbage’s performances were so convincing that the audience often reacted to 
his performance as real; for Gager, his actors’ performances were so unconvincing that 
no audience member would react to the performances as real. In early modern England, at 
least according to the antitheatrical writers, what we might consider bad acting was moral 
and allowed and good acting was immoral and dangerous because it could impact the 
audience. In fact, it has been suggested that boy companies were popular with the 
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educated class because these audiences were anxious about the power of illusionistic 
drama.  Educated and literate playgoers accepted the antitheatrical argument that 
illusionistic drama was dangerous and believed that boy-actors, like student-actors, were 
less likely to trick them into believing that they were watching real events.192  
 To limit the impact of the performance on the audience, playwrights constructed 
an experience of playgoing that highlighted the line between performance and fiction by 
foregrounding the non-illusionistic aspects of the early modern stage. In other words, 
they attempted to craft their plays to be more like Gager’s than Burbage’s. Playwrights 
also attempted to limit the effect that their drama could have on the audience by satirizing 
those playgoers who actually did respond to performances as if they were real. This satire 
was produced by creating and then mocking fictional playgoers or inset audiences who 
did respond to the performance. By satirizing those playgoers, the playwrights were 
simultaneously able to discourage audiences from responding to the performance and 
encourage them to view the performance as purely fictional. The efficacy of performance 
and the representational nature of the stage, then, can be traced to the construction of the 
non-reactive playgoer. In other words, the non-naturalism and non-illusionistic nature of 
the stage are at least partially the result or effect of the construction of the non-reactive 
playgoer. 
Critics have long noted the non-illusionistic nature of the early modern stage. 
However, many scholars tend to view this non-naturalism as a hindrance that needed to 
be overcome by the playwrights, actors and audiences. Critics such as Michael Shapiro, 
Jeremy Lopez and Anthony B. Dawson have relied on the concept of dual consciousness, 
which can be traced to Samuel Johnson and Coleridge, to explain how playwrights and 
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audiences confronted non-naturalistic early modern production techniques.193 The theory 
suggests that early modern audiences were always aware that what they were watching 
was a stage representation, but at the same time audiences were encouraged to imagine 
that what they were watching was real.  For evidence of this theory, one needs only think 
of the chorus in Shakespeare’s Henry V, which asks the audience to forgive the 
unrealistic London stage and imagine that they are watching battles being waged 
throughout England and France.  The Chorus asks, 
Can this cock-pit hold 
The vastly fields of France? Or may we cram  
Within this wooden O the very casques 
That did affright the air at Agincourt? 
O pardon: since a crooked figure may 
Attest in little place a million,  
And let us, ciphers to this great account, 
On your imaginary forces work. 
Suppose within the girdle of these walls  
Are now confined two mightily monarchies (12-20). 
 
Shakespeare’s chorus, however, provides us with a fairly atypical example of how early 
modern plays asked their audience to respond to drama. More often than not, early 
modern playwrights actively dissuade audiences from willfully suspending their disbelief 
and cultivating a dual consciousness.   
 Indeed, Gurr notes that early modern playwrights routinely shattered the illusion 
of the stage through metadrama. For Gurr, metadrama “reflects in the writers’ knowledge 
that their audiences were fully aware of their environs, and that the fictions were to be 
seen as overt mimicry whose pretence at creating illusions had to be obvious.”194 Gurr 
states, as I suggest above, that this shattering of illusion was a reaction to “Puritan 
objections to playing [which] largely stemmed from the evident dishonesty of the players, 
who pretended to be what they were not.”195 And Huston Diehl argues that the non-
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illusionistic stage can be traced to an ethos of Protestant iconoclasm, which was hostile 
towards realistic imagery.196 However, in light of the evidence from eyewitness accounts 
and antitheatrical documents that link naturalism to audience response, playwrights’ 
attempts to highlight the artificiality of the stage were probably aimed at more than 
countering Puritan objections and satisfying Protestant ideology; they were also designed 
to stifle audience reaction. Indeed, as I will argue below, plays sometimes link the 
naturalism of the stage to audience reaction, and conversely their satire of audience 
reaction is also often linked to a rejection of naturalism.  
 The second effect of the construction of playgoing through metadramatic satire, 
the gendering of audience reaction, can also be traced to antitheatrical discourse.197 
Antitheatrical writers seemed to have believed that women were more susceptible to 
performance than men; as Gurr and Karoline Szatek point out, “A great deal throughout 
the period was written by men about how plays could so easily corrupt women.”198 To 
take just one example, an early antitheatrical writer, John Northbrooke, asserts that plays 
teach “unlawfull appetites and desires? with their bawdie and filthie sayings and 
counterfeit doings.”199 But he singles out women as particularly susceptible to the 
corrupting force of performance: “women (especiallye) shoulde absent themselves from 
such playes” because “the nature of women is muche infected with this vice.”200 
Playwrights seemed to pick up on this hierarchical view of gender and tend to represent 
women as particularly susceptible to performance, especially illusionistic or naturalistic 
performances. So women are portrayed as more likely to confuse fiction for reality; this 
confusion then becomes the reason for women’s unruly responses to performance and the 
reason why female playgoers are satirized.201 
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  Focusing their satire on female playgoers does not necessarily mean that 
playwrights were only worried about female playgoers’ reaction or that the satire was 
only intended to work on women. Indeed, it’s likely the satire was not only directed at 
female audience members; it would also resonate with the men.  Anxious men would not 
want to appear feminine and so would avoid responding to performance in a feminine 
manner.  Indeed, scholars have long noted that early modern men were worried about 
behaving like women.  And although this fear is not exactly culturally bound (men 
throughout history and in different cultures tend to stigmatize feminine behavior), the 
widely accepted one-sex model of biological gender within the early modern era 
produced a cultural fear that if men acted like women, they could physically become 
women.202  Thus, men almost obsessively organized their identity and behavior in 
opposition to female identity and behavior.  So by gendering audience response, 
playwrights could, at the same time, satirize female responses to drama in an attempt to 
dissuade women from acting on the impulses created through performance and stigmatize 
that same behavior for men. But by focusing their satire on women, playwrights were 
constructing, reifying and reinforcing the cultural assumption that women were more 
likely than men to confuse fiction for reality and more susceptible than male playgoers to 
the effects of performance. Thus, satirizing playgoers in order to rein in their unruly 






IV: Dramatic Representations of Female Playgoers and Naturalism  
 
Both the belief that women were more likely to respond to performance and the 
belief that confusing reality with fiction led to audience response are present in the inset 
performance and the preparation for that inset performance within A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream. The mechanicals’ description of their future performance demonstrates that 
limiting female playgoers’ reaction was the reason why performers might want to 
highlight the artificiality of the stage.  While preparing for their performance, the 
mechanicals go out of their way to make sure that the audience will have no choice but to 
view the performance as purely fictional – to respond to the performance with a single 
consciousness. They do so because they are worried that the women in the audience will 
be unable to tell the difference between performance and reality, and this confusion will 
lead to audience reaction.   
After hearing Bottom describe how accurately he would portray a lion, Quince 
tells his company what would happen if Bottom did produce a naturalistic roar: “An you 
should do it too terribly you would fright the / Duchess and the ladies that they would 
shriek, and that were / enough to hang us all” (1.2.61-63). Similarly, when they start their 
rehearsal, Bottom expresses his fear that when Pyramus draws “a sword to kill himself,” 
the female audience members will be offended because “the ladies cannot abide” that 
type of violence (3.1.9, 10). To avoid this type of audience reaction, which they believe 
could result in punishment, Bottom proposes a piece of metadrama that will assuage the 
women’s fear that Pyramus might actually kill himself.  
I have a device to make all well. Write me  
a prologue, and let the prologue seem to say we will do no  
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harm with our swords, and that Pyramus is not killed indeed;  
and for the more better assurance, tell them that I, Pyramus,  
am not Pyramus, but Bottom the weaver. This will put them 
out of fear (3.1.15-20).  
 
In order to combat the women’s inability to tell the difference between performance and 
reality, Bottom resolves to bring the fictionality of the performance to the absolute 
surface of the production, so the women in the audience will have no choice but to 
respond to the performance as purely fictional, that is, respond to it with a single 
consciousness. Throughout the rest of the scene, Bottom continues to think of more 
schemes that highlight the fictional nature of the stage. For instance, he has Snug speak 
through the lion’s mouth and announce himself as an actor (3.1.32-40).  This is done to 
limit the effect the performance will have on the audience. As William Walshe argues, 
the mechanicals’ “anxiety about the power of their art drives them to highlight its 
artificiality, to de-fang it.203  There is, within A Midsummer Night’s Dream, a connection 
between naturalism and performance’s effect on the audience and an assumption that 
women are more likely to be tricked by the illusion of naturalistic performances. And, 
significantly, the mechanicals’ desire to limit female playgoers’ reaction through non-
naturalistic stage devices seems driven by a fear of punishment; it’s the drive towards 
self-preservation that leads them to “de-fang” their performance.  
 Of course, Shakespeare, as Walshe goes on to argue, is making fun of the 
mechanicals for their crude dramaturgy. Performance, according to Shakespeare, should 
not seek to “de-fang” itself perhaps because this worry that (female) audiences cannot tell 
the difference between reality and performance is overblown or ridiculous. Indeed, when 
the mechanicals put on their production in front of Theseus’s court, the audience seems to 
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mock their blatant efforts at non-naturalism (5.1.168-345). And Snug’s warning to the 
female playgoers comes across as unwarranted and patronizing:  
You, ladies, you whose gentle hearts do fear 
  The smallest monstrous mouse that creeps on floor, 
May now perchance both quake and tremble here 
When lion rough in wildest rage doth roar (5.1.214-217). 
 
By mocking non-naturalism and the premises that underlie the need for non-naturalism, 
Shakespeare might be suggesting that playwrights should feel free to create naturalistic 
stage performances. 
In fact, this view of performance is similar to the theory of performance expressed 
in Shakespeare’s chorus in Henry V.   In the chorus, Shakespeare seems to want his 
audience to use their imaginations and forget they are watching a play in order to increase 
the efficacy of the production on the audience. And in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
Theseus suggests something similar while watching the Mechanicals’ production: “The 
best in this kind [actors] are but shadows, and the worst / are no worse if imagination 
amend them” (5.1.208-209). And Hippolyta responds, “It must be your imagination, then, 
and not theirs” (5.1.210). Like the Chorus in Henry V, Theseus and Hippolyta suggest 
that the shortcomings of the stage, including its non-naturalism, can be overcome through 
the audience’s imagination. Thus, non-naturalism seems not to be prized as technique that 
can limit audience reaction, but an obstacle to be overcome. However, Shakespeare, at 
least in these two plays, seems to be the outlier.204 Most early modern drama, as Gurr 
points out, seeks to undermine the realism of the stage.205  One might say, early modern 
playwrights often crafted their works like the mechanicals crafted their production. 
In fact, the inset performances in Philip Massinger’s The Roman Actor suggest 
that playwrights did not want playgoers to respond to illusionistic performances.  For 
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instance, the fear that the female audience members might mistake performance for 
reality, which is mocked in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, is taken seriously in The 
Roman Actor.  Indeed, there is a clear parallel between the mechanicals’ “absurd” fear 
that the women in the audience will think that Pyramus will actually kill himself, and 
Domitia’s reaction, in The Roman Actor, to Paris acting the part of a suicide within the 
second inset play – Iphis and Anaxarete. When Paris, while playing the part of Iphis, 
prepares to kill himself because Anaxarete refuses his advances, Domitia interrupts the 
performance by exclaiming, “Not for the world! / Restrain him, as you love your lives!” 
(3.2.281-282). Her interruption seems to catch everybody by surprise. Her husband 
Caesar is particularly confused and chides her for her outburst:  
Why are you  
Transported thus, Domitia? ‘Tis a play; 
Or grant it serious, it at no part merits 
 This passion in you” (3.2.282-285).   
 
Caesar’s diction is instructive. He believes that Domitia has been “transported” or excited 
beyond the point of self-control, and it is this lack of self-control that causes her to “grant 
it [the performance] serious” – to take it as real. Her belief that the play is real is not 
portrayed in a romantic or Coleridgian light. She is not applauded for her love of the 
theater or for her ability to willfully suspend her unbelief.  Instead, she is scolded for 
lacking the willpower to clearly perceive the difference between reality and fiction. In 
response to the admonishment, Domitia apologizes for losing control: “Let me, sir, / 
Entreat your pardon. What I saw presented / Carried me beyond myself” (3.2.287-289). 
Furthermore, Paris is not flattered at the confused outburst. Instead, he seems as puzzled 
as her husband; he remarks, “I ne’er purpos’d, madam, / To do the deed in earnest, 
though I bow / To your care and tenderness of me” (3.2.285-287). 
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The word “earnest” in Paris’ response has a particular resonance within early 
modern drama.  One of the oldest definitions of earnest is “seriousness as opposed to jest 
or play” and comes from the old English word for “in reality.”206   For instance, the 
words “earnest” and “jest” are set against one another in Richard III when Buckingham 
realizes that he will actually receive what he pretended to ask for: “That high all-seer 
which I dallied with / Hath turned my feigned prayer on my head, / and given in earnest 
what I begged in jest” (5.1.20-22).  And in the fourth act of The Roman Actor, Caesar 
responds to a character’s attempt to change his sword with a stage sword by stating, “In 
jest or earnest this [sword] parts never from me” (4.2.232).  Caesar’s point is that either 
within a performance or outside of performance (the fictive reality outside the inset play 
that Caesar is playing a part in), he will keep the same sword.  In Richard III, “feigned” 
action is linked with jest, and in The Roman Actor, stage performance is linked with jest, 
and both are set in opposition to earnest.207  Caesar’s and Buckingham’s diction 
demonstrate that earnest here signifies reality as opposed to fiction, and Caesar’s 
comment produces a special emphasis on the difference between reality and stage 
performance.  Thus, when Paris says that he did not intend “to do the deed in earnest,” he 
is making a fairly explicit reference to the bright line between reality and stage 
performance; a line that Domitia seems to have transgressed by suspending her disbelief 
and becoming too immersed in the performance. 
The way that he reminds her that he is not “in earnest” is also significant. He 
breaks character to tell her that he is just acting. Like the mechanicals, he is forced to 
deconstruct his own performance in order to (in Walshe’s words) “stress [his] own reality 
as enactor.”208 And like the mechanicals, he does it in deference to a woman. However, in 
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this scene, Paris, who behaves like the mechanicals, is not portrayed as absurd; Domitia 
is the one being mocked. Furthermore, Caesar’s apprehension of performance is 
privileged; he never forgets that the play is not “in earnest.” And of course, Caesar does 
not interrupt the performance or get carried away by it. The effect of the performance on 
Caesar is minimal because he doesn’t view the performance as real.  
Domitia is again chastised for responding to performance as real when she asserts 
her love for Paris. She tells Paris that because he has played parts “noble, wise, / Faithful, 
and gamesome,” he “must be really, in some degree, / The thing thou dost present” 
(4.2.32-34; 38-39).  Here she is not being tricked into believing the reality of the play, but 
she is still confusing reality with fiction – mixing up the actor with the part. 209 And 
again, Paris feels like he must set her straight: 
The argument 
Is the same, great Augusta, that I, acting 
A fool, a coward, a traitor or cold cynic, 
Or any other weak and vicious person, 
Of force I must be such. O gracious madam, 
How glorious soever, or deformed,  
I do appear in the scene, my part being ended 
And all my borrowed ornaments put off, 
I am no more nor less than what I was 
Before I entered (4.2. 43-52). 
 
However, Domitia’s response suggests that she is not actually confused, or that if 
confused, it is a willful confusion: 
Come, you would put on  
A willful ignorance, and not understand 
What ‘tis we point at. Must we in plain language 
Against the decent modesty of our sex, 
Say that we love thee (4.2.52-56). 
 
Pastoor contends that Domitia thinks Paris is being coy.210 However, it seems clear that 
Domitia doesn’t think Paris is being coy, but rather that Domitia is signaling to Paris that 
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she is done being coy with him and so is shedding “the decent modesty of our sex.”  In 
other words, Paris simply doesn’t seem to understand that Domitia is flirting with him. 
However, in light of Domitia’s reaction to his initial performance, Paris’ anxiety and his 
misinterpretation of her flirtations are understandable (just as the mechanicals’ anxiety 
about a female audience’s reaction to their performance, while ridiculed in Shakespeare, 
is also understandable); the patriarchy seems to assume that women may actually mistake 
performance for reality, or character for actor, and Paris (and the mechanicals) seem to be 
working within this assumption. By mocking women’s supposed propensity towards this 
confusion, the play is holding a mirror up to audience behavior in an effort to teach them 
what not to do. In Hamlet’s words, which somewhat coincidentally are also gendered, the 
audience can “scorn her own image” when they look into the mirror image of themselves 
that the play is producing (3.2.21).211 
 A more sustained representation and mockery of female reaction to performance 
occurs in Beaumont’s The Knight of the Burning Pestle.  In this highly metadramatic 
play, Beaumont scripts two playgoers into the performance; he has two actors play the 
part of unruly playgoers, Nell and George. Throughout the play these characters 
continually interrupt the performance and, significantly, confuse the performance for 
reality. Although several critics have attempted to defend the citizen couple by arguing 
for their good natured vitality and agency, critics almost universally acknowledge that, at 
its center, the play attempts to satirize the citizens’ behavior.212 For instance, Laurie E. 
Osborne, who argues for Nell’s agency and exploration of female authority within the 
patriarchy, still suggests, “[George and Nell] are undoubtedly satirized in the context of 
Beaumont’s play.”213 However, what is being satirized is not just their boorish citizen 
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behavior, but their behavior as playgoers. This play is clearly holding up a mirror to 
unruly playgoing in order to show the audience how not to act.  
 Specifically, the play is satirizing playgoers who confuse the performance for 
reality and who respond to the performance as real. As Alexander Leggatt observes, 
“they [Nell and George] frequently get so involved in the illusion that they forget they are 
watching a play.”214 Although Leggatt’s point is well taken, it is unclear if George is 
actually a part of this satire. That is, George seems to be humoring his wife, who does 
clearly get seduced by the illusion of the drama, while he seems to understand that what 
he is watching is fictional. Thus, the satire is directed at Nell, not George.  In fact, most 
of the couple’s actions start with Nell; she is the play’s agent, and consequently she is the 
play’s primary object of ridicule.  Osborne calculates that “three-quarters of the 
suggestions originate with Nell.”215  Indeed, when the couple seems to get completely 
lost in the performance, Nell speaks first and George follows his wife’s lead, for as 
Osborne argues, the way that Nell influences the action of the play is to “demand or 
suggest to her husband that such and such an action take place; he then tells the actors to 
do it.”216 For instance, when Jasper pretends to threaten Luce, Nell gets so worried that 
she urges George to call in the authorities: “Away, George, away! raise the watch at 
Ludgate, and bring / a mittimus from the justice for this desperate villain” (3.1.92-93). 217 
George simply responds by saying, “I warrant thee, sweetheart, we’ll have him 
hampered” (3.1.97). It seems clear that George is simply following his wife’s 
instructions, but it is unclear whether George is really offering to call the authorities or 
merely indulging his wife. Although much depends on how the actor chooses to play 
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George, the next scene suggests an accommodating George rather than a George so 
enraptured by the performance that he forgets he is watching a play. 
 When Rafe and the Tapster fight over the bill, Nell asks her husband, “George, I 
pray thee, tell me, must Rafe pay twelve shillings / now?” (3.162-163). George responds 
by assuring her “No, Nell, no; nothing but the old knight is merry with Rafe” (3.164). 
George seems to be telling his wife that the whole thing is in jest; Rafe is not seriously 
being asked to give the Host money because the interaction between the two is not really 
happening. Indeed, and again depending on how the actor wants to play his part, George 
seems to be patronizing Nell by telling her, as one would tell a child, “don’t worry, none 
of this is real.” Nell seems to take George at his word until the Host threatens to jail Rafe. 
At that point, she is no longer sure that the Host (who she calls The Knight of the Bell) is 
just joking and being merry. “Look, George, did not I tell thee as much; the Knight of the 
/ Bell is in earnest” (3.174-175, emphasis mine).  Nell’s use of the word “earnest” 
suggests that she has no longer believes in the fictionality of the performance. Like 
Domitia, she no longer knows what is in “jest” and what is in “earnest.”  And after she is 
no longer convinced of the fiction of the scene, she convinces George to also treat the 
performance as real and tells him to give the Host money (3.176-179). Although the man 
hands over the money, it seems it is the woman who has completely lost track of 
reality.218  
 Although George does not seem to be the primary object of ridicule within 
Beaumont’s play, the satire, as I suggest above, still works through him. He is being 
mocked for following his wife’s lead and for not correcting his wife’s mistakes the way 
that Caesar and Paris correct Domitia’s mistakes. Thus, the play is holding a mirror up to 
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male playgoers as well as female playgoers, showing men that they should not behave 
like women and should not follow women’s examples within the playhouse.  
At the same time that these characters’ reaction to performance is satirized to 
limit audience reaction within the playhouse, their reaction works to highlight the 
artificiality of the stage, which also works to limit audience reaction. That is, audience 
satire and the non-naturalism of the stage are linked because inset audience’s reactions 
constitute a metatheatrical stage device which reminds the audience that they are 
watching a fictional performance. By staging playgoing, the playwrights are highlighting 
the playhouse audience’s role as playgoers watching a performance. Like the 
mechanicals’ metadramatic devices, Domitia’s, Nell’s (and George’s) reactions can be 
interpreted as an attempt to keep the audience from becoming too engrossed in the 
performance. Thus, playgoers’ satirized reactions control the unruly audience twice: they 
stigmatize audience reaction for the playhouse audience and contribute to a non-












Unstable Texts, Active Readers; Stable Performances, Non-Reactive Playgoers 
“Are you acquainted with the difference” – Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice219  
 
 In the last chapter, I argued that Morose’s gesture at the end of Jonson’s Epicene 
constructs playgoing by turning the playhouse audience into a stage audience and 
positioning them within the play as non-reactive observers of performative actions. 
Besides constructing stage utterances as performative and showing the audience their 
position within the playhouse, this scene also constructs performance’s relationship to 
texts. Like the Duchess’s performance/wedding, Morose’s performance/signing seems 
unnecessary. He does not need an audience or a performance to make Dauphine the legal 
heir to his wealth. He could have signed the contract in isolation, and that contract would 
have been enough to create the legal reality that makes Dauphine his heir. Just like the 
Duchess’s per verba wedding, a contract is already performative on its own; it doesn’t 
need a performance to make the action performative.  Why then does he insist on a 
performance and an audience? One answer is that Jonson, like Webster, wants to be 
metadramatic here; he uses this performative action (the signing of a contract) as a figure 
for a playhouse performance, thus constructing stage utterances as performative and 
forming the triadic relationship between performance, audience and reality discussed in 
the previous chapters. However, Morose supplies another reason for why he needs an 
audience and a performance to accompany his signing of the contract, and his answer 
suggests that he understands performance to operate fundamentally differently from texts. 
When he signs the document, he tells Dauphine, 
Come, nephew, give me the pen. I will subscribe to 
anything, and seal to what thou wilt, for my deliverance. 
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Thou art my restorer. Here, I deliver it thee as my deed. 
If there be a word in it lacking or writ with false ortho- 
graphy, I protest before – I will not take the advantage (5.4.193-197). 
 
Morose asserts that the contract is simply not enough to ensure that Dauphine will be 
made his heir, because he could later invalidate the contract if it contained misspelled 
words. The text in and of itself cannot guarantee the transfer of wealth, so Morose 
overlays the signing of the contract with a performance – an oath. This oath seems to do 
what the text could not, unequivocally make Dauphine Morose’s heir.  
Within the scene, there is a sense that the text Morose signs is unstable. Its 
content is unpredictable, and it cannot guarantee that the meaning the author intended 
will remain unchanged. The oath, on the other hand, is stable. The content of the oath will 
not change; in fact, the oath stabilizes the text. It makes the text do what it was supposed 
to do (create an heir) but could not do because of its instability. The instability of the 
contract and the stability of the oath within this scene may seem completely 
counterintuitive from a twenty-first century perspective. We tend to think of written 
contracts as ironclad and oral agreements as weak. One might be able to get out of an oral 
agreement or an oath, but once that agreement is put on paper, it becomes legally binding. 
In fact, within early modern contract law, written contracts, though contestable, were 
probably viewed as more binding and stable than oral agreements.220 The scene then 
doesn’t seem to be necessarily referencing a cultural anxiety over contracts, or even 
privileging an oral contract over a written contract; rather, what this scene seems to be 
suggesting is a more general insight into the instability of texts and the stability of 
performance – an insight that is repeated within several early modern plays.221  
142 
 The instability of early modern texts will not come as a surprise to readers 
familiar with early modern reading strategies. As will be shown, scholars of early modern 
print and reading culture have suggested that the material state of texts, printing practices, 
pedagogical theory and reading habits resulted in a remarkably unstable early modern 
text. By unstable, I mean texts were open to a wide variety of interpretive possibilities 
because the reader was often and this openness to interpretation meant that texts did not 
carry with them inherent, unchanging or authoritative meanings.  
However, the second half of the above claim – playwrights constructed 
performances as stable – may be more surprising. The idea that a performance could 
contain inherent, unchanging and authoritative content may seem counterintuitive or even 
impossible since we tend to think of a stage performances as more ephemeral than texts 
and so more likely to change. And as David Scott Kastan observes, 
Print is a more conservative medium [than performance]. I mean that literally, not 
morally or politically; it conserves in a way that performance can not. Whatever 
else print does, it provides a durable image of the text, one that avoids the 
necessary evanescence of performance; indeed its ability to conserve is, in large 
part, what has made continued performance possible. The text lasts on the page in 
a way it cannot in the theater, its endurance at once the sign and the foundation of 
its greater resistance to appropriation. The printed text remains before our eyes, 
demanding to be respected.222 
 
However, within the early modern era, Kastan’s initial insight into the difference between 
print and performance (an insight he later complicates) seems to have been reversed: 
performance, not texts, resisted appropriation and demanded to be respected as they were. 
Performance’s stability, unlike texts’ instability, was not produced through pedagogical 
theory, but was constructed within the playhouse by playwrights and the larger theatrical 
culture. In fact, as I will argue, the playgoing companies seemed to have constructed 
performance as stable in opposition to texts.  
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Playwrights may have wanted to produce this construction because the instability 
of texts assumed and produced active reading habits that, if appropriated by playgoers, 
would have worked against the playwrights’ interests. Early modern texts were 
understood as unstable not only because of “false orthography” as Morose suggests, but 
because many readers were often trained to take an active role in the creation of the 
meaning of texts. Given that many readers were trained to actively engage texts, it is 
reasonable to assume that these readers would actively engage performances. That is, 
playgoers, at least the educated and literate ones, would take the active reading strategies 
inherited from print culture and apply it to playgoing.  Playwrights, however, did not 
seem to want their performances interpreted in the same way as texts were interpreted, so 
they constructed aspects of their performances in opposition to texts.223  What the 
playwrights seemed to have been worried about is not interpretation as such, but the 
praxis of interpretation – the action that results from interpretation. As will be discussed 
more thoroughly below, early modern readers were often trained to read and interpret 
texts and then use that interpretation as the basis for action. In order to create a truly non-
reactive audience, the playwrights needed to interrupt the interpretative ability of the 
audience as a way of limiting their response to performance. To do so, they constructed 
their performances as stable in opposition to unstable texts by dramatizing the difference 
between texts and performance. That is, texts are often used within early modern drama 
as a foil to performance, as they are in Epicene.  
The texts that are used to describe this contrasting relationship vary. I will argue, 
books, letters, contracts, bonds, warrants are all used to explore the instability of texts in 
relation to the stability of performance. But of course, all of these texts are not identically 
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unstable. A handwritten contract, which Morose’s contract almost certainly was, would 
not have gone through the same destabilizing process of printed book because, as we will 
see, the printing and publishing process itself destabilized texts. Handwritten texts were 
unstable for different but sometimes overlapping reasons: for instance, non-standardized 
spelling and punctuation as well as idiosyncratic legal shorthand.  Nevertheless, while 
keeping in mind the differences between written texts or manuscripts and printed or 
published texts, this chapter will treat them more or less the same because, as I will 
suggest below, a major cause of early modern textual destabilization was reading 
practices, which all texts were subject to. And in any case, early modern drama seemed to 
have used individual types of texts as a figure or synecdoche for texts in general (both 
written and published). In other words, texts were used not only to explore the specificity 
of the kind of text being portrayed, but to explore the general instability of texts in order 
to contrast this instability with performance. And by contrasting unstable texts with 
performance, playwrights could construct a stable performance that limited the 
audience’s interpretative agency and interrupted the praxis of interpretation.  
 One may object to the above claims, arguing that it is impossible to create stable 
performances that bypass or limit the interpretive agency of the audience because 
audiences always interpret performances. In order to make a performance intelligible, the 
audience must first interpret what they see, and this interpretation will necessarily 
destabilize the performance. In post-structuralist terms, every encoding is another 
decoding, so performing entails interpretation. However, I am not arguing that 
playwrights were successful in stabilizing their performances, anymore than I am arguing 
that playwrights actually succeeded in controlling their audiences. Rather, I will argue 
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playwrights created a concept or theory of playgoing that produced the idea of a stable 
performance in order to influence playgoers’ understanding of performance, thereby 
constructing the playgoing experience for their audiences. Their ideas about performance 
may run contrary to our understanding of communication in general and performance in 
particular, but it is, in part, this historical difference that I am trying to describe.  
 And although the stability of performance may seem unworkable to modern 
literary, performance or communication theorists, this concept is, in fact, related to and 
consistent with the construction of stage utterances as performative and so produces a 
relatively coherent early modern theory of performance. Since stage utterances were 
constructed as performative, performance was designed to impact institutional reality and 
not the audience; the audience’s presence was needed to turn the actions into a 
performance, but their interpretation or active participation in the performance was not 
needed. In other words, performative stage utterances do not take the audiences as their 
object, but this also means that the audience does not take the performance as the object 
of its interpretive gaze. The triadic relationship discussed in the previous two chapters 
creates a playgoing experience, in which both the audience and the performance are 
interacting with institutional reality and not each other. In short, performative utterances 
bypass the audience and directly generate institutional reality without the destabilizing 
effect of audience interpretation. This means that performative stage utterances, at least 
theoretically, create stable playhouse performances.  
Furthermore, constructing a stable performance can be understood as part of the 
larger trend of audience construction that this study has been tracing. That is, the 
construction of stable performances is one effect of the construction of the non-reactive 
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playgoer. By constructing performances as stable and as different from the instability of 
print, playwrights were showing the audience that the way they interpret, read and 
consume texts does not work within the theater. In other words, readers’ active responses 
to texts should not be recreated in the theater by playgoers. How the playwrights 
understood performance’s relationship to print is an effect of their overall project of 
audience construction. In fact as will be shown, the effects of the non-reactive playgoer 
are not only traceable within the plays, but can be found within the economic structure 
and marketing strategies of the playhouse. Just as the plays organized the concept of 
performance in opposition to the concept of print, the playhouse organized itself in 
opposition to the printing house by differentiating itself from the economic structure and 
marketing strategies of the printing house. And this organization through difference also 
worked to stabilize performance and, ultimately, construct a non-reactive playgoing 
experience.  
 
I: Early Modern Reading Strategies: Active Readers and Readers’ Actions 
 
 Before investigating these representations of texts and performance, it is first 
necessary to historicize reading and texts because it may be tempting, from a twenty-first 
century perspective, to say that all texts are necessarily unstable. That is, in an “after 
theory” environment, as Terry Eagleton has termed our contemporary critical perspective, 
texts are often understood to lack inherent, authoritative or unchanging meaning, and the 
reading process is often understood as part of the text.224  However, the instability of the 
post-structuralist text and the instability of the early modern texts have different roots, 
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purposes and effects. And because playwrights seemed to have been anxious about the 
effects that unstable texts had on the reader and the potential effects an unstable 
performance could have on the playgoer, the early modern understanding of the 
instability of texts is crucial towards understanding how playwrights constructed 
playgoing’s relationship to reading.  
In fact, many early moderns would have understood texts as unstable and open to 
multiple interpretations, not because early modern readers anticipated post-structuralist 
literary theory, but because most early modern English readers were educated under a 
protestant/humanist educational rubric that tended to privilege individual interpretations 
of texts, and this version of the reading process necessarily destabilized texts.  Indeed, 
scholars of reading have long noted the early modern reader’s inclination towards active 
interpretation. Lisa Jardinee and Anthony Grafton assert that a consensus has been 
reached about early modern reading practices. “All historians of early modern culture 
now acknowledge that early modern readers did not passively receive but rather actively 
reinterpreted their texts, and so do we.”225 In other words, early modern readers read like 
today’s reader-response theorists understand reading to work: readers actively co-create 
meaning through interpretation instead of attempting to locate and extract a meaning 
inherent in the text. But as Victoria Kahn reminds us, writing in the mid-90s, “reader 
response criticism could only be seen as new and fashionable when the assumptions of a 
humanist rhetorical tradition had been forgotten.”226 And Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. 
Zwicker have shown how this “humanist rhetorical tradition,” which contributed to the 
instability of early modern texts, was connected to strains of protestant and reformation 
ideology: 
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Protestant self-identity, we might say, was formed through a progression of 
readings and rereading of the texts of Scripture, sermon and self.  
Such stress on individual readers and personal reading carried important 
hermeneutic implications. The obligation of the godly reader and exegete was 
ever to unfold the personal meaning of Scripture, to apply the sacred texts to the 
self. The logic, indeed the historical outcome, of such a self-centered 
hermeneutic, as the enemies of Protestantism had warned, was an assertion of 
each believer as determinant of meaning.227 
 
In short, groups of literate early moderns, who were taught according to this educational 
and spiritual philosophy, were trained to view texts as unstable and to destabilize texts 
through active interpretation.  
This active method of reading was not only produced through the reader’s 
education but was embedded in the materiality of the text – in the editing and printing of 
texts. Steven Orgel reminds us that the lack of standardized spelling and punctuation in 
the early modern era produced a text that was necessarily and inherently unstable. Orgel 
gives this example: “There is no way of modernizing the notorious crux is Shakespeare’s 
Sonnet 129, ‘A blisse in proofe and proud and very wo,’ not because there is no way of 
knowing whether the crucial letter in ‘proud’ is a u or a v but because for a Renaissance 
reader it can only be both.”228 The u and the v exist in the same place at the same time; 
the undecidability of the letter, word and concept create a vacillating instability within the 
sentence, through which no single authoritative or unchanging meaning can be produced.  
This inherent instability of early modern texts adds another level to Morose’s anxiety 
about the validity of his contract in Epicene. Not only could the contract be nullified 
through “false orthography,” but (if Orgel is right) there is no “true orthography” within 
early modern textual culture. The very act of writing (or printing) created the kind of 
instability that could make the contract useless since the written text had to contain 
unchanging (that is stable) language which would make Dauphine Morose’s heir, and the 
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instability of early modern texts meant that texts could not contain unchanging content. 
The text became changing when it was printed.  
Furthermore, the instability of early modern spelling and punctuations not only 
creates an unstable text, but also constructs a reader who is able to recognize and play 
with these instabilities. Thus, the instability of texts is the result of reading strategies and 
produces those reading strategies. Texts were understood to be unstable prior to reading, 
and so those texts demanded an active reading strategy that could establish meaning or 
recognize the multiple meanings of the text. At the same time, those strategies (aided by 
humanist and Protestant training) that helped make sense of the unstable texts also 
destabilized them by producing multiple meanings. In short, careful and intense reading 
habits in conjunction with (what we would now consider) sloppy writing and printing 
habits produced a remarkably unstable text.  The early modern writer Godfrey Goodman 
nicely captures the various ways that an early modern text could be destabilized. After 
noticing the “corrupt” state of the printed version of his book, The Fall of Man, he 
remarks “that [the corruption] should first begin in the author, then in the pen, then in the 
presse, and now I feare nothing so much as the evill and corrupt exposition of the Reader, 
for thus there is a generall corruption.”229  
For the purposes of this study, what is most significant about these early modern 
reading habits is how the active reading process produced action. Jardinee and Grafton’s 
study of early modern reading practices demonstrates that reading (particularly scholarly 
reading) “was always goal-orientated.”230 Through their analysis of Gabriel Harvey’s and 
others’ reading habits, they establish that “Renaissance readers (and annotators) 
persistently envisage action as the outcome of reading – not simply reading as active, but 
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reading as trigger for action.”231  Jardinee and Grafton focus on scholarly and aristocratic 
readers, but Heidi Brayman Hackel has found that “goal-orientated” reading strategies 
were common throughout the early modern literate population. By studying early modern 
commonplace books and marginalia, she finds that “from these records emerge scenes of 
individual readers engaging texts, personalizing their books, making them useful, and, on 
occasion, rendering them nearly unrecognizable.”232 Indeed, the popularity of 
commonplace books, a practice encouraged by humanist educators, suggests that many 
early modern readers used interpretation as the basis for action.  Hackel argues that 
commonplace books were not only used to record maxims and examples of rhetorical 
flourishes, they were used to organize the “reader’s knowledge, judgment, and 
understanding.”233 Similarly, Steven N. Zwicker describes the active reading habits of the 
early modern era in terms of imitation:  
The detailed portraits we possess of Renaissance humanists argue not simply the 
active and applied agency of the intellect, but an overarching model of 
exemplarity that guided the reading of courtiers, aristocrats and connoisseurs, and 
of their professional servants and protégés. Exemplary reading – the careful study 
of texts for patterns of virtue, the imbibing of classical wisdom, and the 
exportation of models of conduct and expression – was reinforced by a culture of 
imitation which spread far beyond the study or the diplomatic and courtly 
conference.234 
 
The instability of texts then does not only mean that the audience could affect the 
meaning of the texts through their interpretation, but that they were affected by those 
texts because of their interpretation. In other words, early modern texts were affected by 
and affected readers, so active readers often produced readers’ actions. 
This notion of the active reader then is in direct opposition to the way that I have 
been arguing plays constructed their audiences – as non-reactive observers of 
performative actions. That is, while texts were often constructed to produce actions, 
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playwrights attempted to construct performance not to produce actions.  This conflict is 
often overlooked; instead, critics tend to focus on the way that text and performance 
overlap and complement one another. For instance, Marta Strazincky confidently asserts,  
From the earliest appearance of printed plays in England, the relationship between 
text and performance is constructed more often in terms of interchange, 
complementarity, and congruence than of opposition or competition, and 
readership thereby straddles both the theatrical and the reading publics.235 
 
In Shakespeare studies, critics such as Patrick Cheney and Lucas Erne tend to agree with 
Straznicky’s general principle that early modern reading strategies and playgoing are 
overlapping activities; they argue that Shakespeare would have been just as comfortable 
on the page as he would have been on the stage and in fact wrote for both mediums 
simultaneously.236  While I don’t disagree that some aspects of print culture and 
playhouse culture were in congruence, I want to focus on aspects of print and 
performance that worked in opposition to each other. I therefore am following Robert 
Weimann and Douglas Bruster who “address stage/page relations through the issue of 
difference – that is, from how in the theatre the specific form and force of each medium 
defines, and is defined by, the other.”237  
 In fact, by dramatizing the instability of texts, playwrights did not seem to be 
particularly worried about unstable texts; texts were simply used as a contrasting medium 
to performance.  From a historical/political perspective (as described in the first chapter), 
playwrights’ indifferent attitude towards the instability of texts makes sense because the 
broader early modern culture did not seem to be as concerned about reading plays as they 
were with viewing plays. Kastan has convincingly argued that while playgoing was 
considered a dangerous activity by government and religious authorities, reading play 
texts probably was not. Kastan notes that after the closing of the theaters in 1642, play 
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texts were still allowed to be printed, and “in spite of the fact that allusions to plays 
became a significant part of the rhetoric of Civil War propaganda, the government 
seemed unconcerned about play publication.”238 In short, unstable play texts were not 
considered dangerous. Consequently, early modern dramatic culture does not seem to 
have been anxious about the texts it produced because it was under no political or cultural 
pressure to change the way that audiences consumed their play texts. On the other hand, 
playgoers who viewed their drama actively and then used that drama as a basis for action 
threatened the playwright’s professional position. Thus, while playwrights seemed to 
have made a concerted effort to stabilize performances, they generally embraced the 
instability of texts. Consequently, the fictional construction of reading on the stage is 
generally not different from the way that early moderns seemed to have read, so the 
dramatic construction of reading is really a reification of early modern reading strategies 
and not an active reimagining of the concept and activity.  
The construction of texts and reading then is unlike the construction of 
performance and playgoing since the latter effort constructs playgoing in opposition to 
the way that early modern playgoing actually functioned, and the former reinforces and 
reifies the way early moderns read.  But by combining the reification of unstable texts 
with the construction of stable performances, playwrights furthered the construction of 
the non-reactive playgoer by exploring the contrasting relationship between the two 
mediums; because active reading habits were antithetical to playwrights’ desire for a non-




II: Constructing Readers and Playgoers in The Antipodes and Eastward Ho 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that The Antipodes goes out of its way to 
construct playgoing by equating the inset audiences within the play with the playhouse 
audience watching the play. But the play does not only dramatize performance and 
playgoing; it also stages texts and reading. While the play does not dramatize the act of 
reading as it dramatizes the act of playgoing (after all reading is not a very compelling 
dramatic activity), it does thoroughly discuss texts and reading. And as Douglas Brooks 
observes, these discussions of texts are set in opposition to the play’s discussion of 
performance; the play pits “book against play, reading against playing, the closet against 
the stage.”239 For Brooks, this oppositional structure thematizes a battle over cultural 
authority, which he argues took place directly before the closing of the theaters. 
However, the cultural conflict between text and performance or page and stage is not 
important for this study; what is important is the way the structure of the play constructs 
performance in opposition to texts. Specifically, by dramatizing the efficacy of texts and 
contrasting it with the efficacy of performance, this play illustrates that unstable texts 
produce actions within the audience and stable performances do not.  This contrast 
indicates that the efficacy of texts works through their instability – texts function by 
soliciting their readers’ active interpretation, which then inspires behavior – and 
performance functions through its stability working with or without the audience’s active 
interpretation.  
 For instance, when the Doctor is attempting to find the root of Peregrine’s 
addiction to travel, his father Joyless responds by describing the young Peregrine’s 
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reading habits. Hughball asks “What has he in his younger years been most / Addicted 
to? What study or what practice” (1.1.126-128). Joyless responds: 
 You have now, sir, found the question which, I think, 
 Will lead you to the ground of his distemper. 
 … 
 In tender years he always lov’d to read 
 Reports of travels and of voyages; 
 And when young boys like him would tire themselves  
 With sports and pastimes, and restore their spirits 
 Again by meat and sleep, he would whole days  
 And nights (sometimes by stealth) be on such book  
 As might convey his fancy round the world. 
 … 
 When he grew up towards twenty,  
 His mind was all on fire to be abroad; 
 Nothing but travel still was all his aim (1.2.31-32,34-40,41-42). 
 
According to his father, Peregrine seems to be reading as scholars of reading practices 
think that many early moderns read. He reads actively, so much so that his reading takes 
the place of other activities like “sports and pastimes.” In fact, his texts of choice, travel 
narratives, provide an ideal genre through which the play can explore the instability of 
texts and active reading habits because early modern travel narratives seems to have been 
an exceptionally unstable type of text. David McInnis, in his study of the genre of travel 
narratives, early modern reading habits and The Antipodes, suggests the “episodic nature 
of travel narratives invites readers to supply their own bridging details to sustain a 
narrative.”240 Partially because travel narratives demanded active reading habits and 
partially because Peregrine reads actively, the texts move Peregrine to action; his reading 
is, in Jardine’s and Grafton’s words, “goal-orientated.” His reading of travel narratives 
leads him to desire travel. Again, early modern travel narratives seem particularly prone 
to producing this effect in the reading subject. McInnis argues, “whilst some texts 
actively encouraged vicarious pleasure at the expense of real travel, mind-travelling 
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[McInnis’ term for travelling within the imagination] need not be the ultimate end of 
reading, nor …was it intended to be for Peregrine.”241 Indeed, Peregrine does not read to 
escape from reality; his reading is the first step towards an engagement with reality 
through travel. However, he is not allowed to travel because his parents refuse to let him 
(no reason is given as to why his parents object to his traveling).  The reading process 
(active reading produces actions) is interrupted, and this interruption is what causes his 
sickness – his intense preoccupation with travel.242  Hence, the Doctor cures Peregrine by 
tricking him into thinking he has traveled, so he can finish, or think he has finished, the 
reading process.  
 While Peregrine’s illness was partially caused through the instability of texts, the 
Doctor cures Peregrine through a stable performance, which does not work through 
audience interpretation and is not meant to affect the audience. In other words, unlike the 
texts Peregrine reads, the Doctor’s play is not destabilized through the active 
interpretations of the playgoers.  In fact, the audience’s interpretation of the performance 
is beside the point since its purpose is to trick Peregrine into sleeping with his own wife 
by creating the institutions of the Antipodes. The performance is not for the audience’s 
benefit but for the performer’s. This is not to say that the audience does not attempt to 
interact with or interpret the performance; it is just that their comments and 
interpretations are inconsequential. Throughout Letoy’s play, the audience (Joyless, 
Letoy, and Diana) provide a running commentary about the performance (much like the 
Citizens’ commentary in The Knight of the Burning Pestle). For instance, Joyless judges 
the play’s quality, “‘Tis very good; the play begins to please me” (3.4.9), Letoy offers a 
didactic interpretation, “The moral is, the lawyers here prove beggars, / And beggars only 
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thrive by going to law” (3.1.76-77), and Diana periodically summarizes and comments 
upon the actions she sees on stage. However, their active engagement with the 
performance does not influence the meaning of the performance, affect the playgoers or 
help to further the purpose of the performance – to get Peregrine to sleep with his wife. 
The institutional reality that the performance creates remains stable regardless of the 
audience’s interpretations. Indeed, the reason, it seems, that Brome provides the 
audience’s dialogue is to narrate the separate bed-trick plot: Letoy’s seduction of Diana, 
which is designed to cure her husband of his jealousy. In other words, the action taking 
place in the audience has its own purpose (curing Joyless of his jealousy) and object 
(Diana), which is separate from the purpose (curing Peregrine) and object (constructing 
the Antipodes) of the performance. Furthermore, while Peregrine desires to travel after 
reading travel narratives, the playgoers do not desire travel after viewing a dramatization 
of the Antipodes. The playgoers do not affect the performance nor does the performance 
affect the playgoers.  
 By contrasting Peregrine’s reading strategies with the inset playgoers’ experience, 
Brome can show his audience that early modern reading habits are not applicable in the 
playhouse. And one can understand why Brome, and other playwrights, would not want 
those strategies practiced in the playhouse: if playgoers responded to performance in the 
same way that Peregrine responded to texts, the playwrights could, and did, get into legal 
and political trouble. The Antipodes is not a particularly subversive or politically 
dangerous play, but other early modern plays that stage armed rebellion (Henry V) or 
females taking male or non-traditional roles (The Roaring Girl, The Duchess of Malfi) or 
the murder of a king (Richard II) or the disruption of class boundaries (The Shoemaker’s 
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Holiday) could be accused of inspiring those activities in their audiences if playgoers 
were encouraged to respond to the performances by using the performance as the basis 
for action or by imitating the performance. Worse yet, the playgoers could actually 
respond to those performances, and the playwrights would then be held accountable for 
the actions of their audiences. In response to this anxiety about the actions of their 
audiences, playwrights such as Brome discouraged their audiences from actively 
interpreting their performances in order to limit the actions of playgoers. 
George Chapman, Ben Jonson and John Marston’s Eastward Ho offers a more 
thorough and complex reflection on the stability of performance and the instability of 
texts and clearly demonstrates how unstable texts can influence reader’s actions; the play 
contrasts the instability of texts with the stability of performance, which does not 
influence the actions of the audience. By the end of Eastward Ho, much of the play’s 
action is already complete: Sir Petronel is exposed as a fraud, Beatrice is punished for her 
greed, Quicksilver learns the error of his ways, and Golding is clearly shown to be the 
most successful and moral individual of the group. All that is left to fulfill the 
conventions of a comedy is for all to be forgiven; in the words of Touchstone, “to / make 
our harmony full” (5.5.184-185).243  However, this harmonious ending is delayed for an 
entire act, while Touchstone attempts to fend off those who would have him forgive 
Quicksilver and Petronel. This delay allows the characters to reflect on their plight while 
they wait to give or receive forgiveness. These reflections, somewhat surprisingly, 
involve a reflection on texts and performance and the efficacy and stability of both 
mediums.244  
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For instance, at the beginning of act five, Gertrude reflects on how texts 
contributed to her downfall, and this reflection suggests both the efficacy of texts and 
how this efficacy is related to text’s instability.  While contemplating her situation, she 
remarks to her waiting women Sindefy, whom she calls Sin, “Ah, Sin! hast thou ever read 
i’ the chronicle of any / lady and her waiting-woman driven to that ex / tremity that we 
are, Sin?” (5.1.1-3). At this point in the narrative, Gertrude has been abandoned by her 
husband and family and seems to be looking for a textual precedent for her position. 
Gertrude is attempting to read (or remember reading) texts in order to find comfort and 
personal guidance. In other words, her reading is “goal orientated.”  In fact, Gertrude’s 
and Sindefy’s discussion of texts is part of a longer conversation in which they are 
attempting to figure out what they should do to get out of their miserable situation. 
Later in this conversation, she again looks to texts for an answer; she asks Sindefy, 
“Would the Knight o’ the Sun, or Pal / merin of England, have used their ladies so, Sin? / 
Or Sir Lancelot, or Sir Tristram?” (5.1.32-34). Although Gertrude seems to be referring 
to the historical past, “the knighthood of old time” (5.1.38), she is presumably getting 
these stories through texts, Mirror of Princely Deeds and Knighthood, Palmerin of 
England and the various accounts of the knights of the round table. She is, again, looking 
to texts to provide a solution to her problem.  
 Unfortunately, the texts she relies upon and the reading strategy she uses often 
leads her to make poor decisions. For instance, the play makes clear that the chivalric 
romances that she is attempting to imitate are no longer applicable to her situation. As 
Theodora A. Janowksi argues, the play criticizes the notion that noble birth entails noble 
actions or even wealth.245  Rather, the play demonstrates that in proto-capitalist London, 
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landed gentry, like Sir Petronel and Quicksilver, are often financially dependent on the 
merchant class and are often less moral and trustworthy than the merchants they are 
dependent on. So Gertrude’s belief that Petronel is necessarily good and wealthy seems to 
be produced through the texts she read and not through a reading of her social situation. 
She, like Don Quixote, believes that she should attempt to imitate chivalric romances, 
and so uses them as the basis for action, in this case, marrying Petronel.246 Although she 
reads actively, in the sense that she acts based on her reading, she does not actively 
interpret the text to account fully for its instability. A contemporary critic might say that 
she failed to read historically; that is, she failed to recognize the historical, economic, and 
cultural differences between the chivalric tales and her own proto-capitalist reality. But 
this is the consequence of unstable texts. Because they do not carry inherent meaning, 
they need to be interpreted in order to produce meaning, but they can also be misread, 
and because early modern reading strategies were goal-orientated, misreading can 
produce mis-decisions. In the case of Gertrude, her misreading led her to marry Petronel.  
 The effect of unstable texts on the reader is further explored through Touchstone’s 
narrative, but while Gertrude is shown to be too reliant on texts and too affected by them, 
Touchstone refuses to rely on texts because he fears their instability and the efficacy 
produced through that instability. Specifically, Touchstone is worried that texts do not 
provide an authoritative message that remains unchanged after reading.  The resolution of 
the play, in part, hinges on Touchstone forgiving Quicksilver. And Quicksilver attempts 
to win forgiveness through a text; he writes a letter to Touchstone asking for forgiveness. 
However, Touchstone refuses to read the letter because he maintains, 
Son Golding, I will not be tempted.  I find mine 
  own easy nature, and know not what a well- 
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penned subtle letter may work upon it;  There may  
be tricks, packing, do you see? (5.2.4-7).  
 
On a basic level, this scene demonstrates the truism that texts need a reader to work. The 
letter cannot convince Touchstone if he refuses to read it. (The need for an active reader 
will be contrasted with non-necessity of an active playgoer later in the play.) On a more 
complex level, this scene demonstrates the profound instability of texts. Touchstone will 
not read the letter because he knows, or thinks he knows, that the letter will contain 
“tricks” or false information about Quicksilver’s reformed character. The letter then will 
not contain an authoritative description of Quicksilver. Furthermore, once the letter is 
read and interpreted by Touchstone, its message changes. Touchstone believes that his 
“easy nature” will not be able to see the letter for the trick he thinks it is. He will interpret 
it in accordance with his forgiving nature, and this interpretation will produce a letter that 
says Quicksilver is legitimately sorry for his crimes.  The letter then is neither 
authoritative nor unchanging, which makes it essentially useless as a description of 
Touchstone’s character. Like Morose’s contract in Epicene, it cannot do what it was 
intended to do, give an account of Quicksilver’s repentance. Despite the letter’s 
instability (or rather because of its instability), Quicksilver believes that the letter will 
still produce an effect on the reader. Because Touchstone believes he will interpret the 
letter according to his easy nature, he will be lead to forgive Quicksilver. The letter 
demands that it be read actively (in part because of its “tricks”), but once the letter is read 
actively, it will produce actions in the reader. And because Touchstone does not wish to 
forgive Quicksilver, he refuses to read the letter. In short, Touchstone does not read the 
letter because it is both unstable and affective – it cannot guarantee that Quicksilver is 
repentant, but it will lead Touchstone to forgive him.  
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There is a sense then that the letter is so unstable that its content is 
inconsequential. No matter what it says, Touchstone will interpret it as “tricks” that will 
lead him to forgive Quicksilver. In fact, Wolf, Golding and the playhouse audience know 
that Touchstone’s belief about the content of the letter is wrong. Quicksilver is actually 
telling the truth; he has reformed and does feel sorry for his crimes. Although Touchstone 
is wrong about the content of the letter, he seems not to be wrong about his own 
interpretation of that letter. If he reads it, he will find tricks in it, not because they are in 
the text (the audience knows they are not), but because they exist within the reader. 
Touchstone believes there are tricks in the letter and so will find them because the 
unstable text is constative of, not its content, but Touchstone’s interpretation of it.  
Reading takes place within the reading subject, not within the read object. And in this 
case, the reading takes place prior to the subject (Touchstone) physically interacting with 
the object (the letter). Hence, Touchstone refuses to read the letter because, in a sense, he 
has already read and interpreted it and foreseen the consequences of his interpretation – 
forgiving Quicksilver.  
Indeed, the refusal to read a physical text becomes a kind of hyperbolic figure for 
the instability of texts. Texts are so unstable within Eastward Ho that they can be read 
without even looking at them. Because texts really only exist within the action of reading, 
the physical text is insignificant. The play’s depiction of Gertrude’s reading habits 
explore this extreme version of unstable texts.  She, like Touchstone, reads absent texts. 
The texts she is looking for to find comfort and a plan of action do not exist. As she 
points out to Sindefy, there are no texts that describe her situation (5.1.1-2). Nevertheless, 
she continues to read those absent texts and relies on them for comfort: “Why, good faith, 
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Sin, I could dine with a lamen / table story now” (5.1.6-7). Gertrud is imagining a text 
and then interpreting it as being able to help them out of their situation or at least provide 
guidance and comfort.  Texts are being constructed within Eastward Ho as so unstable 
that their meaning only really exists within the reader and so can be read in absentia. 
 This depiction of unstable texts is contrasted with the representation of 
performance, which is dramatized within the play as an authoritative and unchanging 
description or expression of character. And although performance is portrayed within the 
narrative as affective, the effect it produces within the audience works through its 
stability and not its instability.  
Because Touchstone refuses to read the letter, those who are trying to convince 
him to forgive Quicksilver (Wolf, the jailer and Golding, his son-in-law) switch tactics 
and try to convince him through performance. After it is clear that Touchstone will not 
accept Quicksilver’s textual account, Wolf suggests that Touchstone see for himself how 
sorry and reformed Quicksilver has become: “were your worship an eye / witness of it, 
you would say so” (5.2.45-46).  Since Touchstone refuses to be a reader, Wolf wants him 
to be an audience to a performance, an “eyewitness.” Indeed, Wolf himself believes that 
Quicksilver is repentant because he was an audience to one of Quicksilver’s 
performances. He believes Quicksilver after he seems him sings psalms (5.2.49-52). But 
more significantly, Wolf believes in Quicksilver’s redemption because “he can tell / you 
almost all the stories of the Book of Martyrs, / and speak you all the Sick-Man’s Salve 
without / book” (5.2.61-64). On the one hand, Wolf believes in Quicksilver’s redemption 
because Quicksilver has memorized and internalized the content of these texts. His 
reading strategy again suggests the instability and efficacy of texts. Quicksilver has 
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actively read these texts and imitated them.  But Wolf’s language also emphasizes 
Quicksilver’s ability to perform these texts. Indeed, his phrasing provides a fairly direct 
reference to stage performance. Quicksilver can perform these texts “without book,” a 
possible reference to stage performances; performers read lines that are based on a book, 
the play text, but without the physical text in front of them.  They read without book. And 
Wolf seems to believe that Quicksilver’s (stage) performance produces an authoritative 
account of Quicksilver’s character. Texts may have led Quicksilver to reform, but in 
order to express his reformed character, he needs a performance. This performance then 
creates another text, the letter, but as Touchstone’s refusal to read the letter illustrates, the 
text will not be an authoritative account of Quicksilver’s character because of its 
instability. 
However, Wolf’s report of Quicksilver’s performance of redemption still does not 
convince Touchstone. As we saw in chapters one and two, a constative recounting of a 
performance does not have the same efficacy as a performative enactment of a 
performance. One of the reasons why Touchstone is not convinced through Quicksilver’s 
performance is he was not present at the performance; he must accept the word of a 
recounting witness – Wolf.  Wolf’s account of Quicksilver’s performance is similar to 
Quicksilver’s letter that Touchstone refuses to read: it is a record of a performance. 
Because Touchstone is not convinced by Wolf’s recounting of Quicksilver’s 
performance, Golding manufactures a situation in which Touchstone will see firsthand 
the enactment of the performance. In other words, Golding constructs an audience for 
Quicksilver. This strategy recalls other early modern scenes such as the wedding in The 
Duchess of Malfi, the coronation in Tamburlaine, and closely resembles Truewit’s trick 
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in Epicene.  Golding creates a situation that allows Touchstone to directly access 
Quicksilver’s performance and the performative utterances that construct his reformed 
character. Thus, a performance is created that will, in Golding’s words, “bring him 
[Touchstone] to be a spectator of their [Quicksilver’s and Petronel’s] / miseries” 
(5.3.117-118). While Touchstone is watching, Quicksilver is asked by another prisoner to 
perform a song that he has written, which expresses his repentance. Quicksilver responds 
to this request by stating,  
Sir, with all my heart; and, as I told Master 
Toby, I shall be glad to have any man a witness of 
it. And the more openly I profess it, I hope it will 
appear the heartier, and the more unfeigned (5.5.33-36).  
 
As soon as Touchstone sees the song performed, he forgives Quicksilver and says to 
himself, “This cannot be feigned” (5.5.76). Touchstone seems not to be actively 
interpreting the performance, but simply accepts as true what he saw performed. Unlike 
his reaction to the text, he is not skeptical about his ability to actively read the 
performance. He simply believes it to be true.   
In fact, what makes Quicksilver’s redemption believable seems to be the presence 
of an audience. Quicksilver suggests that the more people present at his performance, the 
“more unfeigned” it will appear. Thus, he is happy to perform it as often as possible in 
front of as many people as possible. This statement appears counterintuitive. Having an 
audience present, one would think, should make his performance seem feigned since he 
would be acting for the benefit of an audience; he would be pretending he is something 
he is not, that is, reformed. However, this does not seem to be the case; Quicksilver and 
his audience understand his performance as performative and stable. By performing his 
repentance, he is constructing an institutional reality that cannot be challenged or 
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interpreted as other than it is. In a sense, his performance cannot be feigned because his 
performance of repentance constitutes his repentance, and the people who see that 
performance will have to accept that reality.247  
Indeed, Touchstone understands the performance as working, not through his 
active participation, but by overcoming his resistance and by circumventing his active 
interpretation. When Touchstone thanks Golding for tricking him into becoming an 
audience member to Quicksilver’s performance, he describes the way that the 
performance worked: “Listen. I am ravished with his Repentance, and could stand here a 
whole prenticeship to hear him.” The sexual metaphor of “ravished” suggest that he was 
not an active participant in the performance. He was figuratively raped by the 
performance.248 He was placed in the audience against his will and was convinced of 
Quicksilver’s repentance against his will. This is in direct opposition to the way that texts 
are understood to work in Eastward Ho and within early modern print culture. In the 
early modern theory described above, texts work by soliciting the reader’s active 
interpretation, which can then move the reader to act. The audience of a performance then 
is being constructed within the play as acting in opposition to readers of texts. The 
audience is depicted as accepting the content of the performance and that content is 
produced through the performance and not through the interpretation of the performance.  
Although Touchstone’s sexual metaphor suggests that he was not an active 
participant in the performance, it does seem to suggest that he was the object of the 
performance and that the performance led him to act, that is, forgive Quicksilver. Indeed, 
Wolf, another audience to Quicksilver’s performance, also acted after seeing the 
performance; he tried to convince Touchstone of Quicksilver’s redemption. Thus, it 
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seems that within Eastward Ho, performance is being constructed as producing effects in 
the audience and producing actions in the audience, and this view of performance is in 
opposition to the construction of playgoing that I have been arguing for. However, this 
contradiction between the construction of playgoing in Eastward Ho and the broader 
construction of playgoing that I have been tracing is somewhat resolved by the odd 
position of Touchstone within Quicksilver’s performance.  That is, Quicksilver does not 
know that Touchstone is in the audience. He is not performing for Touchstone. As 
Quicksilver states, the reason that he performs Repentance is because he will “be glad to 
have any man a witness of / it” (5.5.34-35). In other words, he doesn’t care who is in the 
audience. He doesn’t care who is in the audience because the audience is not really the 
object of his performance. There is a sense in which he is performing Repentance in order 
to repent because his repentance is constitutive of his performance. He is becoming 
repentant by performing Repentance. Thus, when looked at from Touchstone’s 
perspective (the audience), the performance is working upon the audience, but when 
looked at from Quicksilver’s perspective (the performer), the audience is not the object of 
the performance; the intended object of the performance is Quicksilver’s own character.   
Despite this complication, Quicksilver’s perspective on his own performance 
helps establish the difference between performance and text. Because Quicksilver 
performs not to convince others of his change of heart but to become repentant within 
institutional reality, the authority of the performance cannot effectively be challenged or 
interpreted in any other way than the expression of repentance. On the other hand, his 
letter is a record of his performative repentance and as such is not performative but 
constative. Thus, Touchstone can interpret that letter to judge how accurately he believes 
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it corresponds to the truth of the situation by employing his own interpretive methods of 
discovering “tricks” and bringing to the text his own “easy nature.” This interpretive 
ability is not available to him when he watches the performance. He simply has to accept 
the performative utterances as an unchanging, authoritative account of Touchstone’s 
character because the performance is where his character is being constructed; the 
meaning of the performance is inherent within the performance, not in the interpretation 
of it. In other words, while Touchstone is worried that Quicksilver’s letter will not be an 
authoritative and unchanging recounting of reality, Touchstone believes Quicksilver’s 
performance because his performance is reality. 
  
III: Constructing Stable Plays and Unstable Play Texts by Dramatizing Legal Texts 
 
The Antipodes and Eastward Ho suggest that texts in general (letters and books) 
were understood as unstable, and playwrights represented them in their plays to help 
construct performance as stable. So texts provided a foil for playwrights: texts were a 
contrasting medium through which they could construct stable performances and non-
reactive playgoers. However, playwrights would have also been professionally interested 
in texts for their own sake. After all, playwrights produced play texts as well as 
playhouse performances and so would have been interested in texts not just as a 
contrasting medium, but as one of their mediums. Indeed, Quicksilver’s redemption 
narrative seems to dramatize texts not only to contrast them with performance, but also to 
reflect on play texts and the performance’s relationship to texts. That is, Quicksilver’s use 
of texts and performances mirrors playwrights’ use of these two mediums. His repentance 
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starts by reading texts, Book of Martyrs and Sick-Man’s Salve; he then turns these texts 
into two separate performances; he next recites or performs the texts “without book,” and 
finally creates a new performance, Repentance. Those performances are then turned into 
another text, his letter to Touchstone. This process mirrors the process through which 
plays and play texts are produced: a play starts with a text, a script and the source 
material that make up that text (chronicles, romances, poems, classical texts); the text is 
then turned into a performance by an individual reading that text with “without book” 
within the playhouse, and then the performance is sometimes turned back into a text by 
another individual publishing a play text. By showing how Quicksilver starts with an 
unstable text that produces a stable performance and ends with another unstable text, 
Eastward Ho seems to be suggesting that play texts, like most text, should be considered 
unstable even though the performance, which produced the unstable text (play text) and 
was a product of an unstable text (play script), is stable.  
Apart from the reference to play texts in Eastward Ho, the relationship 
playwrights had with the instability of their play texts can also be read within the 
dramatizations of legal texts because of the ontological significance of legal texts. Legal 
texts (contracts, bonds, laws) are performative because they create an institutional (legal) 
reality, and so they share with play texts a similar conceptual and ontological space – 
they are a textual representation of performative actions.249 A legal document is a record 
of a performance – for instance, the writing of a law or the signing of a contract – and at 
the same time, it is, in and of itself, performative: as long as it exists, it produces or has 
the potential to produce the institutional reality that it records. Likewise, a play text is the 
record of the performative utterances that make up a performance, and a play text also 
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has the potential to produce more performances and more performative utterances. Thus, 
legal texts offer playwrights an opportunity to reflect upon the texts that their own 
performative drama generates – play texts. This is not to say plays that feature and 
dramatize legal texts are always self-consciously reflecting on play texts. Rather, the 
representations of legal texts provide a trace of how playwrights understood performative 
documents to work and how performative documents should be read. And an analysis of 
these legal texts reveals that while they are depicted as performative, they are not 
depicted, within early modern drama, as stable. Because they are not immune to the 
destabilizing reading practices of early modern print culture, they too are depicted as 
almost inherently unstable.  
 The example from Epicene, discussed at the start of this chapter, provides a clear 
example of a text that can be both performative and unstable, while the performance of 
that text is stable. Morose’s insistence that his contract involve a performance suggests 
the contract (by itself) is not stable. He needs to include a performance in order to 
stabilize the contract, so it cannot be later interpreted and nullified. The contract is 
unstable, but the performance of the signing of that contract is stable.  
 The depiction of unstable legal texts is not unique to Epicene. Throughout early 
modern drama, legal texts, particularly contracts, are similarly depicted as unstable. For 
instance, in Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair, Quarlous employs a pickpocket to steal a 
marriage license that was written for Cokes and Grace so that he can marry Grace 
(3.5.239-265). He claims, “Tis but scraping out Cokes his name, and ‘tis done” (4.3.102). 
Documents are so unstable in this play that they are all but useless. They carry no 
inherent meaning and can be changed at will by whoever happens to posses them. Indeed, 
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the character Troubleall, a fool who absentmindedly runs in and out of scenes asking for 
warrants and will not even urinate or change his shirt unless he has a warrant to tell him 
he can, is a comic fool, whose presence suggests that texts are so unstable, they are all but 
useless (4.1.52-57). That is, only a fool like Troubleall would take legal documents 
seriously, as a stable arbiter of information. And in Middleton’s Michaelmas Term, 
property is transferred between con-artists through falsified contracts and documents so 
often that Quomodo (one of the con-artists who is conned and gets conned through 
documents) equates scriveners who create legal documents with prostitutes and declares 
neither to be trustworthy: “keep his hand from a quean and / a scrivener” (4.1.102-
103).250 The implication seems to be that both professions pretend to be something they 
are not.  
However, not all plays express a frustration with unstable legal texts.  Middleton, 
Rowley and Heywood’s The Old Law shows the usefulness of unstable legal texts by 
positing a dystopian world where documents are actually stable. In the fictional land of 
Epire, a law condemns elderly citizens to death. The play explores the immorality and 
tyranny of the law, but also dramatizes the stability of the law; no one can find a way to 
interpret the law in such a way that would nullify it.251  Unlike Morose’s contract in 
Epicene, this law is airtight. The play narrates the negative consequences of its stability 
and even conflates the tyranny of the law with its stability because the stability of the 
texts is the vehicle of the law’s tyranny.252 To this list of plays that explore the instability 
of legal texts could be added Webster’s The Devil’s Law-Case, Middleton’s A Game at 
Chess and Massinger’s A New Way to Pay Old Debts.  
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 Beyond further demonstrating the instability of texts in general and legal texts in 
particular, these plays may offer interesting insights into the vexed relationship 
playwrights had with their own play texts, a relationship that has been explored by 
several critics.253 That is, the somewhat negative portrayal of legal texts hints at 
playwrights’ anxiety over how their play texts would be re-appropriated, interpreted and 
destabilized once they were put into print and subject to the destabilizing forces of early 
modern print culture.  However, these plays have little to say about the stability of their 
performances in relationship to the instability of texts. And since the stability of 
performance is a facet of the construction of playgoing, which is the focus of this 
argument, a full discussion of these plays is beyond the scope of this study. 
 However, there are (at least) two notable examples of plays that do discuss both 
the instability of legal texts and the stability of performance: Epicene, discussed above, 
and, somewhat surprisingly, Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. As we have seen in 
plays such as Hamlet, Henry V and A Midsummer’s Night Dream, Shakespeare seems not 
to have participated in the construction of the non-reactive playgoer but actively sought 
to engage his audience; however, he uses this play to thoroughly contrast the instability 
of print with the stability of performance, thereby constructing the non-reactive playgoer. 
Like The Old Law, the play depicts the instability of legal performative texts as positive.  
 Shylock’s bond is initially portrayed as so stable that it seems iron-clad (again, 
like texts in The Old Law), but its stability is ultimately undermined by Portia’s 
imaginative interpretation. Before Portia undermines the contract, she points out that the 
contract cannot be changed. “There is no power in Venice / Can alter a decree 
established” (4.1.213-214). And later she asserts, “For the intent and purpose of the law / 
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Hath full relation to the penalty / Which here appeareth due upon the bond” (4.1.242-
244). In other words, if any text (legal or otherwise) were stable, the bond would be it. 
However, Portia is able to overcome this apparent stability through a close reading of the 
text, her famous interpretive quibble. She points out that within the text, “the words 
expressly are ‘a pound of flesh’” (4.1.302). And so, she is able to trap Shylock by 
destabilizing the text through active interpretation.  
This scene has been thoroughly discussed by both legal and literary scholars; in 
fact, R.S. White believes that the fourth act of The Merchant of Venice is “the most 
famous trial scene in imaginative literature.”254 These critics generally tend to see the 
interpretability of the bond as central to Portia’s success. However, their discussion of 
interpretability is generally framed around the issue not of unstable texts but of equity: 
the early modern legal practice of loosely interpreting a law to achieve justice instead of 
strictly following the letter of the law.255 No critic has, to my knowledge, seen the bond 
as a reflection on texts themselves and interpreted the instability of the bond as an 
assertion of the instability of texts.256   
 But the treatment of other texts within the play seems to explore further the theme 
of the instability of texts. Throughout the play, non-legal texts echo the role the bond 
plays in the fourth act, and these texts, like the bond, are portrayed as unstable and are 
contrasted with the stability of performance.  For instance, Portia (disguised as Balthasar) 
is introduced to the Duke’s court through Bellario’s letter. This letter actually announces 
itself as unstable and so destabilizes its own content, even as it hints at the stability of the 
performance that the text is meant to produce. After stating that “his lack of years” 
(4.1.158) should not be counted against Balthasar, the letter provides this caveat: “I leave 
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him to your gracious acceptance, / whose trial shall better publish his commendation” 
(4.1.160-161). This final sentence of the letter seems to be simply saying that Balthasar’s 
performance at the trial will attest to his ability. In other words, the letter is saying, “don’t 
take my word for it.” This caveat destabilizes the entire letter because it claims that the 
trial can “better publish [Balthasar’s] commendation” than the letter and so is suggesting 
that the letter will not be a stable and authoritative guarantee of Balthasar’s character; 
only his performance at court will do that. One could even say that this letter is not a 
meaningful construction of Balthasar’s character but is merely a prompt for his 
performance at court, which will ultimately be the true construction of his character. The 
performance that the letter enables is what produces the stable reality that everyone 
present will have to confront; the letter itself contains no such guarantee. The connection 
to play texts here is fairly clear: the letter, like play texts, is unstable, but it offers the 
chance at a performance, which can then stabilize the content of the text – performance 
can “better publish” the text.  
 It is interesting to note that the instability of the meaning of the final line of the 
letter also captures the instability of texts and the stability of performance.  Although the 
sentence “I leave him to your gracious acceptance, / whose trial shall better publish his 
commendation” (4.1.160-161) seems to be simply saying, let the trial speak for his 
character, the sentence’s exact signification cannot be established because the pronoun 
“whose” does not have a clear referent. It could refer to the “you” in “your gracious 
acceptance” (the Duke), so the word “trial” could be referring to the Duke’s trial of 
Balthasar, that is, the Duke’s test of Balthasar’s character and legal acumen. On the other 
hand, “whose” could be referring to the previous pronoun “him” found in the previous 
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clause, so “trial” refers to the court proceedings against Antonio and Balthasar’s 
performance within them. So Balthasar either is on trial (his competency is being tried by 
the Duke) or in a trial (he is taking part in the court proceedings against Antonio, which 
will ultimately prove his worth). By looking at the print form of this sentence, the reader 
cannot know which character “whose” is referring to. In Orgel’s words, “it can only be 
both.”257 However, this instability can be defused through performance. By looking at or 
pointing to either the Duke or Balthasar while pronouncing “whose,” the actor reading 
the letter can, if he or she chooses, stabilize the instability of the line. The performer’s 
gaze can establish a referent for “whose.”  
Of course in the final analysis, there is no compelling reason to stabilize this 
instability within a performance since both readings of the line – Balthasar is on trial, 
Balthasar is in a trial – are compatible.  Allowing for both meanings actually helps 
explain what is at stake in the trial, both Antonio’s life and Portia’s ability. Nevertheless, 
by producing an unstable sentence that destabilizes the text it is a part of and stabilizes 
the performance that it produces (as argued above), the sentence is able to suggest the 
stability of performance and the instability of texts twice, at the same time.  
 This letter then seems to be announcing what Touchstone’s forgiveness narrative 
dramatizes – that performance constructs a more stable version of institutional reality 
than texts. In Eastward Ho, Touchstone refuses to read Quicksilver’s letter because he 
does not trust its ability to accurately construct a stable and trustworthy social identity. 
He had to wait for Quicksilver’s performance, which did ultimately demonstrate to him 
that Quicksilver was redeemed. Similarly, Bellario’s letter asks its reader not to believe 
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its own unstable message, but to wait for the performance that will create a stable 
construction.  
 This same contrast between the instability of the printed word and the stability of 
a performance is again suggested by the final scene of the play. After Portia has revealed 
to Antonio and Bassanio that she was actually the “young doctor of Rome,” she offers, as 
proof of her story, letters from Bellario:  
You are all amazed. 
Here is a letter. Read it at your leisure.  
It comes from Padua, from Bellario. 
There you shall find that Portia was the doctor, 
Nerissa there her clerk (5.1.265-269). 
 
The men seem to accept her story, but she seems to sense that they are not convinced of 
her version of reality, and so she offers more proof in the form of a formal question and 
answer session:  
 And yet I am sure you are not satisfied 
 Of these events at full. Let us go in,  
 And charge us there upon inter’gatories, 
 And we will answer all things faithfully (5.1.295-298). 
 
The “inter’gatories” seem to reference a mock-court session, in which Portia and Nerissa 
will answer any questions concerning their story. That is, just like Bellario’s letter urges, 
the real and more stable version of reality will be constructed in the performance of the 
events and not within the letter that would seem to confirm their tale. And although these 
“inter’gatories” are not a clear reference or figure of stage performance, they do recall 
Morose’s gesture to the audience at the end of Epicene, which creates a performance that 
stabilizes his document. In other words, the women agree to stage a mock-court session 
in order to stabilize the narrative that is found in the unstable documents they provide as 
evidence of their claims.  
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 These representations of unstable documents (Bellario’s letters) reflect on the 
legal document (the bond) that is at the center of the play, and the play’s central 
characters’ acceptance of the instability of texts stands in contrast to Shylock’s refusal to 
see texts (specifically his bond) as unstable. The majority of the fourth act is dominated 
by characters attempting to convince Shylock that he should be merciful. However, 
embedded in their pleas for mercy is an attempt to get Shylock and Portia to reinterpret or 
nullify his contract – to see the contract and the law as something that can be changed, in 
other words, to view the contract as unstable.258 Thus, within the play, the vehicle of 
mercy is the instability of texts.259  For instance, Bassanio begs Portia not to merely 
dismiss the case, but to interpret the bond in Antonio’s favor (something she, of course, 
eventually does); he asks her to “Wrest once the law to your authority” (4.1.210). And 
Portia urges Shylock to accept a more radical solution: “bid me tear the bond” (4.1.229). 
Here Portia is pretending that she cannot find a way to nullify the bond through 
interpretation and so is proposing to Shylock that he simply destroy it, which assumes 
that it is something that can be simply discarded, and in turn, that it can be discarded 
suggests that the text (like most early modern texts) is not stable, authoritative and 
unchanging, but unstable and ephemeral. Shylock refuses to accept this understanding of 
texts; instead, he insists that the stability of texts is necessary in order to ensure the 
cohesion of the legal and political structure of Venice. For instance, he responds to the 
Duke’s plea for mercy with, “If you deny it [his bond], let the danger light / Upon your 
charter and your city’s freedom” (4.1.37-38), and later, “If you deny me, fie upon your 
law: / There is no force in the decrees of Venice” (4.1.100-101). Thus, Shylock insists on 
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the stability of the text, and this insistence, along with his lack of mercy, proves to be his 
undoing.  
 In the end, The Merchant of Venice does not portray the instability of 
performative texts as negative. It is the instability of the texts that saves Antonio’s life 
and enables Shylock’s punishment. The play then encourages the readers of performative 
texts to actively read and interpret those texts, which contributes to the instability of texts. 
And although these representations of legal texts do not provide a direct reference to play 
texts, they do provide a meditation on performative texts. And this meditation suggests 
that playwrights understood performative texts as constructing an unstable institutional 
reality through the interpretative ability of the reading audience. This unstable reality, 
however, can be stabilized through a performance. Again, the link to play texts seems 
clear. Play texts work through a reading audience, who can change, sometimes drastically 
change the content or intent of the text. Conversely, the performance of those texts 
stabilizes the instability of the texts. That is, it produces an institutional reality 
independent of interpretation.  
  
VI: The Playhouse’s Effort to Stabilize Performance: The Effects of the Non-Reactive 
Playgoer on the Modes of Dramatic Production 
 
While this study has tended to trace the effects of the non-reactive playgoer and 
the construction of playgoing through the play texts or the cultural level of the social 
formation of playgoing, these effects can also be seen within the actual modes of 
production of the social formation.  Specifically, the effects of the effort to differentiate 
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print from performance can be traced to the playhouse’s production techniques – the way 
that the playhouse organized, marketed and sold their product. In other words, the mode 
of production of the social formation of playgoing is determined by the effects of the 
non-reactive playgoer in that these techniques are designed to stabilize performance and 
so control the unruly early modern audience. In fact, just as early modern plays tended to 
construct performance in opposition to texts, the playing companies organized their 
production techniques in opposition to the techniques of the printing house because the 
printing house’s production techniques had the potential to contribute to the 
destabilization of texts and the construction of the active reader. By organizing itself in 
opposition to the printing house, the playhouse was able to produce performances that 
were stable. The playhouse seems to have produced stable performances mainly by 
limiting the number of times a particular play could be seen and by marketing plays to a 
broad audience. This was in opposition to the way that the printing house produced its 
texts. Texts were printed as many times as possible and marketed to a specific audience. 
As will be shown, the printing house techniques might have helped produce unstable 
texts and active readers, and the playhouse helped contribute to stable performances and 
non-reactive playgoers.    
By arguing that the playhouse organized itself in opposition to the printing house, 
I am not attempting to assign a conscious agency to the playhouse. That is, the playhouse 
or the individuals who made up the playhouse (owners, playwrights, actors, audiences) 
seem not to have collaborated together to produce stable performances. Rather, the 
playhouse’s production techniques were influenced by the absent cause of the non-
responsive playgoer, just as playwrights’ metadramatic construction of playgoing was 
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also determined by the same absent cause and not produced through the collaborative 
efforts of the playwrights.  In fact, some of the production techniques discussed below 
may seem not to have been consciously produced at all, but were simply the natural or 
necessary way that plays would have had to have been produced given the physical and 
economic constraints of the early modern playhouse. However, as I will try to 
demonstrate, what looks like natural and necessary elements of the production of early 
modern plays may have been produced by the absent cause of the non-reactive 
playgoer.260  
One aspect of the production of early modern plays that may seem necessary (and 
even obvious) but actually works to stabilize the performance is the un-repeatability of 
performance. That is, performance is not as repeatable as a text; a performance can only 
be viewed a finite number of times, but a text can be read an infinite number of times, 
and each reading of the text allows for (or even demands) a new interpretation of the text, 
and each interpretation produces or potentially produces a new meaning of the text; with 
each new meaning, the text becomes more and more unstable. In other words, there is an 
instability built into repetition, or as Roland Barthes reminds us, rereading “multiplies 
[the text] in its variety and its plurality.”261  Performance, on the other hand, cannot be 
viewed as often. The play is only available to the viewer at certain times (it has to be 
produced) and the number of productions is finite. This contrast brackets for a moment 
the impact of memory on performance (a subject that will be returned to in the final 
section of this study); by remembering a performance, the remembering subject can 
conceptually re-perform (and then reinterpret) the original performance an infinite 
number of times, and remembering in and of itself is a notoriously unstable activity; the 
180 
memory of an object is often substantially different from the object that produced the 
memory.262 Despite the complication of memory, this contrast between performance and 
print still involves a fairly simple and straightforward arithmetic – the more viewings or 
readings that a text or performance undergoes, the more unstable that text or performance 
becomes. 
 This arithmetic may seem ahistorical and natural; however, the early modern 
repertory system magnifies this difference between texts and performance because of the 
short run of most plays. Henslowe’s diary, which contains the best available evidence of 
play scheduling, demonstrates that an individual play was not available for many repeat 
viewings. Roslyn Lander Knutson, in her study of the early modern repertory system and 
Henslowe’s diary, cites September 1594 as a representative sample of a playing schedule. 
From the 2nd to the 30th of September, “Fifteen different titles are offered in this schedule 
of twenty-seven playing days. The pace, though rigorous, is normal.”263  During this 
month, only one play (Henslowe calls it the “the venesyon comedy”) was played three 
times, ten plays were performed twice and six plays were only staged once. Of course, 
the plays that were only performed once in September would have been produced in 
August and October. For instance, even though The Jew of Malta was only produced 
once in September of 1594, Marlowe’s play was by that time already old; it debuted in 
1591 and was performed 19 times before September of 1594, including twice in August 
of that year.264 However, The Jew of Malta seems to have been a fairly popular play, 
enjoying a particularly long run. Knutson points to the 1594 run of Philipo and Hippolito 
as normative:  
Its initial performance had taken place two months before (July 9). Counting that 
debut, it had received eight performances by September 4; it received two more in 
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September, and it was retired on October 7. In all, Philipo and Hippolito received 
twelve performances in a four-month run. The pattern of its scheduling – 
performances within a week of one another at the beginning of the run, stretched 
to separations of two or three weeks toward the end – is a standard one for new 
plays.265  
 
Gurr finds an even more diverse offering of plays and shorter play run in the repertory of 
the Admiral’s Men: “In January 1596, when they put on 26 performances, the Admiral’s 
Men staged 14 different plays in one month. Six of these plays were given only once. The 
shortest interval between two performances of the same play was three days.” 266 On a 
very basic level, then, any one play was not available to a large number of viewings. And 
their short runs, on a theoretical level, stabilized the performance because they would not 
have been subject to the destabilizing force of multiple viewings.  
 It is perhaps useful to briefly compare the early modern repertory system with 
twenty-first century playgoers’ experiences with performance runs to highlight how 
different the early moderns’ playgoing experience was. From April 7, 2010 to June 6, 
2010, the Chicago Shakespeare Theater performed The Taming of the Shrew sixty four 
times. Even very popular plays like The Jew of Malta, Tamburlaine or The Spanish 
Tragedy would have to run for decades to accumulate sixty four performances in the 
sixteenth or seventeenth century. As noted above, The Jew of Malta had to run for almost 
three years before it was performed nineteen times, and there is no record of any play 
accumulating sixty four performances before the close of the theaters in 1642. And of 
course, The Taming of the Shrew will continue to be produced after June 6th by the 
Chicago Theater or some other area theater group. Indeed, it has been said that Hamlet is 
being produced somewhere in America everyday. An avid theatergoer and Hamlet fan 
can see literally hundreds of performances of Hamlet in a life time, and each time she 
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sees the play, she may interpret the performance differently or have the performance 
interpreted differently by the theater group staging the play. These multiple experiences 
simply were not available to an early modern playgoer.267 The repertory system of 
Broadway productions draws out this difference even further. On June 19, 1997, Cats 
became the longest running show in the history of Broadway with 7,485 performances 
over 18 years. It was then performed for another 3 years. In short, there is a 
reproducibility to modern performances that would not have been available to early 
modern audiences, and the early modern lack of reproduction created a more stable 
performance than we are used to.  
 Of course, there are demographic differences that explain the disparity between 
early modern and modern stage runs: modern day Chicago and New York are simply 
much bigger and wealthier cities than early modern London and so can support more 
performances. As Tiffany Stern notes, “Tiny London of the early modern period could 
not sustain a long run of the same play as it would be unable to produce the audience for 
it.”268  Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that some plays were pulled from the 
repertory not for economic reasons, but for the reasons cited above – to limit the amount 
of possible viewings and interpretations.  
Although it is often assumed that the breakneck pace of the early modern 
repertory system was obligatory because early modern audiences demanded novelty, the 
pace of production does not seem to have been necessary.269  In fact, Gurr argues that the 
audience’s tastes probably did not drive the production of new plays. He notes that early 
modern audience’s tastes  
by their nature remained passively receptive. With some companies they allowed 
the attractions of Faustus and The Spanish Tragedy to stay constant for fifty years 
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in the northern amphitheaters. Using that kind of evidence to identify what 
audiences liked in the mass and as passive tasters of what was set before them is, 
allowing for the patchy nature of all the testimonies, a fairly straightforward 
exercise.  On the other hand the poets by their nature had more active appetites, 
always on edge to provide novelty.270 
 
He goes on to point out that the individuals who complain about the old fashioned plays 
in circulation on the London stage were always playwrights and not playgoers. Gurr is in 
effect arguing that the playwrights, and not the audience, were responsible for the short 
run of plays. Furthermore, the economics of the playhouse may have favored the 
repetition of old plays, not the creation of new ones. Knutson calculates that after eight 
performances, the playhouse would have made back its initial investment and started to 
turn a profit.271 To stage a new play was to take the risk that the play would not reach that 
eighth performance, but the staging of old plays all but guaranteed profits.272 In short, 
novelty on the early modern stage was fiscally risky. And aside from the economic 
disincentive towards novelty, the staging of new plays every week or so must have been 
an enormous amount of work, so it would have been simpler and more cost effective to 
simply keep repeating the old plays. Of course, the strategy of staging old plays to 
maximize profit can only be taken so far: a playhouse can not produce a half dozen plays 
for fifty years and expect to keep attracting customers. Eventually new plays would need 
to be found. But if one is going create, produce and fund new plays in the hopes of 
finding cash cows like Doctor Faustus or The Spanish Tragedy, the sheer number of new 
plays produced seems to make this search ineffective.  
In fact, sometimes plays seem to have been retired even though they continued to 
draw crowds. For instance, Henslowe references a play (now lost) called A Toye to 
Please Chaste Ladeys which debuted on November 14, 1595 and ran for five 
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performances. The début brought in 51 shillings (a solid take for a new play), and its final 
performance on April 13, 1596 brought in 39 shillings, which made it the fourth highest 
take for a play that month.273 Nevertheless, the play seems to have been pulled from the 
repertory after its April 13th performance.274 The five performance run probably netted 
Henslowe seven pounds, ten shillings, and Henslowe most likely paid 5 pounds for the 
play script.275 Although we can’t know how much he spent on other expenses, it seems 
likely that he made his money back and some profit from this short run and decided to 
pull the plug even though he was still making money from the play.  It should be noted 
that the run of A Toye to Please Chaste Ladeys does not seem to be normal; most runs 
follow a more fiscally reasonable path; that is, they start with big profits and the profits 
fall steadily until they are dropped from the repertory. Nevertheless, the run of A Toye to 
Please Chaste Ladeys and Gurr’s insight that old plays could continue to draw crowds 
and make money suggest that novelty and the short run of plays was not necessarily 
driven by a desire for profit.  
And although Gurr may be right that the drive for novelty on the stage was 
powered by the playwrights’ and actors’ desire for new plays and new challenges, it is 
also possible that the number of new plays produced and the short run of individual plays 
were the result of a (un)conscious desire to limit the number of times that the plays could 
be seen in order to limit the amount of possible interpretations that an individual play was 
subject to. This in turn would lead to a more stable performance – one that did not 
undergo the destabilizing effect of numerous interpretations. In other words, the early 
modern repertory system was not only produced by the demand for novelty and the 
creative impulses of the actors and playwrights, but may have been determined by the 
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structure of the social formation of playgoing: the repertory system could have been 
designed to stabilize performances which was an effect of the construction of the non-
reactive playgoer. And in the end, even if the playhouse’s desire to stabilize the 
performance was not the cause of the limited play runs, the effect almost certainly was a 
more stable performance that did not get destabilized through numerous interpretations.  
In order to accept that the short run of early modern performances and the demand 
for novelty were an effect of the non-reactive playgoer, one has to accept the fairly 
deterministic and Marxist view of history I described in the first chapter, since under this 
reading, the repertory system was not produced through individual agents trying to 
maximize profit and satisfy customers.  Instead, individual agents’ decisions were 
proscribed, determined or (less radically) influenced by the historical conditions of the 
playhouse.  And although this deterministic reading of the playhouse’s production 
methods may seem unconvincing from a post-Marxist or non-Marxist perspective, this 
reading demonstrates that determinism need not be reductive or limiting.  By attempting 
to control the audience, the playing companies shortened the run of plays, which 
contributed to the rich diversity and experiential nature of the early modern stage and, as 
previously argued, the non-naturalism of the theater and an ambitious model of 
performance that claimed to produce institutional reality. In the end, it is difficult to 
prove that none of this would have happened if the historical conditions of the theater 
were different. Nevertheless, if the absent cause of the non-reactive playgoer was in fact 
the ultimate cause in the last instance of the repertory system, then the social formation of 
playgoing seems to have benefited from the playing companies’ desire to stabilize its 
performances. 
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Beyond merely limiting the amount of viewings and interpretations, the early 
modern repertory system also influenced how plays were marketed.  Because of the short 
run of plays – a different play every day and a new play every two to three weeks – it 
would have been logistically difficult to effectively market a play to a specific 
audience.276 Instead, playing companies seem to have attempted to attract a rather general 
audience.  On the other hand, texts seemed to have been marketed to a very specific 
audience. This contrast between a general playhouse audience and a specific reading 
audience, as I will argue, suggests an understanding of the texts as unstable in contrast to 
stable performances. Indeed, this difference is particularly pronounced between 
performances and the play texts that the performances helped produce.  
 As Zachary Lesser has shown, play texts seem to have been marketed to a fairly 
specific audience. By investigating the economics of the publication of play texts, Lesser 
convincingly argues that the market for play texts was speculative “not only because they 
were an uncertain investment, but also because a publisher needed to speculate on their 
meanings in order to invest wisely.”277 Lesser then suggests that a publisher had to 
“understand the text’s position within all the relevant discourses, institutions, and 
practices, in order to speculate on the meanings his imagined customers might make of 
it.”278 A particular publisher might even specialize in a particular type of play text (or any 
other text for that matter) because he knew that there was a particular niche market for 
that particular type of text.279 The publishers would then market the play texts to that 
niche market. Thus Lesser argues: 
Publishers … developed techniques of presentation and marketing to ensure that 
their imagined customers became real ones. But because they specialized, 
publishers also constructed their customers’ reading simply by the act of 
publication itself, leading customers to consider a play within its publisher’s 
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specialty. For this reason, the same play may carry radically different meanings 
and politics not only between its printed and its performed versions, but even 
between two otherwise-identical printed editions brought out by two different 
publishers.280   
 
I quote Lesser at length here because the above quotation demonstrates the connection 
between the marketing strategy of printing houses and the instability of early modern 
texts. Because a publisher would attempt to assign a particular meaning to a play text and 
then market that text to a specific audience on the basis of that interpretation, a play text 
could take on multiple meanings if different publishers marketed that same text 
differently, or if a single publisher marketed one play text to two or more different 
audiences.  
Individual productions of plays, on the other hand, did not seem to have been 
marketed to a specific audience. Instead, they attempted to attract the largest and broadest 
audience they could get. For instance, Tiffany Stern has assembled the best evidence for 
determining how plays were marketed and concludes that early modern playhouses 
seemed to have marketed their product in three different ways. 1) The players would 
announce to their audience what play was being shown the next day (almost certainly a 
different play than was just performed).281 2) A potential playgoer would have heard 
about a specific production from the actors who, according to Stern, would “parade 
through the city ‘crying the play’, which is to say broadcasting the title of the play to be 
performed accompanied by drums and trumpets.”282 Both these techniques amount to 
little more than announcing the play to as many people as possible. These advertising 
techniques sought to create a general audience; indeed, they attempted to make all of 
London a potential audience.  
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Beyond these one time announcements, playing companies advertized individual 
performances by printing and distributing playbills. Unfortunately, not a single playbill 
from the early modern era has been discovered, so it is difficult to know what they looked 
like or what their exact function was (unlike title-pages, which advertised texts and will 
be discussed below). Nevertheless, Stern has reconstructed how playbills functioned as 
advertisements by examining advertisements for other types of performances – such as 
bills for bear-beating and sword fights – and by investigating the production of printing 
playbills. Her findings suggest playbills, like the other advertizing methods, appealed to a 
general rather than specific audience. Stern finds that throughout the early modern era the 
right to print playbills was controlled by a handful of printing houses and so opines that 
“all bills must have looked similar up to a point, no matter which company, play or 
theatre they were printed for.”283 Also, because the license to print playbills was 
inherited, playbills “would have looked similar not just to each other but also over time” 
because “presses, types and ornaments were also all inherited through the four printing 
establishments.”284 Thus, there did not seem to be an effort, or even ability, to 
differentiate one play from another or one playhouse from another playhouse.285  
Furthermore, the printing house probably produced stock bills: playbills that gave a 
general boilerplate description of a play but left the title, place, and time blank so that it 
could be later filled in once these details were known.286 In short, the producers of 
playbills (the printers of playbills and the theater companies that bought and distributed 
them) did not seem to use playbills as a way of targeting a specific audience because 
early modern playbills would have looked more or less the same. The effect of these non-
differentiated playbills would have been similar to the effect of the players “crying the 
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play” or the announcement at the end of a performance: they would have drawn as many 
people into the performance as possible without trying to market a particular performance 
for a particular audience.  
The distribution of these playbills also suggests that the plays were marketed to a 
diverse and general audience. In fact, London seems to have been blanketed with 
playbills. Although no evidence exists for the exact number of bills produced for a 
performance, Stern proposes, “If bills for every production in every theatre for each day 
of the coming week were all to be found in London at the same time, then playbills must 
have been a significant feature of the city.”287 Contemporary references to playbills lead 
her to conclude, playbills “were so present and so numerous that it was hard for the 
casual observer not to read them.”288 These bills would have been pinned to the posts that 
separated the horse paths from the pedestrian paths, on residential doorposts, “pissing 
posts,” and on the columns of St. Paul’s cathedral.289  In short, playbills were posted 
anywhere people might see them.  
Play texts on the other hand seemed to have been advertised through a more 
narrow marketing strategy. Just as playbills were the primary way that playhouses 
marketed their product, title-pages seems to have been the primary method printing 
houses used to advertise their texts.  In other words, playbills are to performance, as title-
pages are to play texts. Lesser and Alan B. Farmer describe the importance of the title 
page as a marketing tool: 
Title-pages were the major mode of book advertising in early modern London, for 
not until the 1650s did stationers begin to print catalogues of their stock as their 
Continental counterparts had been doing since the sixteenth century … Title-
pages were designed … not only to inform customers of the contents of a book 
but also to entice them to buy it. For this reason, extra copies of title-pages were 
often printed for hanging on walls and in ‘cleft-sticks,’ as Jonson wrote. Not only 
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would title-pages have papered the walls of a bookshop, they would also have 
been laid out on the shop’s “stall,” or exterior counter.290 
 
Title-pages, unlike playbills, did not seem to be posted throughout the city, but were hung 
in and around the bookshops that sold play books. One would almost have to already be 
in the market for a play text in order to be subject to the marketing of a play text because 
one would have to be physically in a bookshop to see that a particular play was in print.  
 That being said, Stern and others do find some evidence that title-pages were 
distributed outside the bookshops and argue that they functioned much like playbills 
would have functioned; however, her argument (and the arguments she follows) needs to 
be challenged. For instance, she states, “Advertisements for books consisted of title-pages 
separately printed and hung up on the posts of the city.”291 Here she is following Marjory 
Plant (who, Stern admits, does not offer proof that playbills were ever distributed 
throughout the city) and R.B McKerrow, who, in Stern’s words, argues 
the information on any book title-page of the period, informing the reader where 
the book in question is to be bought, is hardly of relevance to the owner of a book: 
it is only of relevance to someone who might wish to purchase that book; 
relevant, that is to say, as an advertisement.” 292  
 
However, Peter W.M. Blayney has shown that the imprint on the title page (that is, the 
statement on the title page that offers publication information) always refers to the printer 
or wholesaler of the play text and not to the bookseller. “The primary purpose of an 
imprint was the same in early modern England as it is today: to inform retailers where a 
book could be purchased wholesale.”293 Therefore, the title page would not actually give 
an individual interested in buying a play text the information he or she would need to find 
out where to buy the book, anymore than the imprint of a modern day volume would tell 
us where to purchase the text. Thus, it seems unlikely that title-pages were distributed 
191 
throughout the city in an attempt to lure potential buyers into the bookshops since title-
pages never named the bookshops where the texts could be bought. Rather, the title-pages 
were used to get customers to buy a specific text once they were in the bookshops.  
 Stern does point to some early modern commentary that suggests title-pages were 
distributed throughout the city; however, her evidence does not establish that this practice 
was widespread; instead, it demonstrates that the wide distribution of title-pages was an 
aberration and tellingly frowned upon by authors because this marketing technique was 
similar to the way performance was marketed. Ben Jonson, Henry Parrot, and Thomas 
Nashe separately complained that the title-pages of their books were being posted 
throughout the city (though only Jonson references his play texts).294 So it does seem that 
sometimes title-pages were distributed throughout London.  However, these individuals’ 
complaints suggest this was a practice that could be challenged because it was not the 
common practice. To my knowledge, playwrights and players did not make the same 
complaints about playbills being posted throughout London probably because it was de 
rigueur.295 Furthermore, these authors complained because this marketing technique 
appealed to too broad of an audience. For instance, Jonson (not surprisingly) does not 
want his title-pages spread throughout the city, where “termers, or some clerk-like 
serving-man, / Who scarce can spell th’hard names’” can read them.296 The always 
discriminating Jonson doesn’t like the posting of title-pages because it is too broad of a 
marketing technique appealing to too large of an audience; in other words, he is 
attempting to differentiate the readers of his plays from those who attended the 
performance of his plays. Likewise, Robert Heath, the author of a book of poems called 
Clarastella, asks his publisher not to market his text by posting title-pages around the city 
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because such a marketing technique will overlap with the marketing of performances. He 
asks that the publisher not  
 show it barefac’d on the open stall  
 To tempt the buyer: nor poast it on each wall 
 And corner poast close underneath the Play 
 That must be acted at Black-Friers that day. 297 
 
Heath’s implication is clear: he does not want his text marketed the same way that 
performances were marketed; that is, to a broad audience. Instead, he, like Jonson, seems 
to want his text marketed to a smaller, more discriminating audience.  
These remarks by Heath and Jonson suggest what the overall economics and 
marketing strategy of early modern drama suggest: the playhouse and printing house 
operated under two different modes of production. The printing house attempted to 
appeal to a small group of readers by presupposing a particular interpretation of the texts 
they were attempting to market, and the playhouse attempted to appeal to a general 
audience by not targeting a specific audience. These two methods constructed two 
separate understandings of their respective mediums. On the one hand, the printing house 
constructed an unstable text that was able to be interpreted, appropriated and marketed to 
a specific audience. On the other hand, the playhouse constructed a stable performance 
that was not able to be marketed to a specific audience.  
That being said, the simple physical differences between the printing market and 
the performance market no doubt contributed to the differences between the marketing 
strategy of the printing house and the playhouse.  A playhouse has a finite number of 
seats available. The Rose, for instance, had a capacity of around two thousand, and the 
Swan and the Globe around three thousand.298 However, Gurr estimates that, except for 
holidays, the playhouse average audience probably only occupied about half the available 
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space.299  In other words, a playhouse probably always had, and knew they would have, 
an available product – that is, empty seats. So there would be no need to focus on a 
specific audience. Indeed, such a focus would be counterproductive since by focusing on 
a specific audience one might exclude possible customers. However, a publisher needed 
to determine before printing how much of the product to make available. Blayney 
calculates that a publisher would have had to sell about sixty percent of his run in order to 
turn a profit.300  So the publisher would have had to imagine an audience that would buy 
sixty percent of his texts, or the printing house would loose money. Thus, the publisher 
would have to create an audience for his text through a marketing strategy that would 
guarantee a profit. Furthermore, the different profit margins of the playhouse and printing 
house also determined these different marketing strategies. Lesser establishes the 
significantly different profit margins of the different modes of production:  
But while the cost to the consumer of an indoor stage play and a printed play are 
about the same, an utter disaster in the theatre – a play, for example, that sold out 
its first night but then failed ever to attract another spectator – would be a fair 
success if the same number of people bought the play as saw it. While the 
company must target a rather broad range of people to fill the theatre night after 
night, the publisher can afford to cater to a smaller, “niche” audience.301  
 
However, there is nothing necessary about these physical differences. Theater owners did 
not have to create playhouses that were too big to fill on a regular basis. In fact, the 
existence of these big playhouses is somewhat puzzling: why build playhouses that were 
rarely full? The desire to build big playhouses can be seen as the desire for big, diverse 
and broad audiences. One builds big playhouses because one wants the biggest audience 
one can get, which means a broad audience and, not only coincidentally, stable 
performances. In other words, the size of the playhouses is not the cause of the marketing 
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strategies, which then causes stable performances; rather, the big playhouses and the 
marketing strategies are both the effects of the desire for stable performances.  
Furthermore, the big playhouses and the marketing strategies these big playhouses 
demanded were organized in opposition to the printing house because the printing house 
produced unstable texts, and this difference between the printing house and the playhouse 
can itself be understood as an effect of a larger construction. The playhouse organized 
itself in opposition to the printing house because it was attempting to construct a non-
reactive audience. In order to differentiate playgoers from active readers, the playhouse 
sought to create a stable medium unlike the unstable medium of the printing house. The 
same effect is of course visible within the play texts themselves: the plays constructed 
performance as stable in opposition to the instability of texts. These two effects (which 
are in fact identical, even though they occur in different locations) can be understood as 
reinforcing one another. That is, the representations of stable performances were 
influenced by the production techniques of the playhouse, and these techniques were 
influenced by the representations. But in the final analysis, both effects are caused by the 
construction of the non-reactive playgoer. They are both attempts to stabilize 
performances in order to interrupt the interpretation and activity of the playgoers. And as 
the next chapter will demonstrate, this desire to interrupt the interpretive agency of the 








Anti-Mimetic Drama: Performance’s Relationship to Reality and the Playgoer’s 
Interpretive Agency 
“Things that ne’re were, nor are, nor ne’re will be.” John Suckling, The Goblins302 
 
The early modern dramatic depiction of the stability of performance and the 
instability of texts has (at least) one clear exception. Alice, in Arden of Faversham, 
inverts this depiction of performance and texts by making an appeal to the instability of 
performance and the stability of texts. When her lover Mosby refuses to touch her 
because he has made an oath to her husband promising he would not, Alice responds by 
dismissing the importance of oaths and arguing that performative utterances are unstable: 
 What? Shall an oath make thee forsake my love? 
 As if I have not sworn as much myself, 
 And given my hand unto him in the church! 
 Tush, Mosby! Oaths are words, and words is wind, 
 And wind is mutable. Then, I conclude,  
 ‘Tis childishness to stand upon an oath (1.433-438).303 
 
The performance of a marriage (which Webster exploits for its metadramatic possibilities 
in The Duchess of Malfi) is here depicted as unstable or as “mutable” as the wind. By 
arguing that performative utterances and performances are unstable, she is putting forth a 
conception of performance that opposes the theory of performance that playwrights 
throughout the era exerted so much dramatic energy constructing. Then, later in the 
scene, she describes texts as stable. When Greene asks if it is true that “letters of patents 
from the King” have given her husband, Arden, ownership of Greene’s land (1.461), 
Alice seems to pity Greene’s plight, but she asserts that the land is irreversibly Arden’s: 
 The lands are his in state, 
 And whatsoever leases were before 
 Are void for term of Master Arden’s life. 
 He hath the grant under the Chancery seal (1.465-468). 
196 
 
Since Arden has the lands for the rest of his life, Alice’s solution is to end Arden’s life 
and then give the lands back to Greene. The finality and stability of the “letters of 
patents” recall the dystopian world of The Old Law, where legal texts cannot be disputed 
or quibbled with. There is no attempt on the part of Alice or Greene to dispute the claim 
by reading the text carefully in order to find a way out of their textually produced 
situation, as happens in The Merchant of Venice. Instead, the text is portrayed as perfectly 
stable, and so another more diabolical approach is needed.  
 Of course just because Alice asserts the stability of texts and the instability of 
performance does not mean that the play validates her claims. Since she is, more or less, 
the villain of the play, her claims could be the playwright’s way of arguing for the 
stability of performance. As in, only an unchaste murderer such as Alice would argue that 
performances and performative utterances are as mutable as the wind.  
 However, the play asserts something else about the status of performance, which 
reinforces Alice’s ideas about the stability performance; the play claims to be a 
representation of historical events. In the final lines of the play, Franklin briefly recaps 
the narrative and then asks the audience to forgive the play’s lack of polish.  
 Gentlemen, we hope you’ll pardon this naked tragedy 
 Wherein no filed points are foisted in  
 To make it gracious to the ear or eye; 
 For simple truth is gracious enough 
 And needs no other points of glozing stuff (Epi. 14-18). 
 
Franklin’s description of the play as a “naked tragedy” and a “simple truth” suggests that 
the play is simply retelling the real story of Arden without embellishment. Franklin is 
claiming that the play is mimetic – not necessarily mimetic in the Aristotelian sense of 
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probability, but mimetic in the sense of facticity and historical veracity. In other words, 
Franklin is claiming that the play is a representation of real events.  
The play’s calibration of the audience’s interpretive agency is what links 
Franklin’s description of the play as a “naked tragedy” and Alice’s depiction of 
performance as unstable.  As I argued in the pervious chapter, the playwrights and the 
larger theatrical culture depicted and constructed performance as stable in order to 
discourage the audience from actively interpreting performances, so Alice’s construction 
of performance as unstable has the opposite effect – she is encouraging the audience to 
interpret the performance. The play’s depiction of itself as a “naked tragedy” and so as a 
purely mimetic artifact produces a similar effect. As this chapter will attempt to 
demonstrate, mimetic texts are more amendable to interpretation and more likely to 
produce audience reaction than texts that do not attempt to represent reality. 
Consequently, Franklin’s claims of mimesis invite the audience to interpret and 
destabilize the performance. However, most early modern plays go out of their way to 
create the opposite construction; they depict themselves as non-mimetic (or more 
precisely, anti-mimetic) in an effort to limit the interpretive agency of their audience. In 
the final analysis, early modern drama’s description of itself as non-mimetic then 
constitutes an attempt to produce a non-reactive playgoer because, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, by interrupting the interpretive agency of the audience, playwrights 





I: Mimesis, Interpretation and the Self-referentiality of Metadrama 
 
The concept of mimesis, like the concept of reality that mimesis is said to 
represent, has been shown by post-structuralist thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and 
Philippe Locoue-Labarthe to be a slippery and complex term. Nevertheless, the fullest 
exploration of the connection between mimesis and interpretation seems still to be Erich 
Auerbach’s Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature.304 Auerbach 
explores in unusual detail how the interpretive agency of the audience is connected to the 
mimetic quality of the object of that interpretation.305 And even though theorists have 
shown that Auerbach’s ideas about mimesis often oversimplify or under-theorize the 
concept, his ideas are perhaps more useful in relation to early modern conceptions of 
mimesis than those that come after him because, as Jonathan Holmes and Adrian Streete 
suggest, early modern thinkers never fully theorized (according to a post-modern rubric) 
the term either. Instead they often use it interchangeably with “imitation” and 
“representation.”306 And in any case, the playwrights discussed below do not seem to be 
working within a conventional tradition of mimesis – a tradition that starts with Plato and 
Aristotle in the classical age, is reasserted, at least theoretically, by writers such as Philip 
Sidney in the early modern era and is deconstructed by post-moderns like Derrida and 
Locoue-Labarthe.  Rather, as in the similar case of their rejection of the classical unities, 
some early modern playwrights seem to work against this classical tradition, as the title to 
this chapter suggests.307  That is, playwrights used metadrama to assert an anti-mimetic 
conception of their art – a conception that has much more in common with Auerbach’s 
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understanding of mimesis than it does with Sidney’s or Aristotle’s, in that mimesis allows 
for more interpretive space than texts that are not explicitly mimetic.  
 In the opening chapters of Mimesis, Auerbach shows how a work’s mimetic status 
can affect the audience’s interpretive ability. He contrasts the different relations Homer 
and the Old Testament have to reality, arguing that while the Old Testament claims to be 
representing historical truth, Homer does not:  
The claim of the Old Testament stories to represent universal history, their 
insistent relation – a relation constantly redefined by conflicts – to a single and 
hidden God, who yet shows himself and who guides universal history by promise 
and exaction, gives these stories an entirely different perspective from any the 
Homeric poems can possess.308 
 
Auerbach goes on describe the three mimetic elements of the Old Testament: “legend, 
historical reporting and interpretative historical theology.”309 Legend is the mystification 
of historical figures and events, historical reporting is the synthesis of historical events 
into a narrative, and interpretive historical theology is the interpretation (by the author) of 
these historical events along theological lines, that is, how historical narratives reflect the 
will of god. Auerbach maintains that disentangling and locating these three aspects of the 
text necessitate complex interpretive procedures: “It is a difficult matter, requiring careful 
historical and philological training, to distinguish the true from the synthetic or the biased 
in a historical presentation, but it is easy to separate the historical from the legendary in 
general.”310  
The precise way that Auerbach interprets the Old Testament is not important for 
this study. In fact, because of the highly self-reflective nature of early modern drama, we 
do not have to use the complex analytical tools that Auerbach develops in order to 
uncover a text’s relationship to reality – its mimetic qualities. Instead, we just have to 
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notice the way that plays announce and construct their own relationship to reality. And as 
we will see, this announcement/construction is particularly pronounced within stage-
orations since they comment directly on the play they are a part of.  
What is important for my purposes about Auerbach’s analytical scheme is how he 
contrasts the mimetic qualities of the Old Testament with the mimetic qualities of Homer 
and shows how these qualities affect the interpretive possibilities of each text. He argues 
that Homer does not make claims of historical truth, but tries to create his own “reality” 
(a fictive reality) that draws the reader into the text. For Auerbach, Homer’s texts 
bewitch us and ingratiate themselves to us until we live with them in the reality of 
their lives; so long as we are reading or hearing the poems, it does not matter 
whether we know that all this is only legend, “make-believe.” The oft-repeated 
reproach that Homer is a liar takes nothing from his effectiveness, he does not 
need to base his story on historical reality, his reality is powerful enough in itself; 
it ensnares us, weaving its web around us, and that suffices him. And this “real” 
world into which we are lured, exists for itself, contains nothing but itself; the 
Homeric poems conceal nothing, they contain no teaching and no secret second 
meaning. Homer can be analyzed, as we have assayed to do here, but he cannot be 
interpreted.311 
 
Auerbach may be going too far when he asserts that no meaning or teaching can be found 
in Homer, but his overall analysis of the effect the two different texts have on their 
readers can be usefully applied to early modern drama. While the Old Testament attempts 
to link itself to historical reality and so directs readers out by attempting to connect the 
text to a larger historical truth, Homer attempts to draw readers in, away from historical 
reality and into the fictive reality of the poem, where any meaning or truth that the poem 
conveys is controlled by Homer and only really applicable to the fictive universe that 
Homer has created. The same can be said of early modern drama. Arden of Faversham 
depicts itself as mimetic and so invites its audience to compare it to history and link the 
story within a larger historical narrative. But as I will attempt to show, many early 
201 
modern plays do the opposite; they attempt to show that drama is not purely mimetic in 
an attempt to draw the viewer into the fictive reality of the play. Thus, looked at from this 
perspective and according to Auerbach’s system, most early modern drama has more in 
common with Homer than it does with the Old Testament.   
 The above is, admittedly, a fairly idiosyncratic reading of Auerbach. After all, 
Auerbach is generally interested in describing the different types of mimesis and the 
different ways various cultures and writers represented reality. He is not explicitly 
describing Homer’s poetry as non-mimetic in opposition to the mimesis of the Old 
Testament, but describing the different ways that each text gestures towards mimesis. 
Still, Auerbach contrasting description of Homer and the Old Testament can help us 
make sense of the way that early modern drama seems to connect mimesis with 
interpretation.  
In fact, early modern interpretive or textual culture can perhaps solidify the link 
between mimesis and interpretation found in Auerbach’s analysis. Or put another way, 
we can historicize this link by situating it within early modern interpretive practices. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, early modern readers were often trained to imitate what 
they read according to their active interpretations. Zwicker calls this type of reading 
“exemplary reading – the careful study of texts for patterns of virtue, the imbibing of 
classical wisdom, and the exportation of models of conduct and expression.”312 Thus, 
texts did not just imitate reality, but readers imitated texts. A mimetic text (which made it 
clear that it was imitating historical reality) would seem to be more emendable to this 
type of interpretive strategy. If a text is claiming to be a faithful representation of reality, 
then the reader (or viewer) can easily apply the “models of conduct and expression” 
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found in that textual reality to his or her own reality. The Mirror of Magistrates (and the 
broader De Casibus tradition) is perhaps a good example of how mimesis and exemplary 
reading work together. The text is a mirror or imitation of past events, and its purpose is 
to influence the current reality by explicitly encouraging its readers to imitate or avoid 
imitating the narratives of the text. It seems, early modern mimetic texts encouraged 
active reading and readers’ actions. But as we will see, early modern drama often tries to 
sever the link between the fictive reality of the stage and the reality of the playgoers in an 
attempt to limit this type of imitation and active reading. That is, they try to deny that 
their plays are mimetic.   
This is not to say that there is a perfect and clear demarcation between mimetic 
plays (or any cultural artifact) and non-mimetic plays. All early modern plays, like any 
fictional work, have some connection to reality or represent reality on some level.313  
Thus, I use the term anti-mimetic instead of non-mimetic; early modern plays are not 
non-mimetic in so far as “non” signifies an absence of mimesis. Instead, the plays contain 
anti-mimetic tendencies; they deploy techniques that exert an energy which opposes 
drama’s mimetic qualities. Thus, these early modern plays attempt to limit their 
connection to reality and so limit their audience’s interpretive ability. This chapter will 
chart these anti-mimetic tendencies by analyzing early modern stage-orations that 
announce their own relationship to reality and determine how this relationship constructs 
playgoers’ response to performances.  
Furthermore, playwrights’ attempts at limiting the interpretive agency of the 
audience through anti-mimesis should probably not be thought of as an attempt at 
blocking or completely stopping the audience’s interpretive ability. As discussed in the 
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previous chapter, (literate) early modern audiences were thoroughly trained to actively 
interpret texts, and it seems likely that they would bring this training to the playhouse. By 
interrupting the interpretive agency of the audience, the playwrights were pushing against 
playgoers’ tendency to interpret.  Like their efforts at anti-mimesis, playwrights were 
exerting an anti-interruptive energy, which opposed the audience’s tendency to actively 
interpret the performances without completely stopping them from interpreting it. In fact, 
because (as my reading of Auerbach suggests) mimesis is connected to interpretation, the 
anti-mimetic energy of early modern plays also produces anti-interruptive energy. As the 
plays distance themselves from reality, they also make it difficult for audiences to 
interpret and imitate the performances of these plays.  
Early modern drama’s constructing of this relationship of difference with reality 
is significant because it theoretically follows from and reinforces the construction of 
stage utterances as performative (chapter two), the non-naturalism of the stage (chapter 
three) and the stability of performance (chapter four) and so coheres with the theory of 
performance that I have been arguing was constructed by playwrights throughout the 
early modern era. For starters, if a play is not attempting to link itself to reality, it would 
have little reason to create a realistic or naturalistic portrayal of itself, and non-
naturalistic stage devices contribute to (but do not ensure) the anti-mimetic quality of the 
early modern stage because these techniques remind the audience that they are watching 
purely fictional events – which in turn suggests that events are unconnected to the reality 
outside the playhouse. Also, as I argued in the previous chapter, since stage utterances 
were constructed as performative and having the ability to create institutional reality, they 
produced stable performances, which were difficult to actively interpret. One cannot, at 
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least on a theoretical level, disagree with a performative, choose to believe it or not or 
develop a meaning that is contrary or different from what the performance purports to 
signify. For instance, a guest or audience member of a wedding cannot interpret the 
wedding. They may judge it to be a good marriage or a bad one, with an elegant sermon 
or a crass one, but they cannot deny that it exists or interpret it in any other way than a 
marriage – an institution constructed through performative language. Likewise, an early 
modern play which is viewed as performative is difficult to interpret; it must be 
confronted as one would confront any other form of institutional reality, as necessarily 
real. The audience may judge the performance; they may consider the play to be boring 
or poorly performed, but (in so far as it is performative) it cannot be interpreted.314  And 
as Auerbach suggests, anti-mimetic texts also limit interpretation. In fact, Auerbach’s 
description of Homer and the Old Testament can be described in speech act terms. In 
other words, we can use speech act terms to transcode between Auerbach’s project and 
this one. When he argues that the Old Testament makes a claim of historical veracity, he 
is essentially demonstrating that the Old Testament is made up of constative utterances, 
utterances that report (or claim to report) on a prior reality. Conversely, Homer is 
decidedly not crafting constative utterances because he is not making claims at historical 
veracity and so is not reporting on a prior reality; he is creating his own reality. One 
could say that Auerbach reads Homer as constructing his own text as performative 
because his texts are not mimetic. This is not to say that anti-mimetic texts are always 
performative. However, the opposite is true: performative utterances are always anti-
mimetic because they are not representing reality but constructing their own reality.315 
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Thus, performative stage utterances, which contribute to the stability of performance, also 
contribute to the anti-mimetic quality of the early modern stage.  
Furthermore, by distancing the play from historical reality, playwrights opened up 
an ontological space for performances to create institutional reality. That is, the plays 
attempted to construct themselves as anti-mimetic in order to deny that their works 
represented a reality outside the playhouse, so they could create a reality inside the 
playhouse. So anti-mimesis is not only produced through performative utterances, but it 
also contributes to or allows for the construction of stage utterances as performative, 
which, in turn, helps contribute to the stability of performance. In short, the anti-mimetic 
stage, non-naturalistic productions, performative stage utterances and stable 
performances are all mutually reinforcing.  
In the final analysis, all of these elements of playgoing, including anti-mimesis, 
can be understood as attempts to control the unruly early modern audience or as an effect 
of the construction of the non-reactive playgoer. Anti-mimesis, as Auerbach suggests, 
limits the interpretive agency of the audience, and as I argued in the previous chapter, by 
interrupting the interpretive agency of the audience, the playwrights were, in effect, 
attempting to control audience reaction in so far as early modern audiences were trained 
to view interpretations as a path towards action. Thus, early modern playwrights’ 
construction of their plays’ relationship to reality was an effect of their desire to construct 
a non-reactive playgoer.   
Before investigating plays that reveal their own relationship to reality, I want to 
point out that early modern drama’s self-reflexivity is not just a path through which we 
can discover a play’s relationship to reality or a medium through which playwrights 
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could construct this relationship; it is also, in and of itself, a technique designed to 
construct drama’s relationship with reality.  That is, metadrama qua metadrama calls 
attention to a play’s fictional status (it announces the play as a fictive artifact) and so 
works against the mimetic qualities of the play. In other words, metadrama is anti-
mimetic because metadrama, in so far as it is also self-referential, keeps the play from 
referencing the reality outside the playhouse; it brackets reality from the play. By doing 
so, metadrama is keeping the audience from comparing the fictive actions on the stage to 
real actions. Self-reflexivity does not give the audience a referent through which to 
understand the play in terms other than that which is produced by the play itself. 
Metadrama then has the same affect on the audience’s interpretive agency that Auerbach 
understands Homer’s effect to be on his audience; it traps the audience inside the work 
itself and the fictive world that the work creates, and so in Auerbach’s terms, metadrama 
creates a play that “exists for itself, contains nothing but itself.”316  Thus, metadrama is 
not only saying something –playwrights’ thoughts about drama’s relationship to reality – 
but is also doing something – creating anti-mimetic energy and so constructing drama’s 
relationship with reality.  
 
II: Stage-Orations: Constructing the Play’s Relationship with Reality through Prologues, 
Inductions and Epilogues 
 
 The dramatic spaces where playwrights clearly attempt to construct their plays’ 
mimetic status exist at the beginning and end of performances, within the prologues, 
inductions and epilogues. Stage-orations are able to do this because they exist in a liminal 
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space between the outside and inside of a play. As Douglas Bruster and Robert Weimann 
point out in their study of prologues (and the same could be said of epilogues and 
inductions), “from this crucial position, prologues were able to function as interactive, 
liminal, boundary-breaking entities that negotiated charged thresholds between and 
among, variously, playwrights, actors, characters, audience members, playworlds, and the 
world outside the playhouse.”317  I agree with Bruster and Weimann that stage-orations 
negotiate the thresholds between “playworlds and the world outside the playhouse;” 
indeed, this chapter will highlight the techniques or tropes that stage-orations use to 
describe the relationship between the world of the playhouse and the world outside the 
playhouse – the dramatic representation of reality and the reality that is being 
represented. However, I disagree with their labeling of stage-orations as “boundary-
breaking.” Rather than eroding the boundary between reality and play, early modern 
stage-orations are often interested in establishing this boundary in order to create a 
relationship of difference between “playworlds and the world outside the playhouse.” In 
other words, they seek to frame the play as anti-mimetic by highlighting the differences 
between reality and the play.318  
 This is not to say that the only purpose of early modern stage-orations is to 
establish drama’s relationship to reality. In fact, the vast majority of stage-orations do not 
comment on a play’s mimetic status.  They either make an appeal to the audience for kind 
judgment or describe the theme or plot of the play (similar to an epic argument).319  
Nevertheless, when stage-orations do comment upon their mimetic status, they offer 
explicit and easily recognizable evidence of a play’s relationship to reality because their 
liminal position within a play allows them to comment directly upon the play the stage-
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oration is a part of. Furthermore, these stage-orations offer clear examples of audience 
construction since they speak directly to the audience and so are attempting to influence 
the audience’s understanding of the play they are about to or just finished watching. That 
is, they are not just constructing their play’s relationship to reality; they are constructing 
that relationship for the audience in an attempt to influence the playgoing experience.  
By my count, from 1575 to1642, 309 extent plays include a prologue, epilogue or 
induction (excluding Latin plays).320 Of these 309 plays, only three make what I would 
consider explicit claims of mimesis – an imitation of historical reality. Of course, these 
stage-orations are highly interpretable, as my own analysis will show, so a different critic 
using a different interpretive lens and a different definition of mimesis would probably 
come up with a different number of stage-orations that make claims of mimesis. Still, I 
think most would agree that these three plays, Arden of Faversham (already discussed), 
The Merry Devil of Edmonton and William Sampson’s The Vow Breaker, make fairly 
clear and explicit claims that the plays they frame are a faithful representation of 
historical events.  
For instance, The Merry Devil of Edmonton offers proof that the play is based on 
real events by dispelling the audience’s doubt that the main character, Peter Fabell, is 
fictional. 
 If any heere make doubt of such a name, 
 In Edmonton yet fresh vnto this day, 
 Fixt in the wall of that old antient Church, 
 His monument remayneth to be seen; 
 His memory yet in the mouths of men, 
 That whilst he liued he could deceiue the Deuill (Pro. 16-21).321 
 
Here the prologue is clearly inviting the audience to compare the play to the reality 
outside the playhouse. In fact, the audience can even go to Edmonton, which, the 
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prologue reminds them, is “not seven miles from [London],” and still hear the story being 
told by its citizens. Likewise, The Vow Breaker’s prologue assures the audience that the 
play is a true representation of historical events and historical people.322 
 And yet me thinkes I here some Criticke say 
 That they are much abus’d in this our Play. 
 Their Magistracy laught at ! as if now  
 What Ninety yeeres since dy’d, afresh did grow: 
 To those wee answer, that ere they were borne, 
 The story that we glaunse at, then was worne 
 And held authentick: and the men wee name  
 Grounded in Honours Prowesse, Vertues Fame (Pro. 9-16).323 
 
While The Merry Devil of Edmonton offers testimony and physical proof (the 
townspeople and the monument) to demonstrate that the play is a true representation of 
actual events, The Vow Breaker’s prologue simply assures the audience that the story has 
always been known as “authentick” or historically true. In effect, its historical position, 
(the story has been told for over ninety years) guarantees its authenticity. The play 
promises to reproduce that authentic story.  
 These kinds of claims of mimesis are, as I have suggested, rare. By my count and 
my interpretation, twenty-eight stage-orations attempt to distance themselves from 
reality, thereby minimizing the mimetic effect of the play and limiting the interpretive 
agency of the audience. Each one of these stage-orations will not be discussed in detail; 
instead, I will focus on three distinct but related tropes within stage-orations, which are 
commonly used to accomplish this anti-mimetic effect. Each one of the following tropes 
will be treated separately below even though they sometimes overlap: 1) The stage-
oration attempts to deny completely that the play has any connection to reality and so 
should be treated by the audience as pure fantasy or a dream. 2) The stage-oration 
discourages the audience from comparing the characters in the play to real life characters 
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and assures the audience that the characters are purely fictional and not mimetic 
representations of real figures. 3) The stage-oration calls into question the ability of the 
play to represent reality accurately or faithfully. 
 But as we will see, these tropes are not deployed in isolation within the stage-
orations. Often they are embedded within more conventional or obvious rhetorical 
appeals. The first two tropes are often found within stage-orations (particularly 
prologues) which are attempting to avoid censorship and/or topical readings.324 That is, 
the stage-oration is attempting to create a relationship of difference with reality so that 
their audience won’t think that the play is attacking or satirizing real public figures.  Or 
these types of stage-orations are designed to allow the playwright to deny that these kinds 
of attacks took place, even though they did.  This relationship of difference gives the 
playwrights political cover. And the third trope is often placed within stage-orations that 
are taking part in a larger conversation about the nature of history and practice of 
historiography. However, these other elements or purposes of stage-orations do not, I 
think, negate their ability to construction drama’s relationship with reality. In fact, these 
other elements often dovetail with the broad early modern trend of anti-mimesis (and the 
even broader early modern construction of playgoing), and when these elements are in 
tension or conflict with anti-mimesis or the construction of playgoing, they provide 
interesting insights into the dilemma playwrights faced when trying to balance their need 
to control their unruly audiences and other desires, such as producing dramatic 




1) Denying any Connection to Reality: Lyly’s Play-as-Dream Trope  
 
Although some of the anti-mimetic tendencies of early modern stage-orations are 
quite subtle, some prologues are explicit about their desire to have plays understood as 
disconnected from reality.  John Lyly seems to have been particularly fond of denying 
that his plays were connected to reality. In three of his plays, Sappho and Phao, 
Endymion and The Woman in the Moon, the prologues encourage the audience to view 
the play as pure fantasy or as a dream, thereby framing the play as something other than 
reality. And as we will see, this is ostensibly done to avoid any explicit reference to the 
court, but it also works to create a relationship of difference with reality. 
Sappho and Phao’s prologue to the court exhorts the queen to imagine the play is 
a dream: “in all humbleness we all, and I on knee for all, entreat that / your highness 
imagine yourself to be in a deep dream that, / staying the conclusion, in your rising your 
Majesty vouchsafe / but to say, ‘And so you awaked.’” (Pro. 15-18 emphasis mine).325  
The Woman and the Moon repeats this trope, the prologue reminding the audience (which 
is again the court) that the play is nothing but a dream – “remember all is but a poet’s 
dream” (Pro. 17).326 By framing the plays as dreams, these prologues are drawing a fairly 
bright line between reality and the play. They are, in a sense, drawing an ontological 
circle around the performances and suggesting that what occurs within the plays are like 
dreams that have nothing to do with the world that exists outside the dream world of the 
playhouse. Once the play is over, the audience should imagine themselves awaking to a 
reality that is disconnected from the fictive world of the play.  
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However, even this fairly straightforward attempt at anti-mimesis becomes 
complicated because, as suggested above, all fictional works are somewhat connected to 
reality, and interpretation can never be fully blocked, and Lyly’s prologues seem to be 
aware of both of these caveats. So even though the prologues use anti-mimesis to keep 
the audience from interpreting the performance, they still leave room for mimesis and 
interpretation. Indeed, by describing the play as a dream, the prologues are able to link 
the mimetic status of the play and the interpretive agency of the audience to early modern 
dream theory, and through this link they can explore the complex connections between 
drama, reality and interpretation.  
Although framing the play as a dream seems to distance the play from reality, this 
type of prologue does not necessarily inhibit the interpretive agency of the audience since 
dreams themselves can and often are interpreted. So framing the play as a dream may in 
fact be both an effort at anti-mimesis and an invitation to interpret. However, dreams in 
pre-Freudian early modern England were understood and represented in different terms 
than they are in a post-Freudian era, and these terms suggest that dreams would not 
necessarily have been understood by Lyly’s audience as an invitation to interpret.  The 
differences between early modern and post-Freudian dream theory are complex (too 
complex to treat fully here) in part because the early modern era did not produce a 
coherent and hegemonic theory of dreams.327  However, two aspects of the early modern 
attitude towards dream interpretation are relevant here: 1) the English tended to dismiss 
the significance of dreams by describing them as the residue of lived experience, and 2) 
when the importance of dreams were recognized, they were not represented as a rich 
interpretive field, but as a phenomenon to be decoded.   
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Peter Holland’s study of early modern English dream interpretations finds that 
while pan-European culture maintained a robust if often contradictory tradition of dream 
interpretation, early modern English dream theory was “extremely thin,” and English 
writers were often quite dismissive of the possibility that meaning could be found 
through the interpretation of dreams.328  Holland cites Thomas Hill’s The most pleasuante 
Arte of the Interpretacion of Dreams and Thomas Nashe’s The Terrors of the Night as 
two representative examples of English dream theory. The latter vehemently dismisses 
the relevance of dreams and the wisdom of dream interpretation, and the former 
simplifies dream interpretation into a simple decoding. Nashe, like Antigonus in 
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale, who claims that “dreams are but toys” (3.3.38), largely 
dismisses the importance and interpretive possibility of dreams. For instance, he states 
that “a dream is nothing else but a bubbling scum or froth of the fancy, which the day 
hath left undigested; or an after-feast made of the fragments of idle imagination.”329 
Nashe’s description of dreams as the product of food was not just a metaphor. It was (and 
still is) commonly believed that particular foods produced certain types of dreams.330 
Thus, dreams were not significant pathways to the subject’s unconscious, open to fertile 
interpretation (as Freud would have it), but the meaningless residue of digested meals and 
lived experiences. On the other hand, Hill’s highly influential treatise on dream 
interpretation does seem to take dreams and the interpretation of dreams seriously, but 
according to Hill, one does not interpret a dream the same way one might interpret a text 
– as open to multiple meanings produced through imaginative interpretations by the 
reader.331 Instead, Hill seems to maintain that although a particular dream could be 
interpreted, each dream could only be interpreted in one way. Thus, Hill provides a list of 
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possible dreams and their meanings. For instance, “Hee which seeth his image in the 
moone, not having children, doth foreshew the birth of a sonne to ensue: but to the 
women like dreaming, to have a daughter.” Dreams, under Hill’s theory, are not to be 
interpreted as much as they are to be decoded. Furthermore, the dream is not being 
interpreted by the audience of the dream (the dreamer), but by an expert (Hill) who 
provides the significance of an individual dream. The dreamer merely has to locate his or 
her dream on Hill’s list and determine its significance. In short, the interpretive agency of 
the dreamer is fairly narrow within prominent examples of early modern dream theory. 
Thus, when Lyly’s prologues frame plays as dreams, they seem not to be inviting the 
audience to tease out the subtle and complex significances of the dream/play’s symbols, 
metaphors and themes; rather, they are seeking to limit the interpretive possibilities of 
those symbols, metaphors and themes.  
Indeed, internal evidence within Lyly’s works suggests that when Lyly references 
dreams in his prologues, he seems to be working within this early modern English 
tradition of dream theory.  For instance, in the fourth act of Sapho and Phao, Sapho and 
her ladies in waiting discuss the meaning of dreams. One of the women, Ismena, attempts 
to interpret the symbols of the dreams and comments on their significance, but the other 
women mock her efforts: Mileta tells her “You are no interpreter, but an interprater” 
(4.3.39-40).  And Eugenua asserts, in terms reminiscent of Nashe’s dismissal of dreams, 
“Dreams are but dotings, which come either by / things we see in the day or meats that 
we eat, and so the / common sense preferring it to be the imaginative” (4.3.49-51).332 
Mileta and Eugenua’s comments on dreams reinforce the prologue’s anti-mimetic effects 
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by linking the play’s perspective on dreams to an English tradition of dreams and dream 
interpretation that minimizes interpretive capability.  
That being said, although the play-as-dream trope may interrupt the interpretive 
possibilities of the play, it does not completely detach the play from reality. If dreams are 
thought of as the residue of lived experience, as Nashe’s and Mileta’s comments suggest, 
then they are, at least partially, representations of reality – they are mimetic. Thus, by 
linking the play to dreams and the early modern understanding of dreams, the prologues 
are claiming that the plays are also, at least partially, mimetic. Indeed, dreams, or dreams 
as many early moderns understood them, become a suggestive image for the constructed 
mimetic status of early modern drama: dreams, like plays, are perceived as detached from 
reality but can never be held completely separate from reality. The line between reality 
and plays (or dreams) is always permeable. Both will always contain the residue of lived, 
that is real, experience. The play-as-dream trope then seems meant not to frame the play 
as non-mimetic, but is meant to produce anti-mimesis. It distances the play from the 
world outside the play, thereby producing a relationship of difference with reality; 
dreams contain elements of reality, but are not pure imitations of reality.  The anti-
mimesis of the play-as-dream trope is then able to oppose (while allowing for) the play’s 
mimetic tendency in order to limit the interpretive capabilities of the audience. 
Furthermore, just as the play is unable to keep reality from entering the fictive world of 
the play, it is unable to fully stop the interpretive agency of the audience; dreams can be 
interpreted, but the interpretive possibilities are fairly constrained.  
Understanding Lyly’s play-as-dream trope as an attempt at anti-mimesis and to 
limit the interpretations of the audience is reinforced if we read it along side the prologue 
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to Endymion.  This prologue, like the prologues discussed above, attempts to distance the 
play from reality, but unlike the play-as-dream trope, this stage-oration explicitly 
connects the play’s anti-mimetic efforts to interpretation.  
It was forbidden in old time to dispute of Chimera, because 
it was a fiction.  We hope in our times none will apply pas- 
times, because they are fancies; for there liveth none under the 
sun that knows what to make of the Man in the Moon. We 
present neither comedy, nor tragedy, nor story, nor anything,  
but that whosoever heareth may say this: “Why, here is a tale  
of the Man in the Moon” (Pro. 6-12).333  
 
Here the play is categorized not as a dream, but as a “Chimera,” a “fiction,” a fancy, and 
a “Man in the Moon.” That is, the play has little connection to reality. The prologue also 
connects the non-mimetic nature of the play with an inability to interpret. It tells the 
audience that one cannot “dispute” with such non-mimetic representations, nor can 
anyone “make” anything of it. In other words, the prologue claims that the audience 
cannot disagree with the play they are about to see (they cannot dispute it) nor construct 
any meaning out of it (they can not make anything of it) because it is a fiction with no 
connection to reality. Since this prologue is both distancing the play from reality and 
limiting interpretive agency, it seems likely that Lyly’s other prologues are attempting to 
make the same connection between anti-mimesis and interpretation. 
However, the prologue to Endymion, like the prologues to Sapho and Phao and 
The Woman on the Moon, does not completely detach the play it introduces from reality, 
nor does it completely stop audience interpretation, because the play it frames is still, 
despite the prologue’s efforts, highly interpretable and rather obviously mimetic. That is, 
Cynthia, the virginal female monarch of the play, is a fairly clear figure for Queen 
Elizabeth, and Endymion, Cynthia’s hopeless suitor, is a fairly clear figure for 
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Elizabeth’s various suitors and courtly lovers. In other words, the play is partially an 
analogy of Elizabeth’s court and so is a fictional representation of reality. Therefore, the 
play can (easily) be interpreted as a comment on Elizabeth’s monarchy. So it seems 
unlikely that the prologue could achieve what it seems meant to do: detach from reality 
the play it introduces in order to stop the audience from interpreting the play since the 
play itself seems designed to be interpreted as mimetic. What the prologue does seem to 
accomplish is anti-mimesis: the prologue works against the mimetic aspects of the play 
and limits its interpretive possibilities. Or put another way, the prologue’s anti-mimetic 
tendencies are in tension with the mimetic tendencies of the play. 
In fact, there was a good reason why Lyly, or whatever member of Lyly’s 
company wrote the prologue, would want to keep the audience from interpreting the play 
as mimetic, that is, as an analogy of Elizabeth’s court. All three of the prologues 
discussed above seem only to have been spoken during a performance at court.  In fact, 
the 1584 quarto of Sapho and Phao provides two prologues and claims that one was 
performed at the court (the prologue discussed above) and the other was performed at the 
Blackfriars. The latter does not include any real attempt to distance the play from reality. 
This difference between prologues perhaps suggests that whoever wrote the prologue was 
more worried about the queen’s and court’s interpretations than he was about the 
public’s.334  After all, if the queen or the court interpreted the play as a comment or satire 
about themselves (as some modern commentators have suggested), then Lyly and Lyly’s 
company could have been punished in any number of ways: financially and 
professionally (disallowed from performing at court) or even physically (legally punished 
for offending the aristocratic audience).335  
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Although Lyly seemed particularly fond of this trope, it was not limited to his 
plays. Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, for one, also uses a stage-oration, this 
time an epilogue, to frame the play as a dream. And of course, the title also helps 
contribute to this frame. Robin ends the play by telling the audience: 
If we shadows have offended, 
Think but this, and all is mended: 
That you have but slumbered here,  
While these visions did appear; 
And this weak and idle theme, 
No more yielding but a dream, 
Gentles, do not reprehend. (Epi. 1-7).  
 
Like Lyly’s prologues, this epilogue tries to convince the audience that the play is not a 
representation of reality, but a vision or dream produced by “shadows.” And Like Sapho 
and Phao, dreams are portrayed within this play as inscrutable narratives that resist 
interpretation. When Bottom wakes up, thinking that his time as Titania’s lover was only 
a dream, he remarks, “Man is but an ass if he go about t’expound this / dream” (4.1.201-
202). Depicting the play as a dream seems to be used by Shakespeare to keep the 
audience from actively interpreting the play. And like Lyly’s prologues to the court, A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, which may also have been performed at court, seems to be 
using the play-as-dream trope to avoid offending the audience. Robin seems worried that 
the play will offend the “gentles.” And by convincing them that the play is a dream and 
so not connected to the reality of the audience, the epilogue seeks to convince the 
audience not to be offended. Anti-mimesis is again used to avoid censorship or possible 
punishment. In fact, the play references, hyperbolically, the danger of playing at court. 
When the Mechanicals are practicing their play, they contemplate what would happen if 
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they offend their audience; they all agree that the audience “would hang us, every 
mother’s son” (1.2.64).  
Whatever the immediate reason for the anti-mimesis of the stage-orations, Lyly’s, 
Shakespeare’s and their companies’ apparent belief/hope that this technique could work 
is significant. They seem to believe that a play framed as anti-mimetic could minimize 
(though not negate) the mimetic effects of the performance and interrupt (though not 
stop) the interpretive agency of the audience. And, as we shall see, this effort or 
technique is picked up by other playwrights who address their stage-orations to the non-
courtly audiences of the London playhouses. 
 
2) Dislocating Real People from Fictional Characters: Early Modern Legal Boilerplate  
 
 I suggested above that Lyly may have wanted to interrupt the interpretive agency 
of the audience because his courtly audiences might have been offended if they had 
interpreted the fictional characters as representations of themselves, an interpretation that 
his plays seem to have encouraged. This effort to differentiate real individuals from 
fictional characters is similar to the legal boilerplate phrase found at the beginning and 
ending of films: “All characters appearing in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to 
real persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.” Indeed, representing a living 
monarch or any prominent individual on the early modern stage was technically 
forbidden and was subject to the censor of the Master of Revels.336 So not surprisingly, 
many early modern stage-orations deny that the fictional characters of the play are 
representations of real characters. Although these stage-orations may have been, like the 
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Hollywood boilerplate, meant to keep playwrights and playing companies out of legal 
trouble, they still represents an effort at anti-mimesis and so are, as previously suggested, 
connected to the broader early modern trend of anti-mimesis.  Furthermore, this type of 
early modern legal boilerplate goes beyond a simple denial of mimesis; it is often linked 
to the interpretive ability of the audience.  
For instance, the induction to Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair explicitly discourages 
(indeed it forbids) the audience from connecting the fictional characters to real 
characters.  Within the induction, a scrivener describes a contract between the author of 
the play and the playgoers. Part of this contract forbids the audience from interpreting 
fictional characters as real: 
In consideration of which, it is finally agreed, by the 
foresaid hearers and spectators, that they neither in them- 
selves conceal, nor suffer by them to be concealed, any  
state-decipherer, or politic picklock of the scene, so  
solemnly ridiculous as to search out who was meant by  
the Ginger-bread-woman, who by the Hobby-horse- 
man, who by the Costermonger, nay, who by their 
wares; or that will pretend to affirm, on his own inspired 
ignorance, what Mirror of Magistrates is meant by the  
justice, what great lady by the pig-woman, what con- 
ceal’d statesman by the Seller of Mousetraps (136-146). 
 
If we read this section of the induction literally or un-ironically, it is explicitly prohibiting 
the audience from interpreting the play as a representation of reality by forbidding them 
from reading the fictional characters as representations of real characters. This injunction 
is cast in political terms.  Those who would try to ascertain the real identity of the 
fictional characters are called “state decipherers” and “politic picklocks,” and these 
picklocks and decipherers are asked not to interpret the fictional characters of the play as 
public figures: magistrates, great ladies or statesmen. Jonson is essentially trying to keep 
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the audience from interpreting the play politically – he is interrupting or attempting to 
interrupt the interpretive agency of the audience – and he is doing so by dislocating the 
play from reality.  He is telling the audience that the fictional characters are not mimetic; 
they are not representations of real public figures. 
Of course, Jonson’s injunction against reading the play politically is so obvious 
that the induction could actually be read as an invitation to interpret politically. That is, 
the induction could be deploying paralipsis; it tells the audience not to read the play 
politically in order to plant the idea of this interpretation in their minds. The possibility of 
paralipsis within the prologue demonstrates the difficulty or even impossibility of 
completely stopping the audience from interpreting. That is, even an attempt to interrupt 
interpretation can itself be interpreted as an invitation to interpret. However, even if this 
is the intent of the induction and/or its effect on the audience, it still works to interrupt the 
interpretive agency of the audience. A paraliptical induction would be essentially telling 
the audience how to interpret the performance (in this case politically) and would still be 
closing down the interpretive space for the audience.  
However, I don’t believe that this was the only intent behind the prologue (even if 
it was its effect) because in Jonson’s prologue to the court for the same play, he makes a 
similar appeal, albeit in a less authoritative and commanding tone. “These [the 
characters’ of the play] for your sport, without particular wrong / Or just complaint of any 
private man” (Pro. 8-9).  In this case, paralipsis seems unlikely.  Jonson would not want 
to explicitly encourage the court to interpret his comedy politically, that is, as a satire 
against the figures he is performing in front of. Like Lyly’s prologues to the court, Jonson 
would want to limit, or at least deny, the audience’s topical interpretation not encourage 
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and highlight it. This is not to say that Jonson was unwilling to criticize or satirize the 
court. He was famous, or infamous, for his willingness and desire to attack public figures. 
Rather, I mean to suggest that it’s unlikely that he would want to call attention to the 
topicality of his own work in front of the topics of his work. So even if he was 
representing the court, he could appear as if he wasn’t in order to limit the reactions of his 
audience. In other words, Jonson wants to be political, but doesn’t necessarily want a 
political interpretation and a political reaction.  And the possibility of paralipsis within 
this prologue registers this tension.  
In fact, Jonson was perfectly positioned to understand the danger such 
interpretations held for playwrights and the broader theatrical business. As discussed in 
the first chapter, in 1614, seventeen years before the first production of Bartholomew 
Fair, his play The Isle of Dogs incurred the wrath of the Privy Council for satirizing 
public officials. The play is now lost and little is known about its content, but most 
scholars agree that it was probably “a thinly veiled assault on the reputation of a high-
ranking court official [and] contained either a satire of a prominent individual or policies 
of the government.”337  We can’t know how “thinly veiled” the assault was and so cannot 
know how much interpretation was necessary to discover the object of the satire nor do 
we know what the audience’s reaction was to this interpretation.  But we do know the 
political/legal results of this particular interpretation: the Privy Council ban on all 
theatrical performance and an order to tear down all the theaters. Thus, Jonson had a 
personal and professional incentive to keep the plays from being interpreted politically. 
Or at least, he had an incentive to keep his political satire veiled. Anti-mimesis, in this 
example, becomes the technique through which Jonson can veil his satire. By creating a 
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relationship of difference with reality, he can deny that his work is connected to reality 
and so deny that it is a satire against public figures. But more than a simple denial, anti-
mimesis limits or attempts to limit the interpretive possibilities of the performance in 
order to limit the political damage this type of interpretation could do and the political 
actions that could be produced through these interpretations.  This technique is not just 
designed to provide cover after his audience interprets the play, it is designed to interrupt 
political or topical interpretation before the audience gets a chance to interpret. After all, 
his injunction not to interpret is placed at the beginning not the end of the play.   
But of course, Jonson was not the only playwright to understand the consequences 
of playgoers’ interpretations. This technique of distancing the fictional characters from 
the real characters in order to interrupt interpretations is utilized in several early modern 
plays: William Cartwright’s The Ordinary, Richard Brome’s The Weeding of the Covent 
Garden, Smith W[entworth?]’s The Hector of Germany and John Fletcher’s Rule a Wife 
and Have a Wife. 
To avoid tedious repetition, I won’t discuss each of these plays, but I will single 
out the prologue to Rule a Wife and Have a Wife because it doesn’t just attempt to 
circumvent readings of the play that focus on political or public figures; it attempts to 
distance its fictional characters from everyday real individuals.  The prologue seems 
particularly worried that the playgoers it addresses will interpret the fictional characters 
as representations of themselves.  To keep the audience from enacting this interpretation, 
the prologue attempts to bracket not only political reality from the play, but all of reality 
thereby enclosing the play in its own fictive universe (self-referentiality), which is 
separate from the playgoers’ reality. The full prologue reads,  
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Pleasure attend yee, and about yee sit 
The springs of mirth fancy delight and wit 
To stirre you up, do not your looks let fall, 
Nor to remembrance our late errors call, 
Because this day w’are Spaniards all againe, 
The story of our Play, and our Sceane Spaine: 
The errors too, doe not for this cause hate, 
 Now we present their wit and not their state. 
 Nor Ladies be not angry if you see, 
 A young fresh beauty, wanton and too free, 
 Seeke to abuse your Husband, still tis Spain, 
 No such grosse errors in your Kingdome raigne, 
 W’are Vestalls all, and though we blow the fire,  
 We seldome make it flame up to desire, 
 Take no example neither to beginne, 
 Nor some by president delight to sin: 
 Nor blame the Poet if he slip aside, 
 Sometimes lasciviously if not too wide. 
 But hold your Fannes close, and then smile at ease, 
 A cruell Sceane did never Lady please. 
 Nor Gentlemen, pray be not you displeas’d, 
 Though we present some men fool’d, some diseas’d, 
 Some drunke, some madde: we meane not you, you’r free, 
 We taxe no farther then our Comedie, 
 You are our friends, sit noble then and see (Pro. 1-25 emphasis his).338 
 
The prologue goes out of its way to assure the audience that what they are about to see is 
not a representation of England and themselves, but of Spain and Spaniards. “This day 
w’are Spaniards all againe, / The story of our Play, and our Sceane Spaine” (5-6). 
However, setting a play in another country is not necessarily an effort to distance the play 
from reality.  Indeed, many early modern playwrights set their plays in another time or 
country, but still put forth a representation of early modern London.339 For instance, The 
Duchess of Malfi is set in Malfi but still offers an account of Lady Arbelle’s life, 
dramatizes English marriage law, and represents and critiques English social classes.340 
Thus, The Duchess of Malfi is and is not a representation of England. The prologue to 
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Phineas Fletcher’s Sicelides makes this trope explicit by telling the audience that 
although the play’s subject is Sicily, the play is also very much about England:  
 Then let me here intreate your minds to see, 
 In this our England, fruitfull Sicely, 
 Their two twinne Iles; so like in soyle and frame,  
 That as two twines they’r but another same (Pro. 9-12). 
 
Here Sicily is described as an analogue of England; the tacit connection between the 
exotic setting of early modern plays and England is made explicit.341  However, unlike 
the prologue to Sicelides, John Fletcher’s prologue seems not to invite a comparison 
between two countries, but seeks to avoid comparison in order to distance the play from 
the audience’s reality. 
 The effort to avoid comparison between the two countries is made clear by the 
prologue when it twice tells the audience that because the play is about Spain, the on-
stage characters have no relationship to the audience.  In other words, the characters are 
not representations of London playgoers. The men are told, “Gentlemen, pray be not you 
displeas’d,/ Though we present some men fool’d, some diseas’d/ Some drunke, some 
madde: we mean not you, you’re free” (Pro. 21-23). And the women are told,  
Nor Ladies be not angry if you see, 
 A young fresh beauty, wanton and too free, 
 Seeke to abuse your Husband, still ‘tis Spaine, 
 No such grosse errors in your Kingdome raigne, 
 W’are Vestalls all, and though we blow the fire,  
 We seldome make it flame up to desire (Pro. 9-14). 
 
Here the prologue is (at least on the surface) discouraging the women in the audience 
from viewing the representations of women on the stage as a representation of real 
(English) women either because the characters’ “wanton and too free” attitudes may 
encourage that behavior in the playgoers or because if the women see the characters as a 
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reflection of real English women, then they may believe that such women are out to 
“abuse” their husbands.342  The prologue seems worried that the women will become 
jealous because they will believe that the female characters’ actions are representations of 
real actions, so the prologue assures the female playgoers that no such women exist in 
England; they can only be found in Spain. Thus, the women should not interpret the 
characters as a reflection of the reality that they are a part of. Setting the play in Spain 
then is portrayed within the prologue as an attempt to discourage the audience from 
viewing the play as a representation of their immediate or local reality (“your 
Kingdome”). It distances the reality the play represents from the reality of the playgoers.  
 The penultimate line of the prologue pushes this distance between the play and 
reality further than the distance between Spain and England by telling the audience, in 
effect, that the object of the play’s satire has no relationship to reality at all. The prologue 
tells the audience, “We taxe no farther then our Comedie.” Despite the prologue’s earlier 
claims that the play is about Spain, this line seems to suggest that the only characters that 
are being satirized or censured (taxed) are the fictional characters that exist within the 
fictive reality of the play. The object of the satire goes “no farther” than the boundaries of 
the fictive universe that exists on the stage. Thus, the audience cannot interpret the play 
as a comment on anything “real.” This line’s effect on the audience’s interpretive agency 
is similar to Homer’s effect on his reader; the prologue frames the play as existing within 
a fictive world that, in Auerbach’s words, “exits for itself, contains nothing but itself … 
[it] contains no teaching and no secret second meaning. [It] can be analyzed … but [it] 
cannot be interpreted.” 343  
227 
 Furthermore, the desire to control the audience, which, as I have argued, is the 
purpose of this attempt at anti-mimesis, is connected within the prologue to its effort at 
anti-mimesis. After assuring the women in the audience that the female characters of the 
play are not representations of English women, the prologue tells the audience, 
 W’are Vestalls all, and though we blow the fire,  
 We seldom make it flame up to desire, 
 Take no example neither to beginne, 
 For some by president delight to sinne (Pro. 13-16). 
 
Somewhat like the non-naturalistic stage devices described in the third chapter, this 
section of the prologue reminds the audience that they will not be watching real “young 
fresh beaut[ies], wanton and too free,” who might tempt the audience. However, unlike 
the non-naturalism of the stage, this line is not revealing the actors as actors.  The actors 
are not connected to what they represent, “wanton and too free” women, nor are they 
being connected to what they are, young boys playing the part of women. They are being 
associated with “Vestalls,” virgin characters from the distant and perhaps mythical past 
(and as we will see connecting the play to the past can also be read, in and of itself, as an 
effort at anti-mimesis). By making this association, the prologue disconnects the female 
characters from playgoers’ reality.  Furthermore, this effort at anti-mimesis seems 
designed to keep the audience from reacting to the performance. Because these 
representations are not actually “wanton” women, they should not affect the audience or 
cause playgoers to act on the basis of what they see. Indeed, the prologue also tells the 
audience that they should not view the play as an “example” or “precedent.” The play 
does not narrate real characters participating in real activities, so the play should not be 
interpreted as a representation of real actions, which could be used by the audience to 
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justify (immoral) actions.  Thus, by discouraging the audience from viewing the play as a 
mimetic work, the prologue is trying to limit the actions of the audience. 
 However, somewhat like the other stage-orations discussed in this chapter, this 
prologue is unable or perhaps unwilling to detach the play completely from reality, block 
the audience from interpreting the performance and keep them from reacting to the 
performance.  Like the induction to Bartholomew Fair, it could be deploying paralipsis. 
At the same time that the prologue discourages the audience from using the performance 
as a basis for action or from having their passions inflamed, the prologue could also be 
encouraging that behavior. That is, the prologue could be coyly suggesting to the 
audience that the play will contain racy material and hinting that although they shouldn’t 
delight in the representation of sin, they probably will thereby giving the audience tacit 
permission to respond to the performance.  Furthermore, the prologue could be 
attempting to plant the idea of a specific interpretation in the minds of the audience even 
as it attempts to distance itself from that interpretation. And even though the prologue 
assures the audience that the play will not mimetically narrate representations of English 
individuals, it could be expressing this assurance with a wink, thereby suggesting to the 
audience that they will see themselves in the characters on the stage. In fact, by 
addressing the male and female playgoers separately, the prologue could be read or acted 
as comically playing one gender off the other. The actor playing the prologue could be 
assuring the men that they are not really being portrayed on the stage, while quietly 
encouraging the women to interpret the satire against male characters as a satire against 
real men; then when the prologue addresses the women, the actor could reverse the irony: 
assuring the women and encouraging the men.  
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However, if the actor played these lines coyly, his performance would work 
against his company’s interests. As I have argued, the playwrights and players could be 
punished for inciting immoral activity. So even if the actors and playwrights wanted to 
encourage the audience to see the play as a precedent that would encourage them to 
“delight in sin,” realizing that desire (that is, producing this effect in their audience) could 
result in political and economic punishment. Thus, there exists a tension between the 
playwrights desire to excite and titillate their audience and their need to keep their 
enemies at bay. The two possible interpretations of the prologue – creating a relationship 
of difference with reality or connecting the play with reality through paralipsis – perhaps 
captures this tension between the playing companies’ desires and their needs. One can 
imagine an almost schizophrenic actor trying to accomplish both effects within his 
performance at the same time.  
 
3) Complicating the Play’s Relationship to Reality: Anti-Mimesis within Mimesis  
 
 A more subtle way that stage-orations distance the play from reality is by calling 
into question the play’s ability to represent reality.  This type of stage-oration seems 
concentrated in plays that, because of their genre, are explicitly connected to history and 
reality. City comedies, domestic tragedies and, of course, historical dramas trade in 
representations of reality. They are constitutive of a representation of history and reality 
and so are necessarily mimetic. Thus, the stage-orations cannot explicitly disconnect the 
play from reality since they are always already connected to reality.  Instead of overtly 
attempting to produce anti-mimetic plays, stage-orations within these genres tend to 
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complicate or undermine the play’s connection to reality and so create a tension between 
reality and its dramatic representation. 
  Because this technique is rather general (complicating a play’s relationship to 
reality is much less specific than framing a play as a dream), numerous early modern 
plays can be said to employ this trope. Thomas Decker’s The Whore of Babylon, John 
Day, William Rowley and George Wilken’s The Travels of the Three English Brothers, 
Thomas Hayward’s Four Prentices of London, Markham Gervase’s Herod and Antipater, 
Phillip Massinger’s The Emperor of the East, Thomas Middleton and Thomas Decker’s 
The Roaring Girl, Shakespeare’s Henry VIII and John Ford’s Perkin Warbeck all, to a 
greater or lesser extent, use the prologue to question and undermine drama’s relationship 
to reality. Again, I won’t discuss each of these plays. Instead, I will focus on The Roaring 
Girl, Henry VIII and Perkin Warbeck because they are clear (and canonical) examples of 
plays that while intrinsically mimetic, try to undermine their own mimetic qualities 
through prologues.  
The Roaring Girl is clearly mimetic in that it represents a real character, Mary 
Firth. In fact, the play makes a fairly explicit connection between the fictional character, 
Moll Cutpurse, and her real life counterpart. Moll Cutpurse was the nickname of Mary 
Firth, and so the play is essentially claiming to be a biography. Furthermore, the prologue 
ends by declaring, “her [presumably Mary Firth’s] life, our acts proclaim” (Pro. 30).344 
And it begins by suggesting that the audience knows what and who the play is about; it 
tells the audience that the play has been “(expected long)” (Pro. 1).  Furthermore, as the 
epilogue hints, Mary Firth may have taken part in some of the performances of The 
Roaring Girl (maybe even speaking the prologue), so an early modern audience clearly 
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would have known that the character Moll Cutpurse was a representation of a real 
individual.345  
However, the prologue also seems to undermine this clear connection between the 
dramatic character and the real life individual by questioning the mimetic ability of 
drama.346  After describing all the different types of “roaring girls,” the prologue states:  
 None of these roaring girls is ours: she flies 
 With wings more lofty. Thus her character lies –  
 Yet what need characters, when to give a guess, 
 Is better than the person to express? (Pro. 25-28) 
 
On one level, the prologue seems to be merely suggesting that Moll Cutpurse (or Mary 
Firth) is simply a better subject for poetic drama than all the roaring girls of London.  
Hence, the prologue uses a traditional image of poetry to describe her; she “flies with 
wings/ more lofty.”  In other words, Mary Firth (our roaring girl) is exceptional. 
However, the prologue also seems to be making a contradictory claim about the play’s 
central character; even while it defends its decision to represent on stage the real life 
Mary Firth, it also denies that its fictional character has anything to do with the real Mary 
Firth by 1) suggesting that Moll Cutpurse is not a representation of a real character, but is 
a purely fictional character that only exists within the play and 2) questioning drama’s 
ability to represent real characters. Indeed, it is able to do both at the same time.  On the 
one hand, when the prologue claims “Thus her character lies,” it is telling the audience 
where Mary Firth’s character can be located – within the poetry of the play. The play, and 
not reality, is where “her character lies.”  Therefore, the audience should not view her as 
a representation of reality because her character only really exists within the fictive world 
of the play and is constitutive of the performance of the play.  On the other hand, the 
phrase states that because her character is fictional and “flies with wings / more lofty” it 
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cannot tell the truth – it lies.347  While the former reading assures the audience that her 
character is not to be found in reality and so is claiming that she is anti-mimetic, the latter 
reading suggests that by creating a representation of Mary Firth, the play necessarily 
cannot tell the truth; it will lie about her life and so will not be a representation of 
reality.348   
The prologue goes on to question the usefulness of fictional characters that 
represent contemporary individuals, which further destabilizes the play’s ability to tell the 
truth or create a true representation of reality.  The prologue asks, “Yet what need 
characters” (Pro. 27).  In other words, why not let the real Mary Firth tell her story? 
Again, this distances the play from reality by suggesting that if the audience desires to 
know the real story, they simply ask the real individual Mary Firth, who may have been 
in the audience while the prologue was being performed or may have actually performed 
the prologue herself.  The prologue then is juxtaposing reality and the play and 
suggesting that the play is just a “guess” at what actually happened; it is not an actual 
representation of those events.   
Unlike the stage-orations to Bartholomew Fair and Rule a Wife Have a Wife, the 
prologue to The Roaring Girl does not simply deny that its characters are a representation 
of real characters because such a denial would be implausible given its subject matter. 
Instead, the play complicates and undermines its own mimetic qualities through a 
prologue that calls into question the play’s ability to represent real characters. Thus, the 
prologue is able to exert anti-mimetic energy on a play that is necessarily mimetic, 
minimizing the mimetic effect of the play. 
233 
 Like the topical play The Roaring Girl, historical drama cannot convincingly 
claim to be completely dissociated from reality. So instead of denying mimesis, 
prologues to historical drama sometimes seek to complicate the audience’s notion of 
historically mimetic drama. Two famous examples of this complication via stage-oration 
are Shakespeare’s Henry VIII and Ford’s Perkin Warbeck. The prologues to both plays 
seem to complicate their respective play’s relationship to reality by questioning historical 
drama’s ability to represent history accurately. As critics have noted, each play draws on 
theories of history and historiography that were current during their production, and in 
the mid-sixteenth and early seventeenth century, these theories began to question 
historians’ ability to represent history un-problematically. The prologues to Henry VIII 
and Perkin Warbeck seem to reference this new historiography as a way of distancing the 
history in the play from the history that the play is ostensibly representing. In other 
words, the prologues and the plays they frame seem to reference and then dramatize 
theories of historiography that call into question drama’s mimetic ability. This 
dramatization is done not only to explore history and historiography, but to interrupt the 
interpretive agency of the audience by creating an anti-mimetic play.  
Henry VIII’s prologue (reinforced by the play’s subtitle, All is True) seems to 
connect the play to historical reality by asserting that the play will be a “true” and faithful 
representation of history; however, the prologue and subtitle have long been recognized 
by critics as at least somewhat ironic. The prologue suggests the audience “may here find 
truth” (Pro. 9) and asserts that the players only want to present what is true: “To make 
that only true we now intend” (Pro. 21). Taylor suggests that “true” in this context has 
several connotations, including “an ideal of strict reliance on facts, uncolored by the 
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historian’s suppressed judgment.”349 The prologue then seems to be making a claim that 
it will stay faithful to the actual historical events – that it will be mimetic. However, as 
Howard Felperin has suggested, 
Henry VIII departs from history, that is, from Holinshed, more radically than any 
of the earlier dramas – so much so, that the subtitle of the play, “All Is True,” 
makes one wonder whether Shakespeare is not ironically hinting that we revise 
our conventional notions of historical truth, even of mimetic truth itself.350 
 
Indeed, it’s not only the mimetic claims of the prologue that cannot be taken seriously; 
the prologue’s claims of genre classification (telling the audience what kind of play to 
expect) also seem to be misleading. Matthew H. Wikander points out, following E.M.W. 
Tillyard’s analysis, that the prologue amounts to a “deliberate misdirection of the 
audience’s expectations.”351 Wikander argues,  
From its first admonition – “I come no more to make you laugh” – to its final 
challenge – “and if you can be merry then, I’ll say / A man may weep upon his 
wedding day” – the prologue disavows comedy. But Henry VIII is a joyful 
celebratory play. The “noble scenes” which will “draw the eye to flow” – 
presumably the falls of Buckingham, Katherine, and Wolsey from “mightiness” to 
“misery” – are all subsumed into the larger affirmative rhythms of the play, which 
leads triumphantly to the birth of Elizabeth and Cranmer’s rapturous prophecy.352 
 
In short, the prologue’s claims are ironic. Consequently, its claims at mimesis are actually 
subverting the play’s mimetic qualities; the play is distancing itself from reality by 
ironically claiming to be mimetic.  
 The irony of Henry VIII’s prologue and its questioning of the possibility of 
mimesis are often attributed to the changing attitudes towards history and historiography 
in early modern England.  Phyllis Rackin describes this new historiography as lacking “a 
direct, unequivocal relation with historical truth.  Alternative accounts of historical events 
and opposed interpretations of their causes and significance now threatened each other’s 
credibility.”353  All historical representations, whether they are dramatic or otherwise, 
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were understood by some early modern writers and thinkers as distanced from reality. 
Henry VIII thematizes this understanding of history.354 Thus, the prologue distances the 
play from reality by suggesting (through irony) that the history it represents is different 
from the representation of history, which constitutes the drama.  
 Ford’s Perkin Warbeck also uses the prologue to problematize the play’s 
relationship to history; it does so by questioning the compatibility of history and drama, 
an incompatibility that owes much to the new historiography of the mid sixteenth and 
early seventeenth century.  Like the prologue to Henry VIII, the prologue to Ford’s play 
initially seems as if it is making a claim of mimesis. After pointing out that historical 
drama is “out of fashion” (Pro. 2) and dismissing the more popular satiric plays, the 
prologue asserts what type of play the audience will see: 
 From him to clearer judgments we can say 
 He [the author] shows a history couched in a play, 
 A history of noble mention, known, 
 Famous, and true: most noble ‘cause our own;  
 Not forged from Italy, from France, from Spain, 
 But chronicled at home (Pro. 13-18). 
 
On the surface, the prologue seems to be making a straightforward claim of mimesis. The 
play will provide a “chronicle” of a “true” history. However, critics have repeatedly 
pointed out that the prologue and the play that the prologue introduces complicates its 
own claims of mimesis. For instance Miles Taylor argues,  
the prologue immediately controverts its own justification by declaring that 
Perkin Warbeck “shows a history couch’d in a play” (Pro. 14). History and drama, 
the prologue suggests, are manifestly separate, so that the play’s depiction of 
English history …. entails couching, literally, placing gently, one inside the other 
(Pro. 16-18).  Historical drama is now an uneasy and discordant hybrid, an 
unstable and ephemeral synthesis of antithetical modes of inquiry.355 
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These modes of inquiry are antithetical because of the new historiography which views as 
separate history and what we might call literature. Like Taylor, Wikander (whom Taylor 
draws on) asserts the prologue “acknowledges, backhandedly, the wide gulf that opened 
up, early in the seventeenth century, between historian and playwright.”356 Under the new 
historiography, “historical fact was now open to question, and historical truth was now 
debatable.”357  This meant that history could no longer be written as poetry by poets, who 
often were uninterested in producing a factual account of events but sought to impose 
morals, themes and political or religious narratives on the historical record.  Indeed, prior 
to the beginning of the sixteenth century, English writers did not make a distinction 
between poetry and history.358  As history began seeing itself as a discipline based on 
amoral facts and not on morality, poetry and history drifted apart.359 Taylor goes as far as 
to say that by the middle of the seventeenth century, “the science of history and the art of 
drama, then, begin to define themselves in contradistinction to one another.”360  By 
referencing this newly drawn line between drama and history, the prologue to Perkin 
Warbeck is able to question the play’s (or any literary representation’s) ability to 
represent historical events.   
Indeed, the play itself, as critics note, is not just a representation of the history 
found in the chronicles; it is a radical dramatic reimagining of the chronicle – a “history 
couched in a play.” Perkin’s confession is the play’s most glaring departure from the 
received chronicle. Jonas Barish observes, “All of Ford’s sources conclude the tale of 
Perkin with an account of his confession.”361 But Ford’s Perkin does not confess he is an 
imposter. This reversal of history creates, in Barish’s words, “a conflict with history” in 
that “we are not to equate the Perkin of the play with the vulgar upstart of the 
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historians.”362 By separating the historical Perkin with the literary representation of 
Perkin, the play is creating an anti-mimetic characterization of Perkin which exerts anti-
mimetic energy on the entire play. Because the representation of Perkin is unrelated to 
the historical Perkin (which, in turn, may be unrelated to the actual Perkin), the audience 
cannot be sure that any part of the play is connected to the history it pretends to 
dramatize.  
And by distancing the play from the historical reality that it is ostensibly claiming 
to represent, Perkin Warbeck is interrupting the interpretive agency of the audience so 
that the audience is left in a position where they cannot effectively interpret Perkin’s 
identity.  Or as Barish insists, “Perkin has been removed from the hands of the 
omniscient historian and vested entirely in the hands of his fallible foes. Ford himself 
studiously refuses to declare for either party in the dispute.”363  By doing so, the play is 
not simply leaving it to the audience to judge Perkin and Perkin’s identity because no 
such knowledge is possible. The audience cannot interpret his identity because it is not 
related to anything real or historical; his identity only exists within the fictional 
performance of the play (like Moll Cutpurse’s character), and the performance does not 
put forth an identity. In other words, one cannot say that since the historical Perkin was 
an imposter, the representation of Perkin is also an imposter, because the prologue has 
conditioned the audience to view the two as unrelated.  
Furthermore, because so much of the play depends upon the identity of Perkin, it 
is not only difficult to interpret his character; it is difficult to interpret the entire play.  
Because Perkin’s true identity is unknowable within the confines of the play, interpreting 
the play becomes difficult: is the play casting doubt on the legitimacy of Henry VII’s 
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monarchy and the Tudor dynasty or is it legitimizing both? In short, because the audience 
doesn’t have any interpretive ground to view Perkin, they don’t have interpretive ground 
to view Perkin Warbeck.  
Although critics like Barish, Wikander, Taylor, Felperin and Rackin have all 
shown how Perkin Warbeck and Henry VIII complicate their own relationship with 
reality, these scholars tend to see this complication as an exploration of history and 
historiography. But as I have been suggesting, Ford, Shakespeare and the other 
playwrights who use this trope were not only interested in history; they were interested in 
their audience’s playgoing experience. In other words, complicating the play’s 
relationship to reality was not done only for its own sake; it was also done to interrupt the 
interpretive agency of the audience.  
Likewise, most of the stage-orations discussed in this chapter frame the play they 
are apart of as anti-mimetic in order to limit audience interpretations even if they are 
ostensibly doing other things, such as avoiding censor. By creating a relationship of 
difference with reality, playwrights could limit the possible interpretations of their plays. 
And because, as we saw in the last chapter, audience interpretation often resulted in 
audience action, interrupting audience interpretation worked to limit audience reaction.  
In other words, just as stable performances worked to stifle audience reaction, stage-







Return to Malfi: The Secrecy of Performance and the Consequences of Constructing 
Playgoing 
“To memory hath lent / A lasting fame” John Ford, Commendatory to The Duchess of Malfi 
 
Throughout the study I have been arguing that numerous early modern plays used 
metadrama to construct playgoing with the intent of limiting audience reaction in order to 
counter anti-theatrical attacks against the theater and satisfy London magistrates concerns 
about the unruliness of playgoers. And although this was the cause, in the last instance, of 
this construction, it had other effects that, I believe, benefited the art form: the non-
naturalism of the stage, the short run of plays, performative stage utterances and 
metadrama itself all contributed to the richness and variety of the early modern stage.  
However, this construction was not a win-win situation, in which all the parties 
involved (playwrights, owners, audiences, magistrates, antitheatrical writers) got what 
they wanted.  This construction no doubt had what many might consider negative 
consequences.  One such consequence could have been audience disengagement. By 
repeatedly telling playgoers that they were not the object of performance, the playwrights 
were risking alienating their audiences and producing non-responsive playgoers as well 
as non-reactive ones. Similarly, by making it difficult to interpret performances through 
the construction of stable, anti-mimetic drama, playwrights may have created a less 
interesting playgoing experience, in which the audience was less likely to actively engage 
in the performance. For the most part, we are left to speculate on what these negative 
consequences of the early modern construction of playgoing could have been since (for 
reasons that will be suggested below) few plays seem to offer commentary on their own 
construction. Or perhaps an exploration of these negative consequences has to wait for 
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another study that looks at other types of evidence besides metadrama to discern what 
these consequences were and what the playwrights and/or audiences thought about these 
consequences.  
Still, The Duchess of Malfi deserves mention here because its metadramatic 
construction of playgoing seems to include a self-reflective critique of that construction. 
That is, its metadrama explores at least one of the consequences of the early modern 
construction of playgoing. The play seems to suggest that this construction limits or has 
the potential to limit the influence drama has on the larger culture. And it is able to do so 
because it explores almost all the aspects of playgoing that this study has traced. As a 
result, the play is more self-aware than others from the period, which seems to give it the 
ability to critique itself and its own construction of playgoing.  
Indeed, we have already seen a hint at the prodigious extent of The Duchess of 
Malfi’s contribution to the construction of playgoing. Chapters Two and Three describe 
how The Duchess of Malfi constructs stage utterances as performative and uses its inset 
audiences to position the stage audience as the non-object of the performance. But what 
has been left unexplored is the play’s contribution to the stability of performance and the 
anti-mimesis of drama – not because the play neglects these aspects of the construction of 
playgoing but because the play explores stability and anti-mimesis through different 
avenues from the plays discussed in the proceeding two chapters. Webster’s play does not 
construct performance in opposition to the instability of texts, nor does it use stage-
orations to frame the play as anti-mimetic. Rather, the play uses the concept of secrecy 
within the inset performance of the Duchess’s marriage and within a metadramatic finale 
to construct itself as distanced from the reality outside the playhouse and as stable. That 
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is, the last scene of the play describes the narrative of the play as a secret between the 
stage audience and performers, and, as I argued earlier, the Duchess’s metadramatic 
wedding is dramatized as a secret between the audience (Cariola) and the performers (the 
Duchess and Antonio).  
 By depicting performance as a secret, The Duchess of Malfi is able to 
simultaneously construct itself as both stable and anti-mimetic. Its stability is produced 
through its non-repeatability. If a play is a secret between audience and performers, then 
its content cannot be repeated outside the confines of the playhouse. Think of a secret as 
the opposite of the game telephone. During the game, a story is shared between several 
individuals and each time the story is retold, it changes.  The process of repeating or 
retelling destabilizes the original story. On the other hand, a secret does not go through 
this destabilizing process. In so far as it is only told once, it remains stable. A secret is 
also anti-mimetic in so far as it is distanced from reality. That is, a secret only really 
exists between the teller and hearer. If a secret is kept (not repeated), no one outside the 
secret will know it exists, and so the content of the secret cannot take part in the larger 
reality.  Or looked at another way, if mimetic performances reflect reality, a secret 
performance does not allow reality to reflect it. The reality outside of a secret 
performance cannot repeat, reenact or re-present the contents of the performance because 
it has no knowledge of the performance. Or put yet another way, a secret performance 
cannot influence anything outside of itself because it only really exists to the individuals 
within the performance, and they cannot repeat what they know. So a secret performance 
shares a similar ontological status with anti-mimetic performances because of its stability 
(its non-repeatability). Thus, The Duchess of Malfi is able to connect early modern 
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drama’s effort at stabilizing performances and its attempt to construct performance as 
anti-mimetic even though it does so in a slightly different way from the plays discussed 
in the preceding two chapters.  
 In fact, the play is able to connect these two elements of the construction of 
playgoing to the construction of stage utterances as performative – the other major aspect 
of playgoing discussed in this study. As illustrated in the second and third chapter, the 
Duchess’s marriage is depicted within the play both as performative and as a figure for 
stage performance. And by describing this same marriage as a secret (stable and anti-
mimetic), the play is able to dramatize a performative, stable and anti-mimetic 
performance. And as I have tried to show throughout this study, these three aspects of 
performance do not function autonomously, but form a coherent whole: a performative is 
not mimetic because it creates rather than reflects reality and is stable because it is 
difficult to interpret (it cannot be challenged) and cannot be repeated (a repeated 
performative is a constative).  So perhaps more than any other play from the period, The 
Duchess of Malfi represents and constructs the most coherent theory of performance and 
the most comprehensive construction of the playgoing experience – or at least, more than 
any other play within this study, The Duchess of Malfi is the fullest exploration of the 
construction of playgoing that this study traces.  
 However, the totality of The Duchess of Malfi’s contribution to the construction 
of playgoing is only really recognizable after the broader construction of playgoing is 
clear. That is, once it is understood that early modern stage-orations made a concerted 
effort to distance drama from reality and that playwrights contrasted performance with 
texts to stabilize performance, then the finale of the play and the Duchess’s secret 
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marriage can be understood as contributing to and drawing on these broader early modern 
trends. In other words, the previous two chapters of this study allow us to explore the 
totality of Webster’s construction of playgoing.  
By producing this totality, The Duchess of Malfi is able to reflect on itself and 
explore its own construction’s consequences. The play seems to suggest that this 
construction limits or minimizes drama’s influence on the larger culture. If performance 
is able to create institutional reality but this reality only exists as a non-repeatable secret 
within the confines of the theater, then it cannot (at least theoretically) influence the 
reality outside the theater. Within this construction, performance becomes self-
reflectively influential – it can only influence or affect itself.  A kept secret, then, is a 
suggestive figure for this form of influence; a secret may be powerful (like a play that 
creates institutions), but it is only powerful to those that know it (like an audience 
watching an anti-mimetic, stable play).  Casting the play as a secret allows the play to 
fully explore the coherence of the early modern construction of playgoing and its 
limitations. 
 
I: The Metadramatic Finale  
 
 The Duchess of Malfi does not contain a stage-oration, but because the final scene 
of the play is highly metadramatic, it functions like an epilogue – it frames the play for 
the audience.  Because the finale of the play consistently refers to itself, the scene is 
describing to the audience what they just saw. And this metadramatic pseudo-epilogue 
encourages the audience to forget what they just saw so that they will not repeat the 
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content of the performance. The play is, then, framed as a secret (though this is not the 
term the finale uses) in so far as the scene is asking the audience to not repeat what they 
just saw and heard. 
For instance, the play’s complex final speech seems to encourage the audience to 
wipe away any memory of the story of the play.  Delio ends the play by declaring,  
Let us make noble use 
Of this great ruin; and join all our force 
To establish this young, hopeful gentleman  
In’s mother’s right.  These wretched eminent things 
 Leave no more fame behind ‘em than should one 
 Fall in a frost, and leave his print in snow; 
 As soon as the sun shines, it ever melts, 
 Both form, and matter: – I have ever thought  
 Nature doth nothing so great, for great men, 
 As when she’s pleas’d to make them lords of truth: 
 Integrity of life is fame’s best friend, 
 Which nobly, beyond death, shall crown the end (5.5.110-121).364 
 
On one level, Delio seeks to put the whole affair of the play behind him by establishing 
the Duchess’s son, “this hopeful gentleman,” as the next duke, but he goes further than 
merely producing an heir and providing a tidy end to the play; he also wants to erase any 
trace of the story. When Delio asserts that “These wretched eminent things / Leave no 
more fame behind ‘em than … [a] print in snow,” he may be referring to the Cardinal, 
Ferdinand, Bosola and Antonio, who all lie dead on the stage, and so he is simply 
asserting that these individuals did nothing to deserve “fame” or lasting recognition.   
However, the line is ambiguous, strategically vague and, I argue, metadramatic. Because 
the word “things” in the sentence can refer to persons, the subject of the sentence could 
be the dead characters, but the vagueness of “things” encompasses more than persons; it 
also suggests events and deeds. Thus, the subject of the sentence is not just the “wretched 
eminent” characters, but the events of the entire narrative the characters inhabited and 
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produced – the play itself. Furthermore, the object of the sentence, “fame,” does not just 
refer to lasting recognition of good deeds; in the seventeenth century “fame” could also 
mean public knowledge without the connotation of favorable public knowledge or 
positive reputation.365 This definition of fame helps explain why Antonio’s body is on the 
stage during this speech. If “fame” only signified a positive reputation, then Delio’s 
speech would seem to be linking Antonio with Bosola and the brothers and asserting that 
none of these individuals did anything that merits a positive reputation. This would be an 
unlikely indictment of Antonio by his best friend.  But since “fame” is neutral here, Delio 
is suggesting that all the characters’ actions, good or bad, should be forgotten. In other 
words, the line is not only saying that the evil deeds committed by the characters should 
be forgotten, but that all the events of the play (“these wretched eminent things”) should 
leave no trace and should not become public knowledge (“leave no more fame behind”). 
In short, Delio is asking his audience (both the inset and playhouse audience) to not 
repeat the story outside the playhouse. 
And by describing the plot of the story as footsteps in frost, Delio provides a 
rationale for why the story will not produce public knowledge. A story told through a 
performance is ephemeral; it only really exists within the confines of the playhouse when 
it is being told. After the performance is completed – after the speech Delio is giving is 
finished – the story fades away like footsteps in frost.  In other words, Delio is 
commenting on the ontological status of performance. It is real, but only real within the 
immediacy of its production. Once the production is over, the reality fades away. The 
ontological status Delio is giving to performance within this speech brackets the 
performance from the reality outside the playhouse. Because the reality of the production 
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only exists within the playhouse, it is always separate from the reality outside the 
playhouse. The effect of this bracketing is similar to the anti-mimetic stage-orations 
discussed in the previous chapter. The reality of the play is being distanced from the 
reality outside the play, and he is accomplishing this anti-mimetic effect by encouraging 
the audience to keep the play a secret. 
The last sentence of Delio’s speech furthers this bracketing by describing the play 
as a self-enclosed entity that does not refer or interact with any reality outside itself. 
Delio ends the play by stating, “Integrity of life is fame’s best friend, / which nobly, 
beyond death, shall crown the end” (5.5.120-121). Again, the line is partially referring to 
the reputation of the characters.  Fame is produced through integrity or moral soundness, 
and since some of the characters’ lives lacked integrity, their lives did not produce fame.   
However, since this is the final sentence of the play, integrity also seems to imply the 
completeness or wholeness of the play itself. That is, the sentence is ending the play 
(hence, the last phrase of the sentence is “the end”) by describing what the end of the play 
is doing to the play.  It gives the play integrity or wholeness.  Furthermore, this sentence 
seems to suggest that this integrity or wholeness does not produce anything beyond itself.  
Indeed, the phrase “integrity of life is fame’s best friend” can be read somewhat 
ironically given that Delio just stated his desire for the actions of the play to produce no 
fame – no public knowledge. It is precisely because life has integrity that it is fame’s best 
friend. The wholeness of life is best friends with fame because fame or public knowledge 
is not desirable, and when life is complete and self-enclosed, knowledge of that life does 
not become public. Indeed, Delio asserts that even “after death” the completeness of life 
stops fame. Likewise, the end of the play, which is marked by this last sentence, also 
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gives the play integrity by completing it. So after the end of the play (the play’s death), 
public knowledge of the play will not be produced. The final sentence of the play seems 
to be ending more than just the play. It attempts to end any repetitions of the play, and it 
does so by enclosing the play within its own completeness, thereby bracketing the play 
from the reality outside the playhouse. 
Delio’s desire to wipe away any trace of the characters’ lives is reinforced by 
Bosola’s death speech, which also expresses a desire to limit public knowledge of the 
characters’ deeds.  Indeed, the metadramatic quality of Delio’s speech is emplaced by 
Bosola’s explicitly metadramatic final speech, which is spoken moments before Delio’s.  
Bosola describes Antoino’s death to Malateste in terms that would be self-reflectively 
comic (a metadramatic wink at the audience) if they occurred in a different context. He 
responds to Malateste’s query about Antonio’s death by stating, “In a mist: I know not 
how – / Such a mistake as I have often seen / In a play:” (5.5.94-96).  Bosola’s self-
referentiality is reminding the audience they are watching a play and so closing the play 
off from the rest of reality – creating the integrity that Delio seeks in his final speech.  
Bosola’s next lines associate the effects of this self-referentiality with a lack of public 
knowledge and secrecy: “We are only like dead walls, or vaulted graves, / That, ruin’d, 
yields no echo:” (5.5.97-98). He claims that the characters’ lives will not produce an 
echo; they will not be repeated. In other words, their story will not be retold. Like Delio, 
Bosola is attempting to keep the events of the play a secret.  
 The Cardinal’s last words similarly ask his audience to not repeat his story. “And 
now, I pray, let me / Be laid by, and never thought of” (5.5.89-90). The Cardinal here is 
trying to keep his actions a secret by asking those who know him not to think of him after 
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he is dead. He doesn’t want his life repeated through memory. Of course, the Cardinal 
has good reason to ask those present at his death to forget him; his actions are almost 
always reprehensible, and so his final words could be read as a deathbed conversion: the 
Cardinal simply does not want his evil actions to be remembered because he now sees the 
folly of his ways.  However, the phrasing of this deathbed conversion recalls and 
reinforces Delio’s and Bosola’s speeches; the Cardinal is depicting his own life as an 
event that should be forgotten so that it will not be repeated and will not produce public 
knowledge. 
 By framing the play this way, these characters’ final speeches attempt to construct 
the play as a stable and anti-mimetic performance, a performance that should not be 
repeated and is disconnected from the reality outside the playhouse. And as we will see, 
the play is able to achieve a similar effect within the Duchess’s secret metadramatic 
marriage.  
 
II: The Finale’s Double  
 
The Duchess’s marriage is described in similar terms as the play itself is 
described within the metadramatic finale. The ideas of echo, reputation and fame are used 
within the description of the metadramatic marriage to reflect the stable and anti-mimetic 
nature of performance. Thus, the metadramatic finale of the play doubles the performance 
of the Duchess’s marriage. Both are portrayed as secrets and both are described in similar 
terms. This doubling retroactively constructs the marriage as metadramatic; since the 
finale describes the play as a secret, the secrecy of the marriage within the play takes on 
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metadramatic qualities. Conversely, the doubling sets up the  finale as able to construct 
the play’s audience; because the marriage is a secret between the performers (the 
Duchess and Antonio) and witness (Cariola), the marriage’s double, the finale, can depict 
the play as a secret between the performers (actors) and witnesses (stage audience).  In 
other words, each piece of metadrama reinforces the other.  
 Beyond providing the play with a metadramatic construction of playgoing, the 
Duchess’s secret marriage also enables the play to explore some of the problems with this 
construction. That is, the problems associated with Duchess’s secret are also, as we will 
see, problems with the construction of performance as secret. And as previously 
suggested, this construction is connected to the construction of playgoing traced 
throughout this study, so the Duchess’s problems reflect problems with that broader early 
modern construction of playgoing.  
For instance, one of the most difficult problems the Duchess faces is how to 
maintain the secrecy of her marriage while also maintaining her reputation as a chaste 
female; her marriage must remain a secret, but it must also be made public, or she will be 
considered unchaste. Her reputation or fame becomes increasingly important as rumors 
start to circulate about her relationship with Antonio and the existence of her children. 
Ferdinand asserts that the Duchess has become “a notorious strumpet” and that “Rogues 
do not whisper’t now, but seek to publish’t” (2.5.4; 2.5.5). And Antonio admits, “The 
common rabble do directly say / she is a strumpet” (3.1.25-26). Public knowledge of the 
Duchess already exists, but exists outside the reality that was constructed through her 
marriage.  Within the secret reality she constructed through her performance/marriage, 
she is a married widow, but outside that secret reality, she is an unmarried “strumpet.” In 
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order to save her reputation, she needs to change her secret reality into a public reality by 
allowing knowledge of her secret reality to become public. In short, she needs to tell her 
secret. But she cannot do so because of her brothers’ injunction not to marry. Thus, there 
exists a contradiction between her desire for a secret and her desire for a positive 
reputation. The Duchess’s comment after the marriage describe this problem: “We now 
are man and wife, and ‘tis the church / That must but echo this” (1.1.492-493). Here the 
Duchess seems to want an echo, a repetition of her performance, but this is exactly what 
she can’t have. To create an echo would destroy the secrecy of her marriage. A repetition 
of her marriage would publish it to the world outside the confines of the performance.  
Indeed, the Duchess’s desire for an echo is the exact opposite of the desire for an 
echoless performance expressed by Bosola when he describes himself and the other 
characters as “dead walls” that “yields no echo” (5.5.97; 98). But because the Duchess 
can’t have this echo, her marriage is actually being portrayed in the same way the finale 
constructs the performance of the play, as an echoless or non-repeatable performance. 
Thus, the performance of the play is subject to the same dilemma that the Duchess faces: 
because the performance only exists as a non-repeatable secret within the playhouse, its 
content cannot become public knowledge; it remains a complete whole (it has integrity) 
that cannot influence anything outside itself.  
The problems associated with a secret performance are further explored within 
her conversation with Ferdinand. After he discovers her marriage, she tries to reassure 
Ferdinand that her “reputation / is safe” (3.2.118-119).   Ferdinand then rightly points out 
that she cannot have her cake and eat it too; she cannot have a secret marriage and a safe 
reputation since reputation relies on a public recounting and a public reality, not a secret 
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performance and a secret reality. He explicates her situation by allegorically declaring, 
“and so, for you: / You have shook hands with Reputation, / And made him invisible” 
(3.2.133-135). On the one hand, he merely asserts that she has said goodbye to reputation 
and so can no longer see him. However, invisible does not quite mean that Reputation is 
gone; it implies that Reputation cannot be seen, and of course a handshake does not 
always signify a departure; it often designates an agreement. Furthermore, the 
coordinating conjunction “and” does not necessarily denote a causal relationship between 
the two events. So the lines can also be read as “you shook hands with Reputation (you 
are linking yourself with Reputation) and made it invisible (tried to keep your reputation 
a secret).”  Ferdinand’s allegory describes the impossibility of the Duchess’s situation – 
she cannot have a secret marriage and have that marriage be the basis of her reputation 
because a reputation built on nothing but a secret performance is not really a reputation; a 
reputation needs a repetition of the performance in order to move that performance 
outside of itself. This is very thing that the Duchess cannot afford to do. Note also, 
Ferdinand does not disagree with the Duchess’s claim that she is married. When she tells 
him that she has married, he simply says, “so” (3.2.82). The secretly performed marriage 
did indeed produce reality (a real institution), but the marriage’s secret reality is the 
problem because a secret reality cannot produce a reputation.  
This tension between reputation and secrecy is also present when the Duchess 
ponders the possible influence that her performance/marriage might have on others 
outside the confines of the performance.  As described in the third chapter, the Duchess 
seems uncomfortable with the potential power and influence of her marriage. On the one 
hand, she seems to find comfort in Bosola’s description of her marriage as a model for 
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others; she likes the idea that her marriage will influence the institution of marriage. On 
the other hand, she still wants to keep her marriage a secret. So she tells Bosola, “As I 
taste comfort in this friendly speech, / So would I find concealment” (3.3.299-300). The 
Duchess’s conflicting descriptions of her own marriage also reflect this dilemma. She 
responds to Antonio’s request for sex with “I hope in time ‘twill grow into a custom / 
That noblemen shall come with cap and knee, / To purchase a night’s lodging of their 
wives” (3.2.4-6). But she later tells her brother that she does not want to create a new 
custom, “I have not gone about, in this [her marriage to Antonio], to create / Any new 
world, or custom (3.2.110-111). She seems to understand that keeping her marriage a 
secret will deny it a certain power, but she also understands that allowing it to become 
public may have a radical effect on the institution of marriage.   
In the end, the Duchess’s problem, which stems from her inability to produce a 
reputation through an anti-mimetic (secret) and stable (non-repeatable) performance, is 
also a problem of early modern drama’s self construction of performance and playgoing. 
Throughout the study I have attempted to show that the plays, playwrights and playing 
companies worked hard to construct performance as performative, stable, and anti-
mimetic in order to control unruly playgoers by putting the audience in a position where 
they were not the object of the performance and where they could not fully and freely 
interpret the performance and act on the basis of that interpretation.  However, as the 
Duchess finds out through her own performance, this theoretical understanding of 
performance has consequences and drawbacks. If performance is performative and 
produces a stable institutional reality, which is separate from the reality outside the 
playhouse and cannot be repeated or recounted outside the playhouse, then the content of 
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that performance cannot move outside the playhouse and so will have limited influence. 
It may be able to construct an institutional reality, but this reality remains a secret 
between performers and audience because only the audience has access to the constructed 
reality.  
This may seem like a fairly serious drawback, but apparently for some early 
modern playwrights, it was worth sacrificing widespread fame and influence for a chance 
to control the playgoers and ensure that the playhouses remained open and their 
livelihood remained intact. Just like the Duchess, the playwrights were apparently willing 
to sacrifice fame for survival.  
 
III: Malfi v. Denmark: The Cohesion of Difference 
  
 The Duchess of Malfi’s ability to grasp the consequences and contradictions of the 
early modern construction of playgoing are perhaps the result of its grasp on the totality 
of this construction. As I argued in the first chapter, most early modern plays only 
dramatize some of the effects of the non-responsive playgoer and rarely explore the 
relationship between these effects, which suggest that they don’t fully grasp the cause. 
Thus, they are not in a position to comment upon the consequences of the non-reactive 
playgoer because the totality of that construction is not fully realized in their plays. To 
my knowledge, Webster’s play is unique in its ability both to dramatize the effects and 
the relationship between the effects, which in turn may suggest a grasp the cause. The 
only other play that I am aware of that comes close is Hamlet. But as previously 
suggested, Shakespeare’s play posits an active playgoer, not a non-reactive one, so 
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Hamlet dramatizes the effects of this active playgoer. Significantly, the effects of the 
active playgoer are the inverse of the effects of the non-reactive playgoer. While The 
Duchess of Malfi attempts to produce a non-reactive playgoer by constructing 
performance as performative, stable and anti-mimetic, Hamlet attempts to produce an 
active playgoer by constructing performance as rhetorical, unstable and mimetic. The 
coherence of the differences between these two plays brings into focus the purpose (or 
cause) of these different theories of performance – to produce a non-reactive or active 
playgoing experience.  In fact, these plays are so cohesively different that it is likely 
Webster is, at least partially, reacting to Shakespeare’s view of performance and 
playgoing, which was produced over a decade before The Duchess of Malfi.  In other 
words, Webster is countering Shakespeare’s coherent attempt to produce an active 
playgoer with his own coherent attempt to produce a non-reactive playgoer.  
 For instance, the Cardinal’s final words, “I pray, let me / Be laid by, and never 
thought of” (5.5.89-90) invert Hamlet’s more famous death speech:  
 If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart, 
 Absent thee from felicity a while, 
 And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain 
 To tell my story (5.2.288-291). 
 
While the Cardinal doesn’t want his story to live on after him, Hamlet attempts to assure 
his story’s survival. And although these speeches seek to achieve opposite ends, they are 
both metadramatic and so have similar subjects.  The Cardinal’s last words, when read 
alongside Delio’s and Bosola’s speeches, seem to refer to the entirety of the narrative of 
the play and not only to his own life. Likewise, Hamlet’s death speech seems 
metadramatic when read alongside Fortinbras’s and Horatio’s instructions for how 
Hamlet’s request is to be carried out. Fortinbras asks for an audience to hear the story, 
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“Let us haste to hear it, / And call the noblest to the audience” (5.2.330-331). And 
Horatio asks that Hamlet’s body be brought “like a soldier to the stage” (5.5.340) and that 
the other bodies “High on a stage be placed to the view; / And let me speak to th’yet 
unknowing world/ How these things came about” (5.2.322-324). Horatio then describes 
what the “unknowing world” will learn by essentially summarizing the plot of the play in 
generalized terms (5.2.325-329). Thus, Fortinbras and Horatio are essentially promising 
to repeat (with dead bodies) the performance that the audience just saw in order to make 
the story public. While Webster’s characters seek to keep the story a secret and wipe 
away any trace of it, Shakespeare’s characters pledge to repeat the performance to tell as 
many people as possible what happened. While Hamlet moves outward beyond the 
confines of the play into the “unknowing world,” The Duchess of Malfi moves inward: it 
closes off the play from the outside world, thereby keeping that world unknowing and 
creating a stable, anti-mimetic performance.  
It is perhaps not coincidental that both plays seem to have got their wish: 
Hamlet’s story has been told much more often than the Duchess’s. At least in relation to 
Hamlet, The Duchess of Malfi has remained a secret and left “no more fame behind.” 
Conversely, Hamlet’s story is so famous that the “unknowing world” that Horatio 
references almost doesn’t exist anymore; the world knows Hamlet’s story.  In other 
words, both constructions of playgoing seem to have succeeded.  Of course it would be 
folly to argue that these two plays’ self-constructions are the only reason for their 
different levels of fame. However, this apparent correlation (even if it is only a 
coincidence) between each play’s self-construction and its historical reputation suggests 
the consequences of the early modern construction of playgoing that Webster’s play 
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highlights: if plays construct themselves as performative, stable and anti-mimetic, then 
they run the risk of limiting their own influence.  
 In any case, Hamlet’s inset performance, The Murder of Gonzago, furthers the 
construction of playgoing produced through the metadramatic finale. Like The Duchess 
of Malfi, the finale of Hamlet is doubled within its inset performance, but unlike the 
Duchess’s marriage, the play Hamlet stages is meant not to keep a secret, but to expose a 
secret – Claudius’s murder of Hamlet’s father. That is, the inset play is meant to tell and 
make public Claudius’s story, just as the play Hamlet is meant to tell and make public 
Hamlet’s story. Both of these two metadramatic scenes are attempting to create public 
knowledge out of their performances, and both are decidedly not keeping their own 
performances secret.   
 Furthermore, in opposition to The Duchess of Malfi’s inset performance and the 
larger construction of drama’s relationship to reality discussed in the previous chapter, 
Hamlet’s inset performance is mimetic. It is a representation of real events (at least real in 
the fictive reality of the play) – the murder of Hamlet’s father. If this inset performance is 
a double of the stage performance of Hamlet, then Hamlet too is being constructed as 
mimetic. Just as The Duchess of Malfi is portrayed as anti-mimetic through its 
construction of itself as a secret, Hamlet is portrayed as mimetic within an inset 
performance that is not a secret; by mimicking a real event, the performance creates 
public knowledge of that event.    
 Significantly, this mimetic, non-secretive inset performance affects the audience 
and elicits a response from them. As pointed out in the second chapter, the purpose of 
Hamlet’s inset performance is to influence the audience.  The play is designed to “catch 
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the conscience of the king” (2.2.582). The play is rhetorical rather than performative in 
that its object is the audience and not institutional reality. And as we saw in the last two 
chapters, the play’s ability to affect the audience (Claudius) is not unrelated to its 
mimetic and non-secretive (or repeatable and therefore unstable) nature. Because the 
inset play is mimetic and unstable, it can be interpreted by Claudius as a comment on 
himself (which is its intent), and because Claudius actively interprets the performance, he 
reacts to the performance: he rises and is, in Hamlet’s words, “frighted with false fire.” 
(3.2.244). On the other hand, because The Duchess of Malfi is portrayed as a secret and 
therefore as stable and anti-mimetic, it is not intended to be interpreted by the audience or 
lead the audience to act on the basis of that interpretation.  Indeed, as shown in the 
second and third chapter, Cariola (the inset audience in Webster’s play), unlike Claudius, 
does not act or react on the basis of the inset performance she watches.  
In sum, there is an oppositional coherence between the two plays’ construction of 
audience and performance: while Hamlet depicts performance as rhetorical, unstable and 
mimetic and the audience as active and affected, The Duchess of Malfi depicts 
performance as performative, stable and anti-mimetic and the audience as non-reactive 
and unaffected. The contrast between these two plays then suggests what I have been 
suggesting throughout, that there is a causal relationship between performative stage 
utterances, stable performances, anti-mimetic drama and the non-reaction of the 
audience. And because, as I have been arguing, The Duchess of Malfi’s construction of 
playgoing (and not Hamlet’s) is representative of the broader early modern construction 
of playgoing, this broader construction is also participating in this causal relationship. 
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Early modern playwrights’ construction of playgoing is designed to keep the audience 
from reacting to stage performances.  
 
IV: Concluding Remarks: The Creativity of Economic Determinism 
 
Despite the complications, consequences and drawbacks of the construction of 
playgoing that The Duchess of Malfi explores, this construction of the non-reactive 
playgoer was surprisingly productive, surprising because its productivity springs from 
political and economic restrictions. The non-reactive playgoer was produced by the 
economic and political pressure that the playwrights faced, and by constructing the non-
reactive playgoer, playwrights were able to produce innovated, creative and experimental 
ideas about dramatic production and performance.    
As I argued in chapters two and three, by trying to make the audience the non-
object of performance, they were forced to reorient the efficacy of their performances 
away from the audience and towards institutional reality.  This is in some ways a more 
ambitious model than the affective theory of performance that thinkers from Aristotle on 
down posited. Playwrights produced a theory of performance that could directly affect 
the broader culture, so they could work for social change (or conversely social stasis) 
without worrying about how their ideas were going to be disseminated or appropriated by 
the audience. In the end, this may have been an unworkable model since the audience is 
always a part of the construction of meaning; nevertheless, the model served the 
playwrights well in that it encouraged them to engage in an ambitious project of 
institutional construction. Their plays attempted to redefine marriage, the monarchy, 
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social classes and the state, while reworking the efficacy of performance. In other words, 
by redefining the stage, they were able to redefine early modern institutions. And in 
chapter three, I argued that the non-naturalism of the stage was also caused by this need 
to control the audience. They experimented with the representational nature of the stage 
to keep the audience from becoming too immersed in their performances. This type of 
experimentation would not really continue until the twentieth century with playwrights 
like Brecht and Ionesco. In fact, Brecht was highly influenced by early modern 
playwrights’ non-naturalism, so his epic theater may not have been possible without the 
early modern construction of playgoing. Furthermore, as I argued in the fourth chapter, 
playwrights’ attempt to stabilize performance led the playwrights and playing companies 
to limit the run of their plays. And the short run of plays contributed to the novelty and 
diversity of early modern drama. Finally, playwrights’ construction of drama as anti-
mimetic contributed to playwrights’ exploration of their plays’ use of history and 
inquiries into the ability of representational art to fully imitate reality. 
Of course, it is difficult to argue that none of these aspects of early modern drama 
would have been possible without the economic need of the non-reactive playgoer, but if 
I am right, they do seem to have been at least partially determined in the last instance by 
the economic conditions of the early modern stage.  
That these restraints actually benefited playwrights’ art seems to be at odds with 
our own twenty-first century perspective on freedom and creativity. That is, within the 
modern liberal tradition, we have a tendency to understand personal freedom and 
productivity as causally linked. The less economic, cultural or governmental restraints 
that are placed on the individual, the more likely he or she is to produce. The political 
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right tends to frame this issue in terms of government restriction on the free market: the 
less government interferes with the individual’s economic freedom (through taxes or 
government regulations), the more likely individuals are to innovate. But the left is just as 
likely to rely on this premise when speaking of artistic freedom or personal expression: 
the individual should not be censored by the government or by societal conventions 
because these types of restraints impede individual creativity.  
However, as I have attempted to show, the restraints placed on early modern 
dramatists did not impede their creativity. These playwrights had to contend, by twenty-
first century western standards, with some fairly serious restraints to their artistic 
freedom, and yet they produced some of the most creative and innovative pieces of 
literary art in western history. And as I have been suggesting throughout, pace the 
modern liberal tradition which connects freedom to productivity, the innovations and 
creativity of early modern drama are not unrelated to the restraints placed on the 
playwrights. Playwrights didn’t produce in spite of these restraints; they produced 
because of these restraints.  
Of course, I don’t mean to suggest that we should start imprisoning artists and 
commissioning censorship bureaucrats like the Master of Revels in the hopes that twenty-
first century literature could become as creative as early modern drama, as if there is 
anything wrong with contemporary literature or as if we enjoy too much freedom.  
Rather, I am suggesting, somewhat like Stanley Fish’s argument in There’s No Such 
Thing as Free Speech: And It’s a Good Thing, Too, that restraints on freedom always and 
everywhere exist.366  But while Fish locates these restraints within the rules that govern 
language, interpretation and culture, I am suggesting that these restraints are embedded 
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within the material world. In the case of early modern literature, the playwrights’ 
relationship to their economic situation determined or, less radically, influenced much of 
their art.367  Without the unruly audiences and the economic need to control them, it’s 
likely that (what we have come to know as) early modern drama would have looked quite 
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